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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The founding of the Republic of Liberia in 1847 was a crowning achievement for African 
Americans. Forty-three years after Haiti’s independence, Liberia became only the second nation 
governed exclusively by freed blacks. In nineteenth-century terms, it was “a Negro nationality” 
on equal diplomatic footing as such international powers as France, Great Britain, and the United 
States.  
Liberia rose from inauspicious beginnings. Beginning in the 1820s an eclectic collection 
of African Americans emigrated from the United States back to their ancestral homeland of 
Africa. Without official government sponsorship, they established a tiny outpost in West Africa. 
Being descendants of African slaves shipped to North America, the emigrants had to rebuild 
their lives in an unfamiliar land, one that they knew only from secondhand stories passed down 
from generation to generation. The early years as a colony were brutal. Death, disease, financial 
hardship, sociocultural ruptures, and warfare with natives conspired to limit the number of 
emigrants to Liberia. They also faced opposition from blacks in America, who feared leaving 
would weaken the abolitionist movement while bolstering white arguments that free blacks did 
not belong in the United States. Despite the dearth of domestic and governmental support, 
emigrants received much needed financial assistance from a private philanthropic organization, 
the American Colonization Society. Through the generosity of white colonizationists, black 
colonists were able to get on their feet, figuratively and literally, during their first year in Africa. 
Prominent Liberian leaders would credit the economic aid as crucial to their early existence as a 
colony. 
In time, Liberia’s colonists felt the need to direct their own future. The stated goal had 
always been to create a land of liberty for African Americans, who suffered from discrimination 
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and enslavement in antebellum America. Part of building a Negro nationality meant self-
governance, and Liberians were determined to rule themselves. With the blessing of the 
American Colonization Society, they began to assert their authority in several areas: in politics, 
economics, education, and religion. In 1841 Joseph Jenkins Roberts became the first black 
colonial governor. Liberian merchants built shipping networks, whose trade deals reached six 
figures by decade’s end. In 1862 Liberians celebrated the opening of the country’s first 
institution of higher education in the capital of Monrovia. And black missionaries pioneered 
native schools and churches at the frontier edges, leading to the appointment of Samuel Ferguson 
as the first black Episcopalian missionary bishop in 1884. 
Liberia’s national progress, however, was anything but a straight line. Boundary disputes 
with France’s and Great Britain’s African colonies created diplomatic crises that threatened to 
explode into open warfare (and certain defeat) for Liberia. Squeezed by the territorial demands 
of these two traditional powers, Liberia had to thread the needle between autonomy and 
subservience. Furthermore, Liberia experienced testy relations with the indigenous populations 
within its borders. From the start of emigration, African Americans had proclaimed one of their 
priorities to be evangelizing “heathen” natives, who lacked the salvific benefits of the Christian 
gospel. But competition for land and resources marred prospects for a mutually advantageous 
relationship. Many aborigines viewed Liberians as faithless intruders whose actions failed to live 
up to their lofty ideals. The challenge for Liberia was in figuring how to motivate, incorporate, or 
intimidate natives into a cohesive alliance. Finally, Liberia had to address the internal factions in 
its own community. Divisions arose over differences between class, color, and cultural 
orientation (whether to be Western-leaning or African-focused). Affecting all these relationships 
was the need to keep white colonizationist benefactors happy. Although no longer the 
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acknowledged head after 1847, the ACS still exerted influence by virtue of its continued 
bankrolling of Liberian leaders and institutions. Despite Liberia’s independence, white 
colonizationists were important stakeholders who had to be consulted and appeased. 
The question for Liberia was how to unite and subsume these disparate parties under a 
single identity while fending off international competitors. Without the largesse of another 
country like the United States, Liberia owned little economic clout with which to impress and 
influence. What it did have, though, was the progressive promise of three instrumental ideas—
that of commerce, civilization, and Christianity. Commerce, specifically the notion of free trade, 
would woo people with the potential of financial prosperity through unfettered access to new 
markets. This possibility was especially attractive to natives, whose economies were generally 
more subsistent and localized than what their Liberian counterparts envisioned for themselves. 
Civilization was an elastic concept that encompassed the tangible results that would derive from 
education, government, and values formation. Education provided literacy and mathematics, both 
vital to conducting business with Western traders. Government, or agreeing to representative 
republicanism, would give participants a voice in how their affairs were conducted and defended, 
at least in theory. Security from enemies was the primary reason to adhere oneself to the 
government in Monrovia, and it resulted in the formation of both the country and “civilized 
settlements” of native allies. Christianity was the last spoke in the wheel of progress and 
represented not just the gospel of Christ but also an entire value system derivative of the way 
African Americans practiced Western religion in the nineteenth century.  
This dissertation examines how Liberians utilized commerce, civilization, and 
Christianity in their attempt to build a national identity in the first five decades after 
independence. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
“Africa for the African race, and black men to rule them”: 
Conceptualizing Emigration in the Mid-Nineteenth Century 
 
 
 The emigration of African Americans to Liberia served as a forum in which to work out 
definitions of citizenship. Paul Gilroy provides a useful starting point in thinking about the issue 
when he outlines three phases of the “Black Radical Tradition.”1 The struggle for emancipation 
(e.g. antislavery), rights (e.g. political action), and an autonomous space (e.g. “nationality” 
separatism)—these boundaries delineate the traditional concerns of slaves, free blacks, and 
emigrationists. The fight for “rights” raises a pertinent question: how did African Americans 
conceive equality? Rebecca Scott argues that in Cuba and the postbellum South, suffrage acted 
as the psychological hallmark of citizenship.
2
 This idea of equality as being primarily political is 
interesting, insofar as an emphasis on suffrage was downplayed in the rationale of leading 
emigrationists—Martin Delany, Edward Blyden, and Alexander Crummell—who desired to 
leave the United States during the nineteenth century. To be sure, this trio criticized their 
inability to participate in the political process, but they differed in their main reasons for leaving, 
particularly in their abstract formulations for emigration. Delany rooted his reasons in Masonic 
doctrine, Blyden relied on his belief in racial instincts, and Alexander Crummell structured his 
case around hierarchal “civilizationism.” 
                                                          
1
 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), 122. 
2
 Rebecca J. Scott, Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press/Harvard University Press, 2005), 189-207. 
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C. L. R. James attributes material concerns as the primary motivation for domestic 
migration during World War I.
3
 Subsequent historians, most notably Edwin Redkey, have 
reached a similar conclusion in studying the emigration movement during the last three decades 
of the nineteenth century, namely that material concerns drove these emigrationists more than 
any real commitment to a mystical nationhood.
4
 No doubt economic deprivation pushed the 
group Michele Mitchell describes as the “working poor” to clamor for another alternative to the 
American South with its sharecropping and crop lien systems.
5
 The crumbling of Reconstruction 
prompted a flurry of urgent missives to the American Colonization Society from impoverished 
black laborers desperate to escape crushing debt and lethal violence. Yet though dreaming of 
improving their material lot, members of the “working poor” also presented a host of other 
reasons for yearning to flee the country. By wishing to go to his “natif land,” Jeremiah Jenkins 
intimates his lost sense of belonging, in that he regards himself as an outsider and alien outside 
of Africa, a place he had almost surely never visited.
6
 Likewise, in describing Africa as 
“Heaven” and “Home,” John Wilkins implies that he currently dwelled in hell, a sojourning saint 
tormented by those considerably less worthy than he.
7
 The letters in the American Colonization 
                                                          
3
 C. L. R. James, A History of Pan-African Revolt [1938/1969] (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr Publishing Co., 
1995), 97. 
4
 See Edwin S. Redkey, Black Exodus: Black Nationalist and Back-to-Africa Movements, 1890–1920 (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969), 5. 
5
 Michele Mitchell, Righteous Propagation: African Americans and the Politics of Racial Destiny after 
Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), xx. 
6
 Jeremiah Jenkins to Lardner Gibbon, 1 August 1879, American Colonization Society Papers, roll 119, 
quoted in Steven Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South from Slavery to the 
Great Migration (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 333. 
7
 John Wilkins to [William Coppinger?], 12 November 1877, American Colonization Society Papers, roll 
116B, quoted in Claude A. Clegg, III, The Price of Liberty: African Americans and the Making of Liberia (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 258. 
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Papers, then, find a more ambiguous materialism and less nuanced and cohesive political 
nationalism being recited, if at all. 
Leading emigrationists also grounded their beliefs in the sacred and mystical, whether 
Freemasonry or nationality, providentialism or civilizationism. While they advertised political 
and material benefits of emigrating, they also laid spiritual and philosophical plumb lines that 
outlined what an alternative homeland would look like and encompass. If anything, identity 
was—to borrow Stephanie Smallwood’s term—multivalent, as variegated and competing 
interests shaped emigrationists’ desire to leave.8 
Yet the journey across the Atlantic tended to alter lofty pre-migration ideas of identity 
and belonging. Once in their ancestral homeland, emigrants, as James Sidbury puts it, “became 
American in Liberia.”9 They often defaulted to Western values and ideas, familiar to them but 
foreign to their native neighbors. In recent years, the role of emigrationists, particularly their 
missionaries, has grown controversial, as historians have pilloried them for harboring elitist and 
imperialist sentiment. For example, William Montgomery accuses emigrationists like Henry M. 
Turner of deploying the same Social Darwinian thought that whites utilized to justify 
imperialism in Africa.
10
 James Campbell raises this very point in arguing that “Turner managed 
to recapitulate virtually the entire catalogue of rationalizations for contemporary European 
imperialism.”11 From this perspective, black missionaries were imperialists who preyed upon 
                                                          
8
 Stephanie Smallwood, Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 115. 
9
 James Sidbury, Becoming African in America: Race and Nation in the Early Black Atlantic (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 181. 
10
 William E. Montgomery, Under Their Own Vine and Fig Tree: The African-American Church in the 
South, 1865–1900 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993), 209. 
11
 James T. Campbell, Middle Passages: African American Journeys to Africa, 1787–2005 (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2006), 123. 
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unsuspecting natives by imposing commercial and cultural hegemony over their “benighted” 
charges. At first glance, black emigrationists deserve moral opprobrium for advancing a self-
serving and complicit “civilizing mission” that endorsed exploitation under the mantras of 
progress and moral perfectionism. 
Yet John Thornton, Linda Heywood, and James Sweet offer a necessary corrective. 
Room exists for “Africanized” Christianity that neither exploits nor colonizes. Thornton and 
Heywood show that Christianity could serve as a key cultural bond that remained malleable 
enough for the Kongolese to construct new communal identities. Religious conversion stood not 
as a simple transfer of European Catholicism but as an active appropriation of religious symbols 
and meanings that gave only a cursory nod to European ecclesiastical hierarchy. Sometimes, 
religious organization could run counter to its intended design. For instance, Laurent Dubois 
illustrates the potential for black Catholic confraternities to subvert white colonialists’ original 
intentions for them.
12
 According to Wilson Moses, later African nationalists and Pan-Africanists 
came to favor Christian redemptionism as an effective vehicle for promoting continental and 
transnational unity.
13
 And as Campbell notes in his earlier work Songs of Zion, Africans latched 
onto the idea of a transnational movement dedicated to fighting against white power and 
oppression.
14
 These observations are not to suggest that “heathenism” did not stand as a 
surrogate for African inferiority and hence as a pretext for rationalizing African dependence 
upon African Americans. What it does, however, is compel historians to distinguish between 
                                                          
12
 Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 
1787–1804 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 88. 
13
 Wilson Jeremiah Moses, Creative Conflict in African American Thought: Frederick Douglass, Alexander 
Crummell, Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Marcus Garvey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 101. 
14
 James T. Campbell, Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States and 
South Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 157. 
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legitimate and illegitimate usage of African and African American Christianity on an 
international mission field. If Africans appropriated Christianity in the Kongo or in Brazil, they 
also appropriated it when black Americans exported it to Liberia. 
Finally, one must grapple with bidirectionality (or tridirectionality) inherent in the 
Atlantic Diaspora. This is especially true of Blyden, a native West Indian who spent time in the 
United States before splitting time between British Sierra Leone and Liberia. Blyden is a 
fascinating case study of diasporic identity, especially because he admonishes that “the duty of 
every man, of every race is to contend for its individuality—to keep and develop it. If you are not 
yourself, if you surrender your personality, you have nothing left to give the world.”15 Yet how 
does this individuality operate in a diasporic setting? In later years, Blyden roots one’s 
individuality and personality in racial instinctualism or biologism, lauding Africa as the superior 
locale in which individuality can thrive. This raises the question whether Blyden has given up on 
the promising potential that diasporic migration and interchange can bring. What has happened 
to Michel Trouillot’s “self-proclaimed hybrids,” a class to which Blyden surely belongs?16 Is 
Blyden reacting to a European management of geography by privileging a new spatial 
relocalization centered in Africa? To wit, does he draw that “single line that links past, present, 
and future, and yet insists on their distinctiveness,” when he writes that “[t]he original races of 
the Eastern hemisphere have existed from the beginning and no one of them can be exterminated, 
as degenerate offsprings of them have been in America”?17 Blyden appears to be calling for a 
                                                          
15
 Edward Blyden, “Study and Race,” lecture to Young Men’s Literary Association of Sierra Leone, 19 
May 1893, in Sierra Leone Times, 27 May 1893, reprinted in Edward Blyden, Black Spokesman: Selected Published 
Writings of Edward Wilmot Blyden, edited by Hollis R. Lynch (London: Frank Cass, 1971), 201. 
16
 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Global Transformations: Anthropology and the Modern World (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 33. 
17
 Ibid., 38; Blyden, “Study and Race,” reprinted in Lynch, Black Spokesman, 203. 
  
6 
 
“reversion” to a “pure collective faith” that eschews approximation.18 But what of Blyden’s 
inherent creolization, both physical and intellectual? This he seems to ignore, as well as his 
tendency to force a singular, artificial African mentalité.
19
 The latter is reminiscent of the 
colonial project, but it need not be labeled imperialistic—akin to Montgomery’s denunciation of 
African American missionaries. By recognizing the contingent nature of creating a diasporan 
identity, one can discern Stuart Hall’s articulation or counterhegemonic process at work in 
Blyden’s essentializing project.20 
It is not enough to resort to an either-or paradigm when studying African American 
emigrationists, because they straddled an intersection of intellectual traditions and spatial 
locations created through the overlapping migrations of a diasporic people. Historians have often 
written an oppositional history of Liberia, pitting emigrant against native. And to a large degree, 
they are accurate. But exchanges were not all hostile, and neither actor operated in a cultural or 
philosophical vacuum. Americo-Liberians inherited specific notions of freedom and identity that 
shaped their dealings with their aborigine brethren. Natives took those ideas and molded them 
according to their tastes. And in the process, both groups came to change each other through 
assimilation, opposition, and (mis)appropriation. 
Nineteenth-century black emigrationists were influenced, positively and negatively, by 
white colonizationists in America. To gain historical perspective requires some knowledge of 
two major obstacles facing emigrationist proponents, namely the American Colonization Society 
                                                          
18
 See Edouard Glissant, Caribbean Discourse: Selected Essays, trans. J. Michael Dash (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1989), 15-16. 
19
 See Joseph C. Miller, “Retention, Reinvention, and Remembering: Restoring Identities through 
Enslavement in Africa and under Slavery in Brazil,” in José C. Curto and Paul E. Lovejoy, eds., Enslaving 
Connections: Changing Cultures of Africa and Brazil during the Era of Slavery (Amherst, NY: Humanity 
Books/Prometheus Books, 2004), 84-87. 
20
 For more, see Tiffany Ruby Patterson and Robin D. G. Kelley, “Unfinished Migrations: Reflections on 
the African Diaspora and the Making of the Modern World,” African Studies Review 43, no. 1 (April 2000): 19-20. 
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and the prolific abolitionist Frederick Douglass. The first stood as a racist organization dedicated 
to the expulsion of free blacks from America, while the second loomed as the charismatic 
newspaper editor determined on keeping the race together in order to wage the battle for 
American equality. 
The American Colonization Society grew out of the unresolved problem of slavery left 
over from the nation’s founding. At the time of revolution, 20 percent of Americans were slaves, 
yet ideology and economics forced a fundamental reexamination of the practice. Natural rights, 
Christian egalitarianism, and commercial urbanization led some people to call for blacks’ 
emancipation and relocation. Deporting blacks was not a new idea, as Thomas Paine backed a 
resettlement plan beyond the Alleghenies in the 1770s, while Samuel Hopkins urged sending 
slaves to Africa. Moreover, a small number of free blacks in New England—notably 
Massachusetts and Rhode Island—petitioned for public funds to migrate to Africa. Colonization 
gained one of its most prominent advocates when in 1787, Thomas Jefferson penned Notes on 
the State of Virginia, in which he warned that slavery was divisive, inefficient, socially 
dangerous, and morally wrong. Yet fearing “miscegenation” and a potential race war, he shied 
away from unconditional abolition and instead recommended a ban on the slave trade, a halt to 
slavery’s westward expansion, and gradual emancipation through colonization. A year later, 
James Madison stated his support for an African colony that might prod manumissions. Their 
ideas went nowhere, however, as an indifferent North and a hostile South scuttled their 
proposals. Fear proved more of a spur than reason, especially when Gabriel’s 1800 slave 
conspiracy prompted the Virginia legislature to send a secret missive to President Jefferson, 
which requested the formation of a penal colony for rebellious slaves. Although nothing came of 
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the request, bandying about the idea demonstrated that black colonization remained near the 
forefront during the first quarter century of the nation’s existence.21 
African colonization gained traction in the early decades of the 1800s with the 
organization of the American Colonization Society. In 1773 Congregationalist minister Robert 
Finley conceived the plan to send a band of free Negroes to Africa in order to Christianize the 
“Dark Continent,” and his efforts led to the eventual formation of the American Colonization 
Society, or ACS. Founded in 1816, the society sought to resettle free blacks in Africa, a goal that 
attracted broad initial support from politicians and early abolitionists, who saw it as a way to 
allay fears about the social dangers of emancipating slaves. Furthermore, moderate southerners 
supported the proposal as a way to reduce the number of free blacks in their midst. 
Wary of this second bloc within the ACS, African Americans were much more reluctant 
to embrace the society’s aims. Many felt that forced emigration was tantamount to exile, 
recollecting the idea had been tried once before, when in 1787 English philanthropists had 
forcibly transported 350 American slaves to Sierra Leone, an expensive and mismanaged 
experiment that had ended in utter failure. Yet Paul Cuffe, a sea merchant of African and Native 
American descent, revived interest in African colonization almost single-handedly when he 
lobbied free blacks and Congress for help in colonizing Sierra Leone. In 1816 he managed to 
transport thirty-eight black Americans to the British colony, but after authorities threatened to 
seize his ship, he was forced to flee the settlement. When he died a year later from illness, the 
ACS picked up the colonization mantle. 
                                                          
21
 For more on colonizationist ideology during this period, see David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery 
in the Age of Emancipation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014); Nicholas Guyatt, Bind Us Apart: How Enlightened 
Americans Invented Racial Segregation (New York: Basic Books, 2016). 
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Throughout its history, the society served both conservative and radical interests. During 
the 1820s temperate politicians endorsed the colonization effort because they hoped that 
relocating free blacks could avert civil war, slave insurrection, or racial equality demands. 
Consequently, the ACS offered a respectable compromise, one that maintained the status quo 
while tempering misgivings about slavery’s evil, as an African colony would serve as the 
beachhead for Christian missions and American democracy. Older colonizationists, then, favored 
gradual emancipation, which comported well with the judicious tenor of the early 1800s. But for 
younger abolitionists, the society acted as a halfway institution. While its literature introduced 
them to antislavery viewpoints, its gradualist approach also incensed them to the point of 
rebellion. Once a supporter of colonization, William Lloyd Garrison denounced the society for 
conspiring against human rights. His followers called for immediate emancipation, a mantra 
which many black Americans echoed. 
Garrison’s protégé, Frederick Douglass, became the nationally recognized black 
spokesperson on the basis of his fiery speeches, influential newspaper, and bestselling 
autobiography. When he came out against colonization, each of the three emigrationists had to 
grapple with his arguments, both in their private reflections and public writings.  
On the surface, Douglass did not differ much from the standard emigrationist line that 
blacks be allowed to depart as they saw fit. Douglass may have disapproved of leaving, but he 
never abrogated a person’s right to do so. He further found the missionary endeavor to be a 
worthy and acceptable work, because it extended African American influence while enlarging 
their reputation worldwide. Mass emigration as a federal or state policy, however, Douglass 
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opposed on practical and ideological grounds.
22
 First, departing America’s shores meant 
abandoning southern slaves to their fate.
23
 The black abolitionist denounced those free blacks 
who would break fraternity with their enslaved kin, fearing that their exit would hemorrhage the 
antislavery movement. Second, an exodus undercut Douglass’s assertion that blacks and whites 
could get along together.
24
 If anything, he feared that emigration would stoke white suspicions 
that black Americans were mere sojourners and that black nationalists were irritating interlopers. 
Although most emigrationist leaders expected many blacks to remain in America, Douglass 
feared that by establishing an external nation-state, emigrationists would inadvertently create 
permanent instability between the races, an uneasy truce readily broken when the balance of 
power shifted. Put another way, he foresaw emigration as making integration all the more 
difficult to implement. 
Douglass’s prescribed assimilation was not simply cultural but also biological. He 
explicated his position most clearly in 1886, when he wrote: “My strongest conviction as to the 
future of the Negro therefore is, that he will not be expatriated nor annihilated, nor will he 
forever remain a separate and distinct race from the people around him but that he will be 
absorbed, assimilated, and will only appear finally . . . in the features of a blended race.”25 With 
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an estimated 25 percent of the Negro population a product of mixture, Douglass foresaw the 
“inevitable” rise of an “intermediate race,” which would tighten the cords of “human 
brotherhood.”26 He punctuated personal commitment to this principle with his 1884 marriage to 
his second wife Helen Pitts, a white woman.
27
 His biological assimilationism left him open to the 
criticism that he was not black enough—which Douglass himself seemed to affirm when he 
remarked, “I thank God for making me a man simply, but Delany always thanks Him for making 
him a black man.”28 Douglass’s seeming nonchalance led to the later charge that he harbored 
shame over his skin color,
29
 and at first glance, critics appeared to have a solid case because in 
1889 Douglass went on record with his impolitic scoff that “the whole assumption of race pride 
is ridiculous.”30 But the jibe was at odds with his many efforts to concretize black identity in the 
1850s. One biographer has linked Douglass’s fluctuating race consciousness to his intermittent 
patrimonial search, asserting, “As the issue of race pride became less central to his own identity, 
Douglass correspondingly perceived it as less significant for collective black liberation.”31 
Although Douglass had obsessed about discovering the identity of his (suspected) white paternal 
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father in the 1840s, by the 1880s he resigned himself to the reality of never knowing the truth.
32
 
Accordingly, he downplayed the importance of racial origins, which he considered superfluous 
to achievement.  
Concerning the place of origins, Douglass was willing to extend Christian charity to 
Africa; but he rejected outright the emphasis on sympathy, which he associated with pity, an 
enticing but ultimately enervating sentiment. He had stated as much in his second autobiography, 
when he wrote, “A man without force is without the essential dignity of humanity. Human nature 
is so constituted that it cannot honor a helpless man, although it can pity him; and even that it 
cannot do long, if signs of power do not arise.”33 Douglass had written this in context of his fight 
with Edward Covey, a notorious “slave breaker” whom Douglass had resisted as a sixteen-year 
old slave. The experience does much to explain why the mature Douglass found emigration 
distasteful: it was kowtowing to the majoritarian bully by fleeing the site of manly resistance. 
Just as the biblical character Jacob had wrestled with an angel at Peniel, Douglass had struggled 
with Covey in a climactic battle for identity and supremacy.
34
 Through the soul-testing trial, 
Jacob had been promoted to Israel, father of the Jewish nation-state; and Douglass envisioned a 
similar scenario in which through clutching white America and refusing to let go, blacks could 
wring recognition and reward from their rival. Nationhood could be theirs, Douglass thought, 
just as it was for the resolute patriarch in Scripture, but the key for attainment resided in a stout, 
forceful bid for rights in the presence of the oppressor. 
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This was the social and intellectual milieu in which emigrationists found themselves. 
Unlike white proponents and black opponents of colonization, they wished to leave the country 
on the grounds that doing so was good for blacks. Although they differed in their stated rationale 
for leaving—giving such reasons as hope for autonomy, pride in their heritage, or despair of ever 
overcoming white bigotry—they shared a mutual problem: how to overcome the debilitating 
effects of color prejudice.  
 
Martin Delany 
Although Martin Delany never emigrated to Liberia, he was an important contemporary 
of those who did. His debates with fellow emigrationists helped shape their outlooks and 
arguments. Over his lifetime Delany aspired at first to emigrate within North America, moved 
briefly to Canada, flirted momentarily with the Caribbean, orchestrated a drive to Africa, before 
finally returning to Central America as an ideal emigration site. Therefore, his speeches, 
writings, and travel had direct bearing on the emigration movement to Africa. 
Born to a free mother and an enslaved father in 1812, Martin Robison Delany spent his 
earliest years in Virginia, where he grew up learning the importance of black resistance when his 
father went to jail for fighting his master. Meanwhile, Delany’s grandmother fed the boy a steady 
diet of stories about his grandfather, an African prince who resisted his enslavement in America. 
After being convicted of teaching her children to read, Delany’s mother uprooted the family for 
Pennsylvania. Even then, Delany continued his education under a pastor’s tutelage because 
northern laws barred him from attending public school. 
Determined to study medicine, he left at age twenty-four for Pittsburgh to study with a 
local doctor, arriving in the city in the wake of Nat Turner’s failed rebellion. In response, many 
northern cities began passing restrictive black laws, curtailing the freedoms of free black 
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residents. A resolute Delany—intent on preserving the rights and reputation of blacks—threw 
himself into free black organizations like the Abstinence Society, Philanthropic Society, and a 
vigilante committee. But by the late 1830s he had soured on the North to the point of embarking 
on an 1839 trip to Texas in order to investigate the feasibility of emigrating there; he passed 
safely through the South only to have U.S. annexation of Texas douse his hopes. Back in 
Pittsburgh, Delany launched a shoestring newspaper, the Mystery, in which his outspokenness 
landed him in court on a libel charge. Despite a record fine, the militant editor persisted in his 
sharp attacks against slave catchers. His uncompromising stance soon attracted the attention of 
Frederick Douglass, who promptly hired him away from the Mystery for Douglass’s own upstart 
publication, The North Star. From 1847 to 1849 Delany served as correspondent and coeditor, 
whose name appeared on the masthead with Douglass’s. According to biographer Victor Ullman, 
Delany’s alliance with Douglass marked a high point in his belief in American democracy.35 For 
two years Delany toured the country, preaching moral suasion to the masses. Yet his rhetoric was 
growing more radical, as he endorsed more black autonomy, and Douglass soon felt the need to 
distance himself publicly from Delany’s views. In 1849 Douglass published a notice announcing 
the mutual split of the two editors. 
 Delany had already grown disillusioned by then. Other black abolitionists, he felt, had 
muted the need for independent black initiative in their hopes of currying favor with white 
philanthropists. Besides, white abolitionists could not deliver on their grandiose promises, he 
sniped. Passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act shattered what was left of Delany’s confidence in 
white-led reform. Self-determinism presented the best avenue for blacks. With this as a partial 
motive, he applied to medical school, aiming to follow in James McCune Smith’s footsteps. In 
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1850 he won admittance into Harvard Medical School on the basis of stellar recommendations 
from seventeen white doctors. Yet his presence triggered a wave of campus racism, leading the 
faculty to bar him from returning for his second semester. Ullman described the expulsion as 
“the worst blow Delany had ever received,” while historian Floyd Miller attributed Delany’s 
alienation directly to this event.
36
 Indubitably, it helped cement Delany’s conviction that he 
would never get a fair shake in the United States. No longer would he put full faith in America as 
the land of opportunity. 
 During the 1850s Delany grew more involved in the emigration movement. In 1851 he 
attended the North American Convention of Emigrationists in Toronto, upon the invitation of 
Henry Bibb, where Delany approved of the call of fellow emigrationist, James T. Holly, for a 
separate association free from white control. A year later, Delany published The Condition, 
Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States. In his pamphlet, 
Delany surveyed the condition of African Americans in their adopted homeland: white America 
deprived them not only of political rights but also human rights; meanwhile, its prejudice created 
a disparity between whites and blacks, who could not possibly hope to reach the same 
accomplishments. Blacks’ innate inferiority represented a myth perpetuated to rationalize 
slavery, Delany chafed, while whites’ alleged superiority served as an excuse to prevent equal 
opportunity. White supremacy also fueled the colonization movement, which belied a 
slaveholders’ plot to remove free blacks from the country. Considering the ACS to be a front for 
slaveholders, Delany accused it of being unchristian and misanthropic and of failing to recognize 
that America also belonged to blacks, who had a claim to citizenship by birthright and natural 
law. Moreover, white Americans owed their financial and cultural standing to unpaid black 
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labor. As Delany charged, the Fugitive Slave Act proved that white America had placed its laws 
and institutions above God’s law. Therefore, he concluded that emigration was essential for any 
future elevation of blacks. 
In the decade after their split, Douglass and Delany vied for leadership within the African 
American community. First, they quarreled over the contribution of whites to the movement, 
with Douglass and Harriet Beecher Stowe desiring to build a black vocational school staffed by 
white teachers and administrators. Delany found the proposal absurd: how could blacks develop 
self-reliance when they put whites in charge? Furthermore, he distrusted Stowe because she 
supported the American Colonization Society. While Delany favored emigration, he had no 
desire to affiliate with the hated ACS. Second, the two men organized competing black 
conventions. Douglass fired the first shot, with his 1853 Rochester conference rejecting 
colonization outright. The following year, however, Delany drew even, when emigrationists 
converged on Cleveland, Ohio, to plan an exit strategy. Delany’s keynote address, entitled 
“Political Destiny of the Colored Race on the American Continent,” helped solidify his 
reputation as one of the nation’s leading black emigrationists, with James Holly regarding it as a 
“watershed” in his friend’s life because Delany pledged himself thereafter to black nationalism.37  
 The practical outworking of the conference resulted in three planned expeditions to 
explore emigration sites in Africa, Haiti, and Central America. Moving his base to Ontario, 
Canada, Delany began to plan a scouting trip to Africa. His singlemindedness led him to rebuff 
John Brown when he solicited Delany in 1858 for aid in establishing a black state within the U.S. 
South. In Delany’s estimation, Brown stood for the wrong skin color and the wrong continent. 
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He further disapproved of Presbyterian minister Henry Highland Garnet’s African Civilization 
Society, which was sending out a Yoruba reconnaissance team underwritten by white 
colonizationists. With Liberia already in ACS hands, Delany knew he had to hasten his own trip 
before colonizationists could claim central Africa, too. On 24 May 1859 the black nationalist 
steamed out of New York for Africa. 
 Initially Delany’s visit appeared to be a success. Prominent Liberians feted him in 
Monrovia, including Blyden and Crummell, with the latter even hosting him a month as he 
recovered from fever. Blyden, then an exuberant twenty-six year old newspaper editor, gushed 
that Delany stood poised as a black Moses on the verge of leading his people out of bondage.
38
 
Delany reaped another honor when an African chieftain deeded land for him to settle. His 
crowning achievement came when he hammered out a treaty with the king of Abbeokuta, who 
permitted the settlement of African Americans in exchange for their technical and agricultural 
expertise. Afterward, a jubilant Delany headed to Britain in order to secure loans and 
investments for his envisioned venture. 
 At the end of 1860 Delany returned to the United States, where he found himself in high 
demand as a lecturer on Africa. He made the circuit rounds, preaching his fervent message of 
“Africa for Africans.” Even his former rival Douglass hailed him as “the intensest embodiment 
of black Nationality to be met with outside the valley of the Niger.”39 But Delany’s 
outspokenness irritated Holly, particularly when the former disparaged James Redpath’s 
headship of the Haiti’s emigration bureau. That the Haitian government would appoint a white 
man over black immigration, in Delany’s eyes, smacked of callous disregard for black equality. 
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Loyal to his adopted country, Holly bristled at this aspersion, accusing Delany of conspiring with 
slaveholders in order to malign Haitian immigration. Yet for all his perceived tactlessness, 
Delany raised a valid question: namely whether blacks should place themselves under the 
fostering care of benevolent whites, particularly when such paternalism might stunt the 
development and elevation of an indigenous black leadership class. 
Henry Highland Garnet joined the fray when he accused Delany of inconsistency, 
pointing out that Delany had gone on record in approving John Brown’s leadership. Delany and 
Garnet had an uneven relationship over the years, clashing on emigration strategy and especially 
reliance on white aid. Born in 1815 Garnet escaped slavery as a boy when his family fled 
Maryland. Two childhood events helped shape his growing defiance toward whites. When 
Garnet was fourteen, slave catchers seized his sister, prompting him to buy a knife to defend his 
family. Five years later, as a classmate of Crummell’s at Noyes Academy, he discharged a 
shotgun in self-defense against a white mob that threatened the schoolboys’ lives. In his mid-
twenties, Garnet assumed a leading role in the black convention movement, spearheading the 
drive for African American suffrage in New York. And in 1840 Garnet helped establish the 
American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society when he became dissatisfied with Garrison’s 
apolitical approach to abolitionism. Garnet’s rise to national prominence came in 1843 when he 
delivered a controversial speech before the National Convention of Colored Citizens in Buffalo, 
New York, in which he called on southern slaves to stage insurrections against their masters. 
Slaves had nothing to lose and everything to gain, he argued. Not only was resistance a moral 
duty, it was also the only way for the oppressed to secure their liberty.
40
 In the early 1850s 
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Garnet followed the precedent set by Douglass, Crummell, and other African Americans in 
lecturing throughout Great Britain, lobbying for an economic boycott of slave-manufactured 
goods. After a three-year missionary stint in Jamaica, he returned to America as an advocate of 
overseas emigration, an increasingly popular position in light of passage of the Fugitive Slave 
Law of 1850. In 1858 Garnet founded the African Civilization Society, with its goal being 
African Americans’ voluntary colonization to Africa. Through the society, Garnet desired to (1) 
destroy slavery and the slave trade, (2) end prejudice through black economic gains, (3) 
introduce Christianity to Africa, (4) establish an alternate cotton industry to undermine the 
southern economy, and (5) erect an independent state that promoted black nationalism. Delany 
balked initially at joining the society, concerned about Garnet’s propensity to accept white 
monies and oversight.
41
 But in 1861 Delany joined the society after he succeeded in amending 
the society’s constitution with his own language: henceforth, “the basis of the Society, and 
ulterior objects in encouraging emigration shall be—Self-reliance and Self-government, on the 
principle of an African Nationality, the African race being the ruling element of the nation, 
controlling and directing their own affairs.”42 Thus Delany converted the society into an 
autonomous and Afrocentric organization, moving it away from Garnet’s original vision of a 
biracial society that promoted emigration to not only Africa but also the Western Hemisphere. 
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Events in the United States interrupted and postponed Delany’s African scheme. He 
shifted his priorities to supporting Republicans and recruiting black troops during the U.S. Civil 
War. After the war, he labored in the Freedman’s Bureau, dispensing aid to participants in the 
Port Royal experiment on Sea Island, South Carolina.
43
 Delany grew involved in Reconstruction 
politics, even holding a trial judgeship for a time. But rampant corruption gradually soured 
Delany on the Republican Party, and the Democratic takeover ultimately convinced him of the 
futility of staying in the United States. 
In 1878 a dispirited Delany contacted the American Colonization Society to inquire about 
passage to Liberia for one of his Carolinian constituents. He predicted that “going will be but the 
precursor of many more leaving the South for Africa, my beloved fatherland, who ought to leave 
for their own good and that of posterity.”44 The year before, Delany had joined the board of the 
Liberian Exodus Joint Steam Ship Company, a nonprofit stock company hoping to raise money 
to purchase a ship in which to transport emigrants to Liberia. On 21 April 1878, the Azor left the 
Charleston port with a shipload of emigrants bound for Monrovia. Unfortunately for Delany, the 
maiden voyage proved to be the last for the ill-fated venture, as a crooked ship captain helped 
bankrupt the company and impound the ship. In his waning years, Delany found himself 
impoverished and begging for a civil servant job, which would “enable me to . . . go at once to 
Africa, the field of my destined labor.”45 Despite his humbled financial state, the black 
nationalist still retained enough racial pride to tweak noses at the Emancipation Proclamation’s 
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twentieth-year anniversary celebration in Washington, DC, where he toasted the Republic of 
Liberia before a banquet attended by the nation’s highest dignitaries. Delany never did reach his 
desired destination, dying quietly two years later in Ohio at the age of seventy-three. 
Although his colonizing enthusiasm oscillated over his lifetime, many of his core 
emigrationist beliefs can be found in his Masonic activities. In 1853 he addressed St. Cyprian 
Lodge, No. 13, of Free and Accepted Ancient York Masons—to whom he outlined his seminal 
views on race and prejudice. At the local level Delany was protesting U.S. Masons’ decision to 
withhold recognition of his lodge because of its “colored” membership. Confronted with 
American prejudice, Delany made an international appeal for legitimacy and recognition of his 
Pittsburgh Masonic lodge, arguing that black Masons had the right to organize into a fraternal 
order based on an older tradition, that of British Masons’ bestowal of a fraternal warrant to a 
black lodge in 1784. As such, he refused to acknowledge degrees of membership—black Masons 
were either full members or nothing.
46
 
The 1853 speech and subsequent pamphlet, The Origin and Objects of Ancient 
Freemasonry, evinced Delany’s historical and theological thought.47 As a black man, he claimed 
equal, if not superior, right to be a Mason because Masonry first took root in Egypt and Ethiopia. 
Moreover, Delany asserted that (1) Egyptians recognized humanity as being created in God’s 
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image and (2) Ethiopians adduced a Trinitarian existence long before Jews or Christians reached 
the same conclusions. Because Africans had laid the intellectual groundwork for Masonry before 
its formal organization under the Hebrew monarch Solomon, whose temple construction marked 
official recognition of the group, Delany contended that to deny African Americans the 
privileges of Masonry was to deprive them of their African heritage. From a dispensational 
standpoint, Delany divided history into three discrete periods: the eras of Adam, Noah, and 
Solomon distinguished respectively by fallen innocence, adventurous manhood, and temple 
building—a pattern that he would apply to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in advocating 
black nationalism as fulfillment of the last two historical stages. From an anthropological 
perspective, he affirmed the unity of humankind. Without it, he warned that “our efforts, whether 
as Men or Masons, must fail—utterly fail” because “a house divided against itself, cannot 
stand.”48 In this case, Masonry—and later the body politic—would collapse unless it recognized 
all its members, whether black or white. And on a doctrinal level, Delany averred that in keeping 
with God’s image, man was by nature a triad of the moral, physical, and intellectual. These three 
spheres, then, became the future fronts in which Delany pushed for equality—in religion, 
politics, and education.  
To the three realms, Delany later added a fourth dimension—the economic. He 
envisioned “colored men laboring side by side with white,” a working alliance that would give 
them “a knowledge [of] how to live in this world.”49 Hence he urged “colored people [to] cease 
their servile occupations, and get into business, respectable occupations, and thereby cease to be 
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‘boys’ and ‘girls,’ taking their places among men and women in society.”50 His remarks stirred 
controversy on two fronts, as he offended many free black women, most of whom labored as 
domestic workers, and as he transgressed the preachments of many black ministers, who tended 
to focus primarily on the spiritual needs of their congregants. 
Delany’s defense of the latter exposes another skein running throughout his later 
emigrationism, that of Aristotelian teleology. In a similar maneuver found in his Freemasonry 
treatise, he delineated three divine laws governing the universe (akin to his three spheres arising 
out of imago dei): spiritual, moral, and physical laws. Otherworldliness, maintained Delany, had 
relevance only when dealing with spiritual matters. Where lay the problem for African 
Americans? “It is this, we make use of heavenly means for the attainment of earthly ends, while 
our oppressors make use of earthly means for the attainment of earthly ends. The spiritual laws, 
as previously suggested, only pertain to the things of heaven, and were never intended by their 
Great Author for any other purpose. The physical and moral laws pertain to earthly ends, and by 
them only can all things temporal be effected.”51 Thus whites “induce colored people to depend 
upon faith and prayer” while they are busy “DOING,” using physical means to attain monetary 
ends.
52
 For this world, Delany insisted on procuring wealth, which would better the conditions in 
the here and now. 
Delany would use both the historical and teleological arguments in advancing emigration. 
On the one hand, it represented the pinnacle of the three historical eras, the temple period under 
Solomon in which the Israelite kingdom reached its apex. On the other hand, it constituted the 
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natural fulfillment of physical ends by creating the conditions necessary to prosper socially, 
politically, and materially.  
Delany’s governing political manifesto came in 1852 with publication of The Condition, 
Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States. Setbacks 
abounded during the years leading up to his exposition: the Fugitive Slave Law obviously 
angered and frightened him; Harvard expelled him based solely on his skin color; the U.S. Patent 
Office refused to grant him a patent for a personal invention because he was black and hence not 
an eligible citizen; and he had just begun to formulate objections to Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, 
leading to a bruising debate with Douglass. In the midst of these disappointments, he attended 
his first conference devoted to emigration. A year later he was ready to circulate his brand of 
emigration to free blacks in the United States. 
Delany was not alone in his disillusionment, as Blyden left for Liberia after finding doors 
closed to seminary and as Holly departed for Canada after despairing of achieving equality in 
America. Three months after Delany’s landmark piece, the ever optimistic Douglass blistered the 
nation with his “What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?” address.53 Therefore, Delany’s 
manifesto not only articulated his own disenchantment but also captured the desperation of 
fellow blacks. 
In Condition Delany detailed his understanding of sociological relations. He believed that 
sympathy played as strong a role as self-interest in determining who enslaved whom. 
Sympathy—that natural feeling of pity or compassion—came about when one group identified 
with another group’s plight. This sentiment occurred, Delany contended, only when the two 
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groups shared a common identity, or at least the perception of having one. On the macro level, a 
nation subjected other nations with which it neither sympathized nor self-identified, because they 
were both foreign and Other. In Delany’s mind, nations that failed to stand for independence and 
self-governance found themselves on the losing end, as stronger nations regarded the absence of 
such traits as being signs of alienness and weakness. In short, nations preyed upon those whom 
they disrespected. For Delany the phenomenon extended to minority groups, which he regarded 
as “nations within nations,” most prominent being the Israelites in Egypt, the Irish in the U.K., or 
the black population in America.
54
 National minorities, then, needed to earn the respect of the 
majority in order to elicit sympathy and recognition of their equality. African Americans, in 
driving for self-initiative and self-rule, would demonstrate sameness, attenuate difference, and 
elevate their national standing. 
 Delany knew that American blacks faced imposing hurdles in their present 
circumstances, because the country deprived them of freedom and rights—did so out of self-
interest and disdain, not bound by the strictures of sympathy. As Delany perceived, the nation 
withheld political rights because it regarded blacks as incapable of self-governance and thus 
ineligible for identification and assimilation into the body politic. How then could African 
Americans realize self-government? The answer for Delany rested in controlling territory; if 
blacks could gain neither rights nor land in America, he surmised they would have to look 
elsewhere. Even if blacks were accorded legal citizenship, he did not foresee sympathy 
forthcoming or power structures rearranged. African Americans were still at the mercy of self-
interested whites, still open to exploitation by the rapacious majority. They needed a new 
country, a new nation-state where they could wield political and economic authority. 
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 Like Holly, Blyden, and Crummell, Delany did not advocate wholesale migration of the 
race to another land. In the appendix, he called for “enlightened freemen” to travel to Africa.55 
This limited proposal arose from frustration he felt at the apathy he encountered among his 
people, too “degraded” and “servile” to leave. But a beachhead in Africa, he hoped, would testify 
to the race’s potential and would reify black independence. The stalwart few would represent the 
interests of the many, envisioned Delany, by exerting international pressure and by directly 
petitioning the U.S. government on behalf of its black residents. 
In one sense, Delany had given up on the hope implicit in Origin and Objects of Ancient 
Freemasonry. He had surrendered the dream of a biracial country in which each race would 
contribute to the building of a united house. Yet in another sense, though events had shattered his 
naïveté, he still adhered to the logic of his earlier thinking. For Delany, emigration meant a move 
toward adventurous manhood and established nationality by promising continued growth of the 
moral, physical, and intellectual in a new land, by fulfilling his race’s teleological development 
toward full manhood and global brotherhood in the fraternity of nations.
56
 It was doing in the 
best sense: creating autonomy, prosperity, and a legacy for people of color. And in time—for 
Delany probably not until his 1859 trip to Liberia—it signaled a return to a glorious African past, 
as embodied by the ancient empires in Egypt and Ethiopia. 
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A month after publication, Garrison published a prompt review of Condition, in which he 
lamented Delany’s “tone of despondency, and an exhibition of the spirit of caste.”57 A week 
later, Delany responded with a succinct letter that tried to justify pessimism and separation, 
retorting, 
I am not in favor of caste, nor a separation of the brotherhood of mankind, and would as 
willingly live among white men as black, if I had an equal possession and enjoyment of 
privileges; but shall never be reconciled to live among them, subservient to their will—
existing by mere sufferance, as we, the colored people, do in this country. . . . If there 
were any probability of this [exercise and enjoyment of rights], I should be willing to 
remain in the country, fighting and struggling on, the good fight of faith. But I must 
admit, that I have no hopes in this country—no confidence in the American people—with 
a few excellent exceptions—therefore, I have written as I have done. Heathenism and 
Liberty, before Christianity and Slavery.
58
 
 
Delany’s shift toward separatism was not sudden, as a half decade earlier, he had voiced his 
mistrust of the political process. Skeptical of the Liberty Party, he had warned that “our friends, 
if they desire our co-operation or approbation, must not forget or neglect our interest. This is 
imperative. We have been duped and cajoled now quite sufficient.”59 Likewise, he had wondered 
whether the slogan of the Free Soil Party was actually “Free Soil, Free Territory, Free Speech, 
and Free White Men.”60 In light of empty political promises, he had recommended that “we must, 
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in fact, become our own representatives in presenting our own claims, and making known our 
own wrongs.”61 
His chief problem with politics was that it gave the veneer, though not the veracity, of 
national unity. Put differently, it violated his doctrine of human oneness, his tenet of sympathy. 
What bound a nation together in Delany’s mind? For him, 
Patriotism consists not in a mere professed love of country, the place of one’s birth—an 
endearment to the scenery, however delightful and interesting, of such country; nor 
simply the laws and political policy by which such country is governed; but a pure and 
unsophisticated interest felt and manifested for man—an impartial love and desire for the 
promotion and elevation of every member of the body politic, their eligibility to all the 
rights and privileges of society.
62
 
 
In short, patriotism required one “to love all men, regarding their humanity with equal 
importance.”63 
 If politics failed him, so too did religion. His preference for heathenism and liberty over 
Christianity and slavery—while perhaps hyperbole—illustrates his disaffection with white 
religion. Much like Douglass, he deplored the farce of southern Christianity.
64
 Less than a 
decade after Condition, Delany published his serial novel Blake, whose main character vows, 
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“No religion but that which brings us liberty will we know . . . .”65 Delany’s protagonist, Henry 
Blake, dismisses slave religion as “the shadow without the substance” and drips with cynicism in 
lecturing, “You must make your religion subserve your interests, as your oppressors do theirs! 
They use the Scriptures to make you submit, by preaching to you the texts of ‘obedience to your 
masters’ and ‘standing still to see the salvation,’ and we must now begin to understand the Bible 
so as to make it of interest to us.”66 Even in the North, Delany experienced racism firsthand, 
being heckled and even mobbed in churches during his western tour. On one of his jaunts 
between churches, he remarked, “Indeed, it is only in the mountains that I can fully appreciate 
my existence as a man in America, my own native land. It is then and there my soul is lifted up, 
my bosom caused to swell with emotion, and I am lost in wonder at the dignity of my own 
nature. I see in the works of nature around me, the wisdom and goodness of God. I contemplate 
them, and conscious that he has endowed me with faculties to comprehend them, I then perceive 
the likeness I bear to him.”67 That he communed with God on a mountaintop and not before a 
church altar served as an unspoken indictment of organized religion.
68
 
Finally, Delany found Negro education an elusive, if not illusive, target. His western tour 
opened his eyes to the deficiencies of and disregard for educating blacks. In Columbus, Ohio, he 
railed against “black laws” that denied “colored children” from receiving education funds as 
provided by state law. African Americans were being taxed for schools that their children could 
barely hope to attend. Black students could enroll only if no whites objected, and they were 
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diverted to dilapidated, segregated schools if their numbers reached twenty or more. “With the 
present prejudices of the whites,” Delany challenged, “cannot every one see that no colored 
children will ever be educated in the common schools of Ohio?”69 In Philadelphia, he questioned 
the wisdom of having black pupils instructed by a white teacher, whose goal he suspected was to 
“raise them subservient to pro-slavery will.”70 The charade of equal education, Delany 
complained, caused free blacks to tout the “colored school system” and “cling to Pennsylvania as 
to a Paradise.”71  
 Thus in the three spheres limned in Origin and Objects of Ancient Freemasonry—
politics, religion, and education—Delany tested America and found her wanting. His desire to 
emigrate arose out of his futile attempts to concretize Masonic ideals in these three areas in order 
to realize the three-stage historical progress foreordained by God and natural laws. Black 
nationalism was his response to the absence he found of universal brotherhood between 
individuals, nations, and races. 
 
Edward Blyden 
 Edward Wilmot Blyden emigrated to Liberia from St. Thomas, Danish West Indies. Born 
in 1832, the child roamed his racially integrated neighborhood, frolicking with Jewish playmates 
when not attending the Dutch Reformed Church. A white pastor saw his academic promise and 
tried to send the teenager to the United States for seminary training, but rejection by three white 
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theological institutions aborted any hopes of a ministerial career. Thereafter, Blyden landed in 
Monrovia in 1851 and underwent a “literary” education at the local Presbyterian school. In eight 
short years, he had earned ordination in the Presbyterian Church, the editorship of the Liberia 
Herald, and principalship of his former high school. Religion, literacy, and a classical education, 
in Blyden’s mind and experience, formed a trio of pillars for building a strong “Negro 
nationality.” 
 Blyden soon earned a reputation as a staunch defender of the American Colonization 
Society, whose New York branch had financed his initial trip to Monrovia. A year after arriving, 
he launched a public defense of Liberian settlement, in which he rebuked abolitionist Gerrit 
Smith for attacking the society and scolded Delany for flirting with Central American 
emigration. His first pamphlet, A Voice from Bleeding Africa (1856), asserted that “the object of 
Liberia was the redemption of Africa and the disenthralment and elevation of the African race.”72 
According to Blyden, Africa offered historical and psychological advantages by (1) boasting a 
rich intellectual and religious heritage as the “cradle” of both Judaism and Christianity and (2) 
not suffering from the blight of slavery, which had crippled African Americans both mentally 
and culturally. Through education and evangelism, the early Blyden believed that he could 
rescue backward Africans and cultivate stunted African Americans; his two-prong approach 
would establish the “last” and “noblest” Christian empire in Africa.73 
 Blyden’s dream received a boost when Garnet organized the African Civilization Society 
in America to supply Liberia with qualified African Americans; Delany’s expedition enthused 
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Blyden even more, especially after the two met in Monrovia at the start of Delany’s continental 
tour. When Delany departed nineteenth months later for America, Blyden harbored high hopes 
that African American emigrants would soon flood Liberia. Even the American Civil War 
warmed him because, from his vantage, the North’s victory would allow millions more to leave 
for their fatherland. Liberia’s government caught Blyden’s vision, too, leading the president to 
commission Blyden and Crummell as emigration agents to America. In 1861 both men boarded 
ships bound for the United States, intent on pressing the case for settling in Liberia. Blyden 
sensed that success was within his grasp. 
 The recruiting trip opened Blyden’s eyes to the pervasive racism endured by African 
Americans. Officials blocked him from visiting the Capitol, while he had to obtain written 
permission to leave Washington, DC. Blyden decried the humiliating conditions he found, 
vowing that he would rather be a naked savage than a submissive colored. “A whole race in 
degradation!” he fumed. “The idea is horrible. If they all went and died [in Africa] it would be a 
noble sacrifice to liberty.”74 He spread a message similar to that of other black emigrationists: 
blacks would garner respect only when they erected their own nation. Blyden urged his 
audiences to heed the natural impulse to carve out a separate and distinct identity in their African 
homeland. To Blyden’s chagrin, most African Americans ignored his admonitions because the 
Civil War had renewed their hopes of living in America as full citizens. A frustrated Blyden 
returned to Liberia in 1863, certain that their “struggles against caste” would end up fruitless.75 
 Blyden faced his own skirmishes in 1860, as he tussled with Americo-Liberians over the 
location of the new Liberia College. He wanted to build the school in the interior in order to 
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benefit natives, but Americo-Liberians insisted it stay on the mulatto-populated coast. Bad blood 
continued as the two sides squabbled over immigration and school admission policies; and 
Blyden further poisoned relations when he aired his grievances in public, blaming “decadent 
mulattoes” for impeding progress.76 The dispute climaxed when Blyden’s opponents snatched 
him and nearly succeeded in lynching him. Surviving the attempt on his life, Blyden would 
henceforth distinguish between despicable mulattoes and the noble-minded Negroes, rejecting 
the first as being illegitimate because “miscegenation” had deprived them of a true race instinct. 
Like slavery, racial intermixture had enfeebled African Americans; thus the future of the race lay 
with native Africans and “pure” Negroes from America. 
 Blyden seized the mantle of being the chief guardian of African culture. Surpassing even 
Crummell and Delany in African pride, Blyden hailed Islam, polygamy, and pantheism for 
preserving African culture. Conversely, he condemned Christianity, in its outward practice, for 
its disruptive influence, because “Christianity has consecrated drunkenness; it has consecrated 
slavery; it has consecrated war . . . .”77 Other than Roman Catholicism—Blyden had in mind 
Haiti and Toussaint L’Ouverture here—Christian denominations had a deleterious effect on the 
Negro, leading Blyden to direct his colonization appeals increasingly to governments and secular 
organizations. He still associated with ministers, especially Garnet and Henry M. Turner; but he 
advised them to send only qualified Negroes, i.e., full-blooded blacks, and privately urged the 
ACS to screen out mulatto candidates. 
His race essentialism led him to take some unpopular positions: lauding the U.S. 
Supreme Court for overturning the 1875 Civil Rights Act, approving of measures to limit 
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African Americans’ access to higher education, and requesting that future U.S. diplomats to 
Liberia be white (because he distrusted black American diplomats, whose mulatto origins made 
their race instincts suspect).
78
 On one hand, he felt that a stateside education contaminated 
potential emigrants; on the other hand, he hoped that societal restrictions would weaken ties to 
America. By migrating to Liberia, African Americans could receive an unadulterated education 
and realize their full potential, just as Blyden had done. If he opposed African American 
advancement, he did so in order to nudge his fellow Negroes toward an African alternative. 
For Blyden, the colony was the “indispensable agency” for advancing commerce, 
evangelism, and civilization, and no organization was more effective than the American 
Colonization Society in populating and sustaining it.
79
 In a romantic portrayal, Blyden 
pronounced colonizationists to be philosophical visionaries with prophetic foresight and 
towering moral agency, tackling the last obstacles to economic opportunity and material success. 
The ACS advocate urged African Americans to recognize the “glorious achievements of African 
Colonization” and to “look at the cause and not the instruments,” to “behold and contemplate 
results, and not form conjectures concerning motives and intentions.”80 Those beneficial results, 
by Blyden’s arithmetic, numbered three: spiritual regeneration of Africa, recognition of Negro 
manhood, and establishment of the independent nation of Liberia.
81
 “I can see,” Blyden 
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concluded, “no other solution of the Negro question in the United States than that proposed by 
the Colonization Society—viz., that of transferring these people back to Africa, and building up 
an African empire of respectability and power.”82 Liberia served as the prime model, then, for 
what the Negro race could become: the “germ of an African empire,” through which a people 
could procure “respectability, influence, and power in the world.”83 Blyden feared that African 
Americans such as Douglass overlooked the political and compensatory promise of ACS-
sponsored emigration, which represented a return to familial roots and a restoration for past 
wrongs. 
Yet Liberia accrued personal benefits as well. Blyden advocated emigration there because 
the emigrant “is placed in the high attitude of an actor, that his words and deeds will now be felt 
by those around him. A consciousness of individual importance, which he never experienced 
before, comes over him” as “every sentiment which his new position inspires is on the side of 
independence and manliness. In a word, [h]e becomes a full man—a distinction to which he can 
never arrive in this country.”84 
And there lay the rub because, in the United States, African Americans found themselves 
blocked at every turn. Upon his first speaking tour there, Blyden compared his journey as going 
“southward to hell” reportedly because of “the indignities he suffers in getting there, and the 
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insults he must endure while there.”85 Traveling to the nation’s capital, he tasted the degradation 
under which American blacks lived, whereupon he declared that he would rather be a native 
naked in the African interior than be subjected to “the prejudices of white trash.”86 
When confronted with the exhortation for the African American to continue the struggle 
in the United States, Blyden snorted, “What has he to fight for?”87 African Americans “are 
pressed to the earth by the whites and by each other. And the moral effect of these things upon 
the masses is, that they give up all hope, and abandon themselves to the groveling influences of 
their condition.”88 By the time prejudice in America ceased, Blyden was convinced that “the 
Negro will have passed away, victimized and absorbed by the Caucasian.”89 In the spirit of 
Patrick Henry, he challenged, “Is it not better to die free than live to be slaves?”—recalling the 
similar sacrifices of America’s pioneers and revolutionaries while observing that “this is the 
spirit the Anglo Saxons everywhere exhibit.”90 But Blyden also penned a relentless stream of 
criticism against white America, whose manifest destiny was nothing more than “the blending in 
material[,] political and religious work of the conglomerate forces existing in the land.”91 As the 
Liberian grumbled, 
The Anglo-saxon mind and the African mind trained under Anglo-saxon influence, seem 
to be intolerant of all customs and practices which do not conform to the standard of 
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European tastes and habits. In coming among a people hardly possessing the rudiments of 
civilization they attempt at once to introduce European views and practices among the 
people, thus interfering with and disturbing the normal operation of their native 
instincts . . . .
92
 
 
Native instincts—otherwise called natural or racial instincts by Blyden93—formed a crucial 
linchpin in his view of race. For his part, he considered skin color a tertiary trait of race, “a 
superficial accident” that paled in comparison to the more determinative factors of climate and 
environment, which he regarded as formative in developing the mental and moral faculties of his 
people.
94
 But forming these faculties had an inner component, as “it is a question also of 
instinct,” by which he meant cultural choices in one’s tastes, feelings, and preferences.95 
Blyden’s guiding rule was to “respect and preserve the harmless instincts of the people,” such as 
African dress, diet, and dialect.
96
 For the educator, harmless meant anything that did not violate 
universal principles, whose application could morph into different forms depending on the group 
in question.
97
 Hence he deplored African converts who insisted on imitating European 
missionaries in their attire to the point that a beaver hat or Wellington boots came to be seen as 
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concomitant with faith. The fallacy lay in assuming that all worship experiences were to look the 
same in Liberia as in England or America. 
 “But the duty of every man, of every race is to contend for its individuality—to keep and 
develop it,” Blyden admonished. “If you are not yourself, if you surrender your personality, you 
have nothing left to give the world.”98 By individuality, he meant “any special or peculiar 
adaptation to the situation it occupies” that “makes a man or a nation [or a race] interesting and 
indispensable on certain lines of work.”99 Consequently, he commended a sermon by Stopford 
Brooke for espousing the desire that “people gr[o]w naturally into their distinctive type and 
place in the world.”100 In Blyden’s words, “We do not want the same thing in Africa we left in 
America. Progress is difference . . . it is not to suppress individuality but to develop and 
emphasize it.”101 Hence Blyden held two positions: race essentialism based on culture, and 
complementarianism in human history and the world community. 
 These stances derived from Blyden’s view of history, and they influenced his political 
vision and hence his emigration policy. From the historical record, Blyden divined a fourfold 
providential design for African Americans: (1) their enslavement had trained them for civilizing 
and evangelizing Africa; (2) their continued marginalization kindled their desire for a true 
homeland; (3) Africa’s independence signaled divine preservation from Euro-American rule and 
reservation for African Americans; and (4) their return to Africa marked the start of reclaiming 
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and reestablishing the fatherland.
102
 On one hand, Blyden staked the move as foreordained in 
cosmic history: like ancient Israelites, African Americans were to go and possess the promised 
land for themselves and for their God. On the other hand, Blyden depicted migration as a natural 
and necessary step in the race’s historical development, predicting that “[t]he Negro exodus from 
America—gradual it may be, but, nevertheless, an exodus—is sure to come. It is an inevitable 
condition in the evolution of the Negro race.”103 
 Interestingly, Blyden articulated a view of history that was not linear but instead cyclical, 
one in which African Americans would have to repeat the same processes that Caucasians 
underwent in order to progress. At the start of all great civilizations, Blyden noted that their early 
settlers had to endure deprivation and death. Thus suffering became a key ingredient to advance, 
as “the Cross precedes the Crown.”104 And hence, “the man, then, who is not able to suffer and to 
die for his fellows when necessity requires it, is not fit to be a pioneer in this great work.”105 
Now one begins to glimpse the difficulty facing Blyden: he required not just recruits but true 
converts who possessed unshakable racial instincts that would spur them not only to sacrifice 
their lives but also to perform cultural excavation that would preserve their purity and 
individuality. In one sense, it was easier for Blyden when they died because when dead, a person 
becomes an object that the living can commodify and refigure for their own cause. 
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 Few African Americans could live up to Blyden’s ideal, and in time he ended up as an 
equal opportunity critic, blasting U.S. northern and southern blacks alike. “It is well, perhaps,” 
he sighed, “that these Northern blacks have not rushed in large numbers to Liberia; they do not 
seem fitted to the endurance and self-denial of founding new empires, which the southern 
emigrants to Liberia have manifested.”106 And of former Southern slaves, he pined, “The body 
was set free, but the soul remained in bondage. Therefore, the intellectual, social and religious 
freedom of the American ex-slave has yet to be achieved.”107 As Blyden came to realize, a 
change in location would not automatically change one’s mental condition. Thus he judged an 
immediate exodus to Africa to be neither desirable nor prudent: “I believe that while there are 
and will continue to be intense longings on the part of many in the South for Africa, and while 
there will be now and then small emigrations to the Fatherland, the time for anything like a 
general exodus is far distant—perhaps three hundred years off . . . .”108 
 Moving away from his early exuberance of unqualified emigration, Blyden eschewed an 
American replica in favor of a racial restoration that boasted African—i.e. non Anglo-Saxon—
methods and achievement. No doubt his opposition stemmed in part from his mistreatment by 
American emigrants in the 1860s; nearly a half century later, he still railed against “Americo-
Liberians or Afro-Americans, that is to say, Africans with the prejudices and predilections—the 
bias and aspirations—of white men: with ‘ideals’ . . . pitifully Anglo-Saxon” and “altogether 
unattainable” for the political and cultural context in which black people found themselves.109 
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Although “we have tried to copy the United States,” Blyden conceded “this system has failed” 
because “it is not natural to man as an individual to be a republican which means all for one and 
one for all.”110 Only Africans could save Africa, because as Blyden trumpeted, “The African idea 
is the idea of the first Christian Church—‘One for all and all for one’ . . . . Now this model is in 
entire agreement with African instincts.”111  
Blyden’s disillusionment translated into ironic support for Booker T. Washington’s 
Atlanta Exposition speech.
112
 Because Blyden judged the Southern Negro “not yet ready for the 
transition” to Africa, he contended, “The [present] interest as well as the duty of the Southern 
Negro, it appears to me, is to follow the practical and sensible advice by Mr. Booker T. 
Washington, in his now famous metaphor, ‘to drop his bucket where he is’—to use the ample, 
and I must add, unexampled means to put into his hands for real progress and permanent 
usefulness.”113 As such, Blyden ruled out political involvement—which hindered “genuine 
progress” by distracting African Americans from the “higher and nobler work” of spiritual and 
industrial amelioration
114—because “practically the Negro is in the United States to stay, and 
should adjust his relations with the white people upon a basis that will ensure peace, harmony 
and prosperity.”115 
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Blyden never gave up on his notion of racial instincts, but he did contract the pool who 
possessed them. American blacks still had a leadership role to play, but their number shrank 
from the 600,000 he had once envisioned.
116
 In his later years, Blyden adopted a racial biologism 
that he had earlier denounced in some colonizationists. In 1869 he exulted, “The Negro is being 
taught to respect himself, and soon he will think it no honour to mingle his blood with that of the 
Caucasian, Indian, or Mongolian.”117 More than two decades later, he went public with his 
biological essentialism, exhaling, 
 The great mass of the race, thank God, has not been tampered with. At least 200 millions 
in the vast regions east and north and south of us remain intact. The contamination has 
affected only a few millions in the western hemisphere and a few thousands along the 
margin of the continent. But no pure race has ever yet been destroyed. The original races 
of the Eastern hemisphere have existed from the beginning and no one of them can be 
exterminated, as degenerate offsprings of them have been in America . . . .
118
  
 
These are Frederick Douglass’s premises in reverse: biological assimilationism becomes a 
detriment rather than an advantage, as racial homogeneity serves as the prerequisite to creating a 
successful nation-state. Racial intermixture creates not a new progressive race but a degenerate 
one riddled with “psychological possibilities and susceptibilities” inferior to the “mental 
idiosyncrasy of Africans.”119 Not with a little irony, then, does one discover that Blyden’s 
admirable respect for African and Islamic civilization originated in his biologically-driven 
contempt for those of biracial and interracial descent. In the end, Blyden’s emigrationism fell 
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victim to his racialism, leaving him to enshrine racial standards that most African Americans, 
with their mixed heritage, could not possibly hope to meet. 
 
Alexander Crummell 
Of the men discussed, Alexander Crummell was born with the most advantaged birth as 
the eldest son of an affluent free black family in New York. As a child, young Alex rubbed 
shoulders with such family friends and luminaries as John Russwurm, Samuel Cornish, and 
Arthur Tappan. Family wealth and connections gave the boy access to a model education at the 
African Free School, Canal Street High School, and Oneida Institute. And as a classmate of 
Henry Garnet, James McCune Smith, and Samuel Ringgold Ward, Crummell circulated among a 
pantheon of future African American novas. Yet his childhood was not entirely idyllic, as a 
white mob torched his family’s church in 1834 and another one destroyed his school in 1835.120 
Blessed with exceptional training and beset by racist-tinged experiences, at the tender age of 
nineteen he lectured as the featured speaker of the Association for the Political Improvement of 
the People of Color, which lobbied for full enfranchisement of black voters. He was determined 
to embark on an illustrious career that would fulfill his leadership potential and bring glory to his 
race. 
Crummell’s defining encounter with racism came in 1839, when he petitioned for 
admittance into seminary, only to be denied because of his racial background. Episcopalian 
bishop Benjamin Onderdonk summoned the twenty-year old before him in order to berate the 
upstart youth for having the impudence to apply to a white school, reducing the aspiring 
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seminarian to tears.
121
 During the next decade, he had a run-in with Benjamin Onderdonk’s 
brother, Henry, another Episcopal bishop who offered to recognize his clergy credentials as long 
as he avoided seeking official recognition in the diocese convention. Years later, W. E. B. Du 
Bois would immortalize the confrontation in The Souls of Black Folk, painting Crummell as a 
principled objector who gravely informed Onderdonk, “I will never enter your diocese on such 
terms,” before turning and “pass[ing] into the Valley of the Shadow of Death.”122 Although Du 
Bois’s poignant recount may be idealized, it does accurately depict the obduracy Crummell 
encountered in his quest to become a man of letters. During the early 1840s he spent some time 
taking classes at Yale, though never finishing because of a probable proscription against formal 
admittance of African American students. Restless and ambitious, Crummell decided to obtain 
his academic credentials abroad in England. 
Crummell would later wax nostalgic about his time in Britain as “a period of grand 
opportunities, of the richest privileges, of cherished remembrances and of golden light.”123 He 
disembarked in London in 1848 with a young family in tow, ostensibly to fundraise for his parish 
back home. Yet he had an ulterior motive, to earn a college degree from either Oxford or 
Cambridge, whose prestigious reputation he hoped would “shame, contempt, neutralize caste—
yea even command respect and consideration.”124 In 1853 he had in hand a precious sheepskin 
from Cambridge, where he had matriculated for the past four years. Yet he shocked his 
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supporters and New York congregants when he announced his decision not to return to America 
because of “the earnest counsel of my medical advisor that I must seek a warm climate. It was 
this advice which led me to Africa.”125 Still, the pastor scholar considered his move to be 
consistent with race amelioration, insisting, “My heart, from youth, was consecrated to my race 
and its interests; and as I was ordered to a tropical clime, I chose the land of my forefathers, and 
went to West Africa.”126 After his arrival in Liberia, he defended his choice more stridently, 
smarting, “I claim as good a right to live in Africa as any man. I have come back to within a 
day’s journey of the very spot whence my own father was stolen in his boyhood and where my 
poor ancestors lived from time immemorial! Who has a better right to emigrate to Africa than I? 
However disagreeable my presence may be to any man, it is nevertheless my birthright; I claim 
and insist upon it, to live and labor in Liberia . . . .”127 
 Crummell’s decision to emigrate derived from a combination of factors, both personal 
and ideological, including health, professional ambition, pecuniary concerns, evangelistic 
idealism, sense of heritage, and mounting respect for Liberians. “All men have the natural right 
to rise to any position to which talent and energy may fit them,” he averred.128 But the 1850 
Fugitive Slave Law had reinforced to Crummell the barrier to social ascent in the United States, 
and the 1851 founding of Liberia College beckoned him to utilize his academic gifts as an 
African don. From an economic vantage, the burgeoning coffee market and liberal landowning 
policies moved Crummell to boast “that a retirement to a farm, with ordinary activity will give 
                                                          
125
 Crummell, Jubilate, reprinted in Moses, Destiny and Race, 38. 
126
 Ibid., 40. 
127
 Alexander Crummell letter, Monrovia, Liberia, 7 May 1866, in Archives of the Episcopal Church, RG 
72: Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society/National Council—The Liberia Papers, Period A: 1822–1867, Box 2, 
Crummell, Rev. Alexander, 1853–1867, “Liberia: Crummell, Rev. Alex, 1866” folder. 
128
 Alex Crummell, “The Dignity of Labor; and Its Value to a New People,” in Crummell, Africa and 
America, 400. 
  
46 
 
any intelligent stirring man, a fortune in 10 or 15 years.”129 With the Domestic and Foreign 
Missionary Society scouring Episcopalian ranks for black missionaries to go to Africa, 
Crummell seemed a perfect candidate with his pastoral background. Finally, he had harbored an 
inner desire to see Africa since childhood, as “it was by listening to his [father’s] tales of African 
life, I became deeply interested in the land of our fathers; and early in my life resolved, at some 
future day, to go to Africa.”130 Presented with the chance, the newly minted college graduate 
seized the prospects for a better life outside the confines of a repressive America. 
Emigration made business sense, too, because as Crummell touted, by stimulating and 
investing in African industry, one could (1) block Euro-American inroads into Africa, (2) shed 
the stigma of penury and impotence, (3) indebt African society to its American kin, and (4) 
enrich African American investors in the process.
131
 He pinned his hopes particularly on coffee, 
which he foresaw as a major cash crop and as a civilizing agent. Thus “I regard it as one of the 
most hopeful incidents in Liberian life; for, as the people plant Coffee and increase their means, 
more comfort will prevail, and higher social and domestic ambitions will arise, civilization will 
advance, and churches will become self-supporting, and new missions will be originated in our 
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own religious bodies.”132 Regarding commerce as a requisite step for the gospel, Crummell 
bubbled, “This interior country is opened for trade and barter: and then why not for the Gospel, 
for Missions, for Schools, for [Chris]tian training and instruction? Surely the former are not of as 
much importance as the latter.”133 So while “I recognize the need of Trade, Agriculture, 
Commerce, Art, Letters and Government, as the collateral and the indispensable aids to the 
complete restoration of my fatherland,” Crummell deemed them to be “but collateral and 
auxiliary; not the end, and aim, and object of that divine will and providence.”134 To accuse 
Crummell of succumbing to capitalist greed, then, is to miss the point that his economic 
arguments for emigrating were to lead to the higher ends of evangelization and civilization. 
 Crummell stamped his colonization efforts often with a divinely sanctioned imprint. In 
his sermons, the missionary pastor warned of God’s retributive destruction and restorative 
discipline to the wayward, extending God’s “governmental” and “universal” principle to not only 
individuals but also societies.
135
 Hence the African American community had a choice of two 
paths: it could succumb to the effects of slavery and prejudice, or it could submit to divine trial 
in order to augur a better tomorrow. In the 1860s Crummell interpreted the latter to mean a return 
                                                          
132
 Alexander Crummell letter, Caldwell and Monrovia, Liberia, West Africa, 3 April 1871, in Archives of 
the Episcopal Church, RG 72: Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society/National Council—The Liberia Papers, 
Period B: 1868–1896, Box 21 [35], Crummell, Rev. Alexander, 1868–1874, “Liberia, Rev. Alexander Crummell, 
1871” folder. 
133
 Alexander Crummell letter, Caldwell and Monrovia, Liberia, West Africa, 9 September 1870, in 
Archives of the Episcopal Church, RG 72: Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society/National Council—The 
Liberia Papers, Period B: 1868–1896, Box 21 [35], Crummell, Rev. Alexander, 1868–1874, “Liberia, Crummell, 
Rev. Alexander, 1870” folder, original emphasis retained. 
134
 Alex Crummell, “The Regeneration of Africa,” discourse before the Pennsylvania Colonization Society, 
at the Church of the Epiphany, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 1865, in Crummell, Africa and America, 446, 
original emphasis retained. 
135
 Alexander Crummell, “The Destined Superiority of the Negro,” in Alexander Crummell, The Greatness 
of Christ and Other Sermons (New York: Thomas Whittaker, 1882), 332-52, reprinted in Alexander Crummell, 
Civilization and Black Progress: Selected Writings of Alexander Crummell on the South, edited by J. R. Oldfield 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995), 46. 
  
48 
 
to Africa in order to complete God’s historical plan. On one hand, emigration was “almost 
coeval with humanity itself,” as people exhibited “a spontaneous, instinctive nature” in migrating 
during the earliest recorded history.
136
 As Crummell asserted, “Colonization is history.”137 And 
on the other hand, emigration was also providential due to the forced exile of enslaved millions, 
from which “God is bringing scores and hundred of them back to this continent [of Africa], as 
colonists and teachers; and with them ‘casts the pearl of the gospel’ upon these heathen 
shores!”138 Therefore, Crummell surmised that the duty of emigrants was to civilize and 
Christianize African natives so that they “become citizens in a negro nationality and the creators 
of a free Republic amid despotic heathenism.”139 Here one finds a political goal behind 
Crummell’s economic and religious reasons for departing the United States.  
 Yet Crummell’s concept of nationality differed from Delany’s political state, coming 
closer to Blyden’s idea of a distinct sphere of sociocultural influence. For Crummell, national 
identity depended on circumstance, position, religion, and race. Commenting on the social 
conditions in postwar United States, he pinpointed that “[i]t is this our actual separation from the 
real life of the nation, which constitutes us ‘a nation within a nation:’ thrown very considerably 
upon ourselves for many of the largest interests of life, and for nearly all our social and religious 
advantages.”140 While none of the other emigrationists would have disagreed with this statement, 
Crummell went further in defining nation by the presence of characteristics usually attributed to 
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a civilization. “It was not, in a true sense, a nation,” he adjudged when first arriving in Liberia. 
“It has never risen above crude and simple Colonial life; for it was, at first, driven by untoward 
circumstances, and these not of its own creation, to assume, and before due time, exaggerated 
and almost crushing national functions. I found there great crudities, and sad anomalies. How 
could it have been otherwise? Was not Liberia the fruit, the product of slavery? Did not its 
illiteracy and its immorality spring directly from the plantation?”141 Servility, illiteracy, and 
immorality—all of these signaled to Crummell that Liberia had not yet met his cultural criteria 
for nationhood. 
Throughout his years in Monrovia, the straitlaced Episcopalian harped incessantly about 
the degenerate condition of American emigrants, once venting, 
Yet I cannot cannot [sic] write the glowing reports of the nation and of the people, and 
the conditions and prospects of the Republic wh[ich] many people do; and yet be a true 
and honest man, that is, in my own estimation of myself. There is a great work to be done 
here for these colonists: they come out here, whole cargoes of them, fresh from the 
plantations, and, with rare and individual exceptions, ignorant, benighted, besotted and 
filthy, both in the inner and the outer man: for . . . the life of these men, that is their inner 
life, is gone: crushed . . . and only the shredded wreck of humanity remains.
142
 
 
Crummell’s antipathy had less to do with circumstance and position and more to do with religion 
and race. In short, African American emigrants failed to uphold the moral and racial ideals 
integral to his notion of nationality. “The race is essentially religious,” Crummell instructed. 
“Even in his pagan state the spiritual instinct always has had the ascendancy.”143 As a boy, he 
had tended to measure others by whether they had “high moral and spiritual instincts” rather than 
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by Blyden’s racial instincts.144 Crummell, however, did believe in racial instincts that produced 
moral distinctiveness—whereas Blyden’s racial instincts accented cultural difference—claiming, 
“Every race of people has its special instincts, carries in its blood its distinctive individuality. 
This peculiar element is its own and exclusive possession, and is incapable of transference.”145 
Crummell wedded race to religion when he proposed, “It is thus, through this peculiarity, that the 
Negro has held on to those special moral qualities, to those high spiritual instincts which were 
recognized by ancient Pagan writers as qualities of the Hamitic family; and which have been 
noticed by discerning Christian philosophers and philanthropists in all subsequent times.”146 One 
may wonder why all the fuss about a religious race, or stated differently, a racialized religion. 
Crummell obsessed over the idea because it not only informed the past but also dictated the 
future. He staked “the principle of race [a]s one of the most persistent of all things in the 
constitution of man. It is one of those structural facts in our nature which abide with a fixed, 
vital, and reproductive power.”147 His procreative language hints at the importance of the family 
in Crummell’s conceptual framework, “[f]or the basis of all human progress and of all 
civilization is the family,” which he regarded as more valuable than “the school, the college, the 
profession, suffrage, civil office.”148 In his paradigm, “[i]ndeed, a race is a family. The principle 
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of continuity is as masterful in races as it is in families—as it is in nations.”149 Thus Crummell 
was a racial/religious essentialist, in that he remained steadfastly convinced that survival of the 
race was rooted in “those special moral qualities” intrinsic in one’s biological constitution and 
familial association.
150
 Less than a year before his death, he was still bemoaning, “We have as 
yet no wide, stable basis of race-feeling to work upon; it has got to be created. Take the average 
black man in America, and you will find that he thinks that the creation of races was a 
superfluous act on the part of the Almighty; and that that superfluity is to be corrected in 
America.”151 
No surprise, then, that Crummell reiterated Blyden’s desire for selective emigration. In 
1861 he begged for fifty thousand emigrants to Liberia; in 1865 he spoke of using just a 
“remnant”; and by 1882 he privileged “the few who lift up and bear the burdens and give 
character to the many.”152 On the mission field, he predicted that uplift of incoming emigrants 
would take a half century to accomplish, and he brooded over their “corroded” affections.153 
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“Who are to be the agents to raise and elevate this people to a higher plane of being?” queried 
Crummell. “They are to be the scholars; for to transform, stimulate and uplift a people is a work 
of intelligence; it is a work which demands the clear induction of historical facts and their 
application to new circumstances,—a work which will require the most skillful resources and the 
wise practicality of superior men.”154 Thus one uncovers the hierarchal nature of Crummell’s 
emigrationism: a small intelligentsia would mobilize the masses by reforming their morals, 
civilizing their manners, and establishing their commerce, which would result in an African 
nationality emerging to showcase the religious, intellectual, and political superiority of the black 
race. It required time, discipline, and “a superior class of men” who possessed “like sentiments, 
feelings, blood and ancestry.”155 At its core, Crummell’s emigrationism followed Plato’s 
Republic in its vision of rule by philosopher-kings. As the Episcopalian Platonist summed, “All 
the improvement, the progress, the culture, the civilization of men come from somewhere above. 
They never come from below!”156 Consequently, in pronouncing on Crummell, one finds 
emigration infused with collective duty but also tinged with exclusivity designed to fulfill 
individual aspirations. His hierarchal civilizationism, while not as exclusionary as Blyden’s 
racial instincts, was just as rigid, demanding adherence to moral perfectionism and autocratic 
rule. 
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Historiography 
Emigrationists’ philosophies of leadership and nationality had ramifications for relations 
with natives, who often found themselves assigned to the bottom rung of society. In the decades 
after postcolonialist critics like Frantz Fanon, historians have reevaluated emigrationists such as 
Delany, Blyden, and Crummell. 
According to Alfred Moss, Crummell held unswerving belief in the efficacy of Western 
civilization, what he considered the apex of human advancement. Crummell advocated strong 
national identity through the promotion of commerce, culture, and Christianity—all hallmarks of 
the Western world. As Moss avers, Crummell’s sense of duty compelled him to transfer these 
Western ideals to indigenous Africans, whether wanted or not. In Moss’s estimation, Crummell 
conflated culture with civilization, expecting Africans to conform to Western culture in order to 
be civilized. Consequently, Crummell became “a hostile and unsympathetic surveyor” of African 
culture, blind to how Euro-American values could debase the socioeconomic lives of blacks.
157
 
Wilson Moses finds Crummell to be a “mass of contradictions” in trying to hold 
simultaneously to black nationalism, Victorian civilizationism, and Anglocentric elitism. On the 
one hand, Crummell opposed what Moses terms “settler-state colonialism,” which favored the 
forcible displacement and extermination of aborigines for the benefit of Monrovia’s mulatto-
ruled government. Furthermore, Crummell placed a premium on Africans’ morals and 
upbringing. He admired the physical prowess and high character of tribal natives. The Vey and 
Mandingoes were truly “noble savages” in their perceived innocence, intelligence, and 
industriousness. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Crummell valued the aborigines for their 
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physical feats and personal integrity. On the other hand, Moses faults the “whiggish, elitist, 
capitalistic, and statist republicanism” embraced by nationalists such as Crummell. Although 
Crummell espoused benevolent rule over natives, it was rule nonetheless. His additional belief in 
Christian redemptionism, Moses argues, prevented Crummell from ever shaking the conviction 
that they were somehow “degraded.” Indigenous tribes lacked the spiritual, political, and cultural 
advancement that Crummell presupposed Christianity brought. If Liberia were to rise to 
England’s stature, it needed its inhabitants to adopt Protestant faith. The same went for language. 
Moses points to Crummell’s strident endorsement of the English language as another example of 
his Anglophilism. In championing English as the language of liberty and Christianity, he 
dismissed native languages as “rude” and unfit for expressing “higher” ideals. Taken together, 
Crummell’s notions of civilizationism and Anglophilism clashed with his Afrocentrism, Moses 
judges, leaving Crummell incapable of fully assimilating into Liberian society.
158
 
Tunde Adeleke disagrees with Moses’ “reductionist” assessment. More than just 
promoting civilizationism, Crummell legitimated imperialism. As Adeleke explains, a negative 
view of Africans led Crummell to disparage their culture and eventually advocate European rule. 
His disdain for Africans arose from belief that slavery had been a divinely-directed “fortunate 
fall”—that is, slavery had a salutary civilizing influence on its victims—causing him to regard 
African Americans as better suited for progress. This thinking was tantamount to rationalizing 
oppression, Adeleke charges. Crummell was an imperialist masquerading as a providentialist. 
Just as God had used slavery to “better” African Americans, Crummell thought colonialism 
could benefit Africans through the principle of diffusion: civilization would replace barbarism, 
as colonial governance imprinted its values on the populace. By venerating Anglo-Saxon values, 
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he “castigated and scorned indigenous Africans.” Because natives needed strong guidance, 
Crummell went as far as to lobby for a European protectorate over Liberia. Crummell’s low 
opinion of Africans and his high regard for European civilization, Adeleke concludes, led him to 
justify future white domination in Africa. For Adeleke, Crummell’s black nationalism was 
merely European colonialism in a different guise.
159
 
Adeleke judges Delany just as harshly. Although Delany promoted self-rule, Adeleke 
charges that he also perpetuated the economic and cultural pretexts for imperialism. Determined 
that American blacks form “the ruling element,” Delany looked for a location that possessed the 
building blocks for erecting a black nationality: land, labor, and natural resources. He found 
Africa to be that place, Adeleke argues, and championed African American emigration to the 
continent. Despite denouncing white intrusion, Delany advocated their methods, particularly 
utilizing commerce to cement political power. As Adeleke construes Delany’s approach, African 
Americans had to become “equally imperialistic” and economically aggressive to match the 
Europeans. They had to colonize Africa before white financiers did. But Adeleke warns 
commerce was a double-edged sword that produced not only wealth but also hegemony and 
exploitation. Worse for Adeleke, Delany cloaked his motives in religious language, co-opting the 
Deuteronomic admonition for Israel to go and possess the land. “Essentially, Delany used 
providentialism to legitimize emigration and the accumulation and appropriation of wealth,” 
Adeleke accuses.
160
 In his quest to resettle Africa, Delany compromised his longstanding 
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opposition to white financing, even going so far as to court British industrialists.
161
 His proposed 
alliance of British manufacturers, African American workers, and native laborers cultivating 
cotton in Africa, in Adeleke’s mind, left indigenous Africans in the unenviable role of serving as 
a cheap labor force. In Delany’s scheme, they were but objects to be exploited. 
Delany’s travels caused him to move further toward European methods. For evidence, 
Adeleke cites Delany’s praise of missionary efforts to end such “barbaric” native practices as 
sleeping on the ground, eating without utensils, and appearing in various states of undress. His 
approval amounted to the imposition of Western values upon Africa, exposing the “imperialistic 
aspect of Delany’s character.”162 Adeleke attributes his reversal to Euro-American acculturation 
and the culture shock of confronting an Africa different from the one he preconceived. In spite of 
his impassioned nationalist pronouncements, Delany suffered from the complex duality of being 
an African American—thereby preventing complete identification with Africa. 
Nell Irvin Painter focuses on the second aspect of Delany’s identity. She depicts Delany 
as a thoroughgoing American who favored both elevation and elitism. By elevation, Painter 
means the acquisition of morals, culture, and robust religion. She argues that early Delany was 
not so much a nationalist as a proto-Zionist who thought building a nation-state would help 
defeat racism. Under this scenario, Delany envisioned an intelligent elite who would instruct the 
masses on proper methods to achieving elevation. For Painter, this conviction informed Delany’s 
views on native Africans. Thus during his visit to Africa, he was quick to praise the missionary 
oversight that transformed “dirty, ragged, barefooted black boys” into “cleanly, well-dressed, 
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polite young gentlemen.”163 Painter notes the inconsistency of Delany’s railing against Americo-
Liberian settlers for their dependency on the white ACS all the while approving of their 
supremacy over black aborigines. In a sense, he was just as paternalistic as the ACS. This settler 
mentality Delany shared did little to distinguish him from British settlers in East Africa or Jewish 
settlers in Palestine, Painter contends. And had Delany’s Yorubaland plans materialized, she 
asserts that his commercial expansion would have exploited native land and labor. Although not 
denouncing Delany as an imperialist, Painter deems him a “class-bound” American whose black 
nationalism was as elitist as any white settler’s thinking of that day. 
Paul Gilroy follows Painter in pronouncing Delany’s black nationalism as elitist. Africa 
needed a wholesale renovation, and Delany looked to Western civilization to effect the 
turnaround. He thought commercial development, intelligently led, could accomplish that end. 
Like others, Gilroy points out that Delany’s proposed Triple Alliance comprised English capital, 
black American intellect, and African labor. While benefits were to be shared mutually, 
leadership would be assigned unequally.  
Delany’s ideals extended beyond the commercial to encompass the moral and political 
realms. Gilroy argues that Delany advanced an anti-mystical, racial rationalism as the future 
basis for his nationalizing project. He eschewed heathen superstition (and African American 
religion) as preventing the catholicity of a synthetic, supra-ethnic nation-state. In place of folk-
cultural religiosity, he substituted an individual ethic of thrift, temperance, and hard work—all 
staples of black American uplift ideology. Whether by practice or principle, Delany’s nationalist 
vision propagated a hermetically sealed culture that fit African Americans best of all. 
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Gilroy identifies Delany as holding to ontological essentialism, one which relies on the 
black intellectual to pronounce on the rightness of cultural practices and to enforce their 
implementation among the race. Devoted to this rigid doctrine, Delany overlooked ethnic 
particularities embedded within his intended polity. Although Delany’s goal of melding a nation-
state was noble, Gilroy criticizes him for holding a romantic notion of “race” and “nation” that 
prioritized Delany and black Americans over the native people they meant to represent.
164
 
 Robert Levine hews closely to Gilroy’s interpretation. The literary critic performs a close 
reading of Delany’s novella, Blake; or, the Huts of America. Written on the eve of the Civil War, 
the story traces the travels of a fictional slave, Henry Blake, who escapes his Mississippi owner 
and travels throughout the U.S. South and Cuba, fomenting insurrectionary plots among the 
slaves, as he steals from plantation to plantation. Moving to slaveholding Cuba, Blake aspires to 
lead a revolt in order to topple the government and to install a black ruling element in the 
country. Levine asks how Blake’s revolutionary project differs from William Walker’s 
“filibustering” in Central America.165  
What makes Blake—and Delany by extension—any different than Walker? Levine 
questions whether Blake’s mission was just as imperialistic as Walker’s freebooting. As Levine 
observes, Delany tries to legitimate Blake’s coup two ways—one with reference to Blake’s 
personal history and another in an appeal to Blake’s blackness. First, Blake claims he is “the lost 
boy of Cuba,” a native-born son who was kidnapped and sold into slavery. Second, co-
conspirators can trust Blake because he is “true to [his] own color.” That he is black and Cuban 
sets him apart, at least in Delany’s mind. 
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Yet Levine detects a whiff of “civilized” hierarchalism in both Blake’s Caribbean 
revolution and Delany’s Afrocentric black nationalism. Blake finds himself in the “fortunate” 
position he is in because of his enslavement in the United States, where he learns the evils of 
slavery and the means of liberation. He gains the intelligence and vocabulary necessary to 
institute freedom in his birth country. Leading up to the long-planned revolution, Blake 
engineers a mutiny of a Spanish slaver. The principal actors are native Krumen who 
commandeer the ship from their white captors. But the mutiny’s mastermind remains none other 
than Blake himself, the embodiment of black civilized leadership. Natives, both African and 
Cuban, draw on his expertise in carrying out their insurrections. 
Most troubling for Levine is Blake’s colonizing tendencies. Blake depicts native Indians 
and blacks as a united “colored race” against white supremacy. In reality, Blake elides 
Amerindians, subsuming them under a black Manifest Destiny that is not theirs, one neither 
claimed nor shared. The foibles in Blake are ones Levine detects in Delany, whose black 
nationality ideal comes saddled with top-down leadership pretensions, exaggerated kinship 
claims, and co-opted group identities.
166
 
James Campbell proffers a novel take on Delany’s ethnocentrism, suggesting he was 
influenced by David Livingstone’s Seventeen Years’ Explorations and Adventures in the Wilds of 
Africa (1857) and Thomas Bowen’s Central Africa: Adventures and Missionary Labors in 
Several Countries in the Interior of Africa (1857). Both men were missionary explorers who 
wrote adventure tales that served as “intellectual foundations of empire, posing a stark opposition 
between an ‘enlightened’ West, imagined as rational, progressive, and white, and a ‘benighted’ 
Africa, imagined as irrational, backward, and black.” These travelogues represented an 
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inspiration for Delany, who would go on to style his Yorubaland visit as scientific exploration. 
His Official Report of the Niger Valley Exploring Party also echoed a common theme. To quote 
Campbell: “Of all the ideas about landscape embedded in Western travel writing, none played a 
more central role in the construction of colonial authority than the idea of improvement.” Delany 
used the term more than twenty times in the report, revealing his conviction that Africa was a 
reclamation project which only cultivated black Westerners could conduct. To Campbell, Delany 
demonstrated little concern for indigenous culture in his zeal to remake Africa through 
commerce, industry, and civilization. And when he penned, “Africa for the African race, and 
black men to rule them,” Delany had little room for indigenous people, except as those to be 
ruled.
167
 
Unlike either Delany or Crummell, Edward Blyden is more palatable to historians 
because of his progressive views on African religion and culture. His main biographer, Hollis 
Lynch, labels Blyden a “Pan-Negro patriot” who was “the most learned and articulate champion 
of Africa” during his lifetime. Early on, Blyden held a conservative outlook that comported with 
traditional Euro-American views. As Lynch notes, in the 1850s Blyden portrayed Africa as the 
“Dark Continent” whose “barbarous tribes” needed “civilized and enlightened influences.” Its 
inhabitants needed emancipation, redemption, and elevation by means of “Christian civilization.” 
As early as the 1860s, Blyden depicted the civilizing project as a race between blacks and 
Europeans, with the stated motivation being not colonial partition but humanitarian 
regeneration.
168
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Consequently, Blyden was a staunch proponent of territorial expansion. As Secretary of 
State in 1864, he dismissed African chieftains’ opposition to Liberia’s territorial claims as being 
fueled by “mercenary motives.” He wrote the British Foreign Office to justify Liberia’s 
jurisdiction. He based its legitimacy on two reasons: (1) Liberians had a special relationship with 
aborigines on account of their fraternal, kinship ties and (2) Liberians extended “intelligent rule” 
over the natives by “civilizing them to Christian law.”169 
Three decades later, Blyden had reimagined the civilized African. Blyden disassociated 
the European further from “him”—the prototypical African was almost invariably male for 
Blyden—casting him as the antithesis of the truculent, hedonistic white man. Blyden’s African 
was spiritually civilized in his “perfect state,” which Blyden construed to be pastoral agriculture 
(itself reminiscent of Thomas Jefferson’s agrarian republicanism). Lynch identifies Blyden as 
reassembling the idyllic construct of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s noble savage and Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky’s rural Slav in propagating an untainted, bucolic vision of Africa. While natives 
could benefit from western “culture,” the process was to be additive rather than assimilative. In 
other words, white civilization could enrich Africans—if properly filtered and adapted. In the 
1850s and 1860s Blyden assigned that role to African Americans, who had returned to their 
ancestral homeland with the requisite education and acculturation to carry out the job.
170
 
After Blyden’s near lynching in 1871, he veered away from a strict Liberian nationalism 
and shifted toward what Lynch terms “cultural nationalism.” It was during this time that Blyden 
truly became Lynch’s so-called “Pan-Negro patriot.” Blyden argued for preserving African 
customs and traditions while decrying forced Europeanization that impugned and obliterated 
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their perpetuation. As discussed previously, he became a vocal critic of Christian missions, much 
of which he regarded as a ham-fisted attempt to straitjacket natives—both religiously and 
culturally. He rejected John Locke’s tabula rasa when applied to Africans; their practices were 
neither meaningless nor meritless. Blyden defended polygamy, pantheism, and Mohammedanism 
in print, igniting controversy among western readers. Lynch points out that Blyden still esteemed 
Christianity as the highest form of religion, but this valuation came with a caveat. Blyden judged 
religious belief based on its efficacy to advance cultural nationalism. Did it affirm indigenous 
values, and did it further pan-Negro aims? If so, Blyden was apt to subsume it under his 
particular brand of patriotism. 
Perhaps Blyden’s most polarizing position, in retrospect, was his advocacy of a European 
protectorate for West Africa. In 1872, under the auspices of a Freetown-funded expedition, he 
appealed for a British protectorate over the natives in Sierra Leone on the grounds that they were 
“besotted pagans” whose trade and traits were “incompatible with human progress.”171 As his 
trust in Americo-Liberians faltered, his enthusiasm for European oversight mushroomed. Lynch 
chides Blyden for his blind support of Leopold II’s Belgian involvement in the Congo, but by the 
1890s Blyden’s calls for European intervention had become an unwavering article of faith, 
however naïve and misguided. Adeleke also rebukes Blyden for his contradictory commitment to 
African civilization and European “occupation.”172 For all of Blyden’s commendable views on 
Africans, his position on Euro-American superintendence represents a blemish on his otherwise 
sterling record of defending native interests. 
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Claude Clegg argues Americo-Liberians practiced paternalism at best and outright 
exploitation at worst. He criticizes their treatment of recaptives, whom the government viewed as 
a cheap labor force and safety buffer against hostile natives.
173
 Liberia settled many recaptives in 
the dangerous territory adjacent to tribal lands, where it expected recaptives to join settlers in 
quelling any native rebellions. Granted neither political rights nor economic independence, 
recaptives found themselves in a murky intermediate status, one which Clegg asserts Americo-
Liberians used to create “networks of dependence.” Additionally, scores of recaptive children 
ended up living in Americo-Liberian households, ostensibly to speed the assimilation process. In 
exchange for food, shelter, and domestic service, they were to receive a Western education and 
future entry into Liberia’s sociopolitical society. But some Liberians took advantage of their 
position to mistreat their wards through harsh discipline, inadequate provisions, or a denied 
education. This arrangement—be it called adoption, pawnage, apprenticeship, domestic 
servanthood, or household slavery—proved to be an uneven experience for these children who 
were at the mercy of their trustees, some of whom treated their charges as little more than unfree 
labor. These dependency networks also extended to natives, who also sent hundreds of their 
children to live with Americo-Liberians. Sadly the practice was rarely a fair trade.  
More fundamentally, Clegg criticizes the larger issue of Americo-Liberian chauvinism. 
Monrovia came to assume “the arrogance of a conqueror” whose presupposed superiority led to 
an unhealthy and artificial dualism. Liberians were republican citizens who brought culture, 
civilization, and the Gospel to the continent; whereas Africans were heathen savages who 
wallowed in witchcraft, superstition, and backward ignorance. Given this perceived binary, 
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Liberians felt justified in defining Africans as outsiders, which Clegg views as a precursor to the 
European-style “colonialism” Liberia imposed on natives by the end of the nineteenth century.174 
David Brion Davis is more sympathetic. Although he faults Americo-Liberians for their 
shortcomings, he finds extenuating circumstances explain some of those failings. Davis concedes 
Americo-Liberians were just as ethnocentric as the English settlers who colonized North 
America in the eighteenth century. Yet the first group carried the additional burden of proving to 
the world that blacks could achieve the same lofty accomplishments as whites. Liberia was seen 
as a social experiment in Negro ability, much like post-revolutionary Haiti had been a test case 
for free labor.
175
 Many colonizationists, including some who were slaveholders, expected 
emigrants to acquit themselves by demonstrating the ability to erect and maintain a civilized 
society—especially now that they were free from the toxicity of American slavery and racism. A 
successful showing, it was thought, would exonerate the black race by confirming “radical 
environmentalism,” the theory that humans could change swiftly and suddenly when thrust into 
new surroundings. In short, a beacon nation would disprove a benighted state. 
Thusly charged with vindicating their race by serving as “a city on a hill,” Americo-
Liberians were wary of “counter-conversion,” or assimilating into the native population. This 
psychic wedge was only one of many missteps. Davis characterizes Americo-Liberians as being 
naïve about the native reception to colonization. Privatized land, territorial cession, political 
jurisdiction—all these colonial practices clashed with existing native structures in place. Even 
the emigrants’ well-intentioned emphasis on “legitimate” trade such as rice, camwood, and palm 
oil did little to tamp down the slave trade. It merely shifted the site: Africans were no longer 
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needed as trafficked exports but as domestic slaves. The West African colonies of Sierra Leone 
and Liberia were, as Davis describes, “building an entrance ramp on the road to imperialism.” 
Examples of subjugation were not difficult to locate. Like Clegg, Davis cites Americo-Liberians’ 
abusive practice of “pawning,” or borrowing a native for a period of household service. These 
wardships were intended to acculturate Africans to western lifestyles, but reports filtered back to 
the U.S. of some Liberians treating their wards as chattel slaves. 
Despite these abuses, Davis contends that criticism like Adeleke’s obscures the symbolic 
significance of Americo-Liberians, who founded a constitutional republic that fended off British 
and French incursions while establishing small domestic industries in rice, sugar, and coffee. He 
admonishes contemporaries not to judge Liberia too harshly because, from the outset, it was 
constrained by white, Western standards of progress. In light of early Americans’ own colonial 
failures, Davis complains: “It is clearly unrealistic to judge the Americo-Liberians’ treatment of 
aborigines by higher standards than those applied to white colonists from the sixteenth to the 
twentieth century.”176 After all, as he observes, white consumer demand for Liberian goods was 
the main reason for Liberia’s forced labor. Davis does not acquit Liberians of wrongdoing, but 
neither does he indict them for a common, historical blind spot suffered by whites and blacks 
alike. 
Lamin Sanneh goes the furthest in absolving Liberians of blame. In his study, Liberians 
ran into chiefly opposition for a perfectly justifiable reason: they were attempting to promote 
antislavery in West Africa, a region rife with slave traders. Unable to persuade native chiefs to 
give up the lucrative slave trade, Liberians resorted to antistructure, a competing social order that 
would challenge chiefs’ authority and prerogatives. Similar to Victor Turner’s idea of 
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communitas, antistructure involved the formation of a new community based on outsiders and 
social outcasts, who would subscribe to antislavery principles. Seen from this light, Delany’s 
separatist activities were paving the road not to economic imperialism but to an independent 
economy required to sustain future migration of American blacks to the fatherland—tangible 
proof that they were destined for something more than slavery. Crummell’s religious 
proselytizing was a vehicle for social equality and collective amelioration. And Blyden’s call for 
Western colonial rule was a forward-thinking scheme to expose Africans to the technological 
superiority possessed by Europeans. As Sanneh argues, what seems oppressive and imperialistic 
needs the contextual gloss of antislavery. Civilization rhetoric, he insists, was actually 
progressive when one sees it as promoting antistructure in the cause of antislavery. To build a 
free society, Liberians needed to tear down the old order of chieftain-backed slavery. In short, 
they needed to build an alternate power structure, a new world order that inverted the 
antihumanitarian impulses of surrounding slave-trading societies. Hence they resorted to 
hierarchal claims that sanctioned Western middle-class values over and against native cultural 
norms. For Sanneh, Crummell’s and Blyden’s appeals for European guardianships—viewed by 
many scholars as precursors to imperialism—were logical requests given that people then 
associated colonialism with antislavery because of the pioneering efforts of Western powers in 
abolishing the slave trade. Sanneh acknowledges that Liberians’ black nationalist ideology 
comes across as speculative, romantic, and even airy. Yet he contends Liberians like Blyden and 
Crummell never had a real chance to implement their vision because the American government 
betrayed them: it “equivocated when antislavery required public responsibility [i.e. financing] for 
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colonization,” leaving them “an insecure group of ‘alien residents,’ on a free reservation, forced 
to live by their wits.”177 
In one of the latest works, James Ciment swings back to the dominant viewpoint, tagging 
the Americo-Liberian ruling elite as “corrupt, callow, and callous.” Although infused with noble 
ideals, they resorted to pragmatic survival in the face of African opposition and European 
aggression, Ciment contends. He observes that Americoes did a remarkable job of replicating 
Southern society and its master class. They pursued capital, kept de facto slaves, maintained 
African mistresses, disenfranchised natives and lower-class citizens, and enforced rigid class 
distinctions. At the same time, Ciment marvels at Americoes’ ability to plant and nurture a 
budding republic, one that embraced political freedom, economic opportunity, and equality under 
the law. The problem resided in their reflex to reserve these privileges only for themselves. In 
danger of being overrun by hostile natives and dismembered by European imperialists, 
Americoes sacrificed their high principles for expedient policies that preserved their physical and 
national existence. As a result, Americoes were “in Africa but not of it.” Ultimately their 
stratified society proved untenable, Ciment laments, leading to their overthrow and ruin in the 
next century.
178
 
Eric Burin touches on settler-native relations in passing. He adopts a sanguine viewpoint 
of Liberia’s interaction with indigenous tribes. Although aborigines lacked constitutional 
protections, Burin notes that Liberians affirmed the potential for their “savage” neighbors to 
transition to civilization and presumably citizenship, at least in theory. He quotes Diane 
Skipwith, a longtime settler, who believed literacy would help natives overcome superstitious 
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barbarism. But Burin concludes that Americo-Liberians rarely tried to integrate communities, 
nor did Africans embrace their attempts.
179
 
For all their shortcomings, Americo-Liberians were not so different from their 
contemporaries. According to Wilson Moses, chauvinism and civilizationism were hallmarks of 
most black nationalists’ thought in the nineteenth century.180 The idea of progress was 
foundational to racial uplift, an ideology to which most African Americans subscribed. Although 
focused on the twentieth century, Kevin Gaines’s work on the subject is instructive. Gaines 
argues that African Americans adopted uplift ideology as a strategic means of coping with their 
disadvantaged state. Espoused primarily by black elites, uplift preachments centered on self-help, 
social virtue, wealth accumulation, gendered hierarchy and, above all, racial solidarity. Many 
blacks saw uplift as a way to refute racial biologism and its contention that perceived social and 
intellectual differences between races were fixed in nature. As Gaines avers, uplift ideology 
promoted an evolutionary view of cultural assimilation, that African Americans could integrate 
into society and the body politic by raising the status of family and civilization. Although 
commendable in its focus, black uplift had a gaping chasm, namely that collective advancement 
did not necessarily guarantee individual equality within the race.
181
 
The weakness of uplift lay in its very method. Uplift depended on self-improvement, 
which presupposed an agreed-upon standard for amelioration. For most black elites, the measure 
was bourgeois respectability, which borrowed heavily from Victorian norms. On one hand, a 
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common Weltbild is essential to creating a collective sense of unity and historical destiny. On the 
other hand, bourgeois respectability entails class differentiation by its very definition. It is a 
middle-class ideology that demands individual adherence and social conformity for its members 
and beneficiaries, who are often one and the same. In Liberia it served as a gateway to settler 
society and its attendant accoutrements like citizenship, enfranchisement, and access to capital. 
For West African natives, uplift became less a ramp to assimilation and more a rampart against 
integration. If Americo-Liberians were the bourgeois agents of civilization—and many viewed 
themselves as such—aborigines were “the native problem,” akin to the so-called “Negro 
problem” in the United States. From this vantage, natives were to blame for their own 
“degraded” status and needed only to raise themselves to the moral and social standards held by 
their “better kin.” The task of living up to Victorian standards, however, required the repudiation 
of many cherished African beliefs and customs. Because most natives rejected the wholesale 
devaluation of their culture, many Americo-Liberians refused to treat them as equals. They were 
permanent problems, to be excluded from the national polity until they capitulated or were 
pacified. 
Yet it would be wrong to regard black nationalists as categorically inimical to native 
interests. As Moses notes, black nationalists did feel the duty to uplift the continent as a first step 
in improving the lives of black people everywhere. But without a heavy influx of capital, 
Liberians had precious little with which to entice their neighbors.  
In short, Liberia had limited options in how it could attract others into its fold. Samuel 
Huntington outlines four types of national identity: ideological, bifurcated, exclusivist, and 
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cultural.
182
 Ideological here is identification with a political creed, be it a federal compact, 
national constitution, or declaration of rights. Bifurcated is accommodation for dual allegiances 
in terms of language and culture. Exclusivist is repression or expulsion of specific racial, ethnic, 
and cultural groups from the body politic. And cultural is devotion to the values, heritage, and 
language of a group, usually that of the majority. Based on the previous discussion, Liberia in the 
nineteenth century was neither bifurcated nor exclusivist. While cultural intermediaries existed, 
historically the Monrovia government frowned on bifurcation among its citizenry, regarding dual 
allegiances as subversive. And although some Liberians probably preferred total exclusion, 
Monrovia had neither the numbers nor the armaments to expunge all the tribes from its claimed 
territory. The ideological made more sense, even if on a pragmatic level. The government sent 
out emissaries over the years to woo tribes with promises of security, free trade, and political 
representation. But Liberia lacked the clout, capital, or political will to make good on its word, 
and tribal chieftains were often disappointed or disgruntled with the empty pledges given them. 
Almost by default, Liberians were left to tout their cultural identity, which was itself nebulous 
and nettlesome. 
Religion, social practice, and the culture of capitalism came to be seen as the sine quibus 
non of national identity. Christianity, civilizationism, and capitalist ideology were the building 
blocks as well as the bait. To be Liberian in the nineteenth century looked totally foreign in the 
new homeland and yet thoroughly familiar in the old. Juxtaposing New World values and Old 
World aspirations, Americo-Liberians set about making their mark—for themselves and for their 
race. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
“Surely we are here to take our native brethren by the hand, 
and teach them how to live”: The Early Vision 
for the New Republic 
 
 
Joseph Jenkins Roberts delivered his first official presidential speech on 3 January 1848, 
in which providentialism was a prominent theme throughout. In his oration to the citizenry, he 
regaled his audience with the story of the nation’s founders, a tale of a besieged band of patriots 
who succeeded against all odds. Having come to Africa in pursuit of civil and religious liberty, 
this “mere handful of isolated christian pilgrims” found themselves “surrounded by savage and 
warlike tribes bent upon their ruin and total annihilation.”1 Roberts likened the settlers to David 
before Goliath, armed with only a staff and sling, prepared to do battle for God and each other. 
The president credited stout manliness and divine providence for their deliverance from a 
“powerful adversary.” This oft-repeated origin story moved from lore to canon. The enemy was 
always nameless and faceless aborigines who threatened the existential survival of Liberia. By 
defeating this superior force, colonists had passed their “important trial” and prove themselves 
worthy of deliverance and self-governance. This is what Nicholas Guyatt terms “judicial 
providentialism,” where God rewards a people based on their virtue.2 Deity had spared Liberians, 
but only because they had shown themselves deserving. And natives had played an integral role 
in the story by acting as the antagonists and forming the crucible from which Liberians emerged 
victorious. 
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Yet Roberts articulated grander ambitions. The 1847 independence of Liberia was more 
than the establishment of a new nation. It was the culmination of a long journey to freedom. Like 
Israelites from the Exodus, colored men had traveled from “the house of bondage” to “the land 
of liberty and promise.” It was, to borrow Roberts’s words, “political redemption,” one that 
would extend “God’s moral government of the earth.” Here is historical providentialism on 
display, the belief that God uses specific nations to improve the world and accomplish His 
cosmic plan.
3
 The will of Heaven was for all mankind to be free, and Liberia represented 
fulfillment of that universal intent. Interesting to note, though, is that the divine test for Liberia 
was emancipation, not equality. While equal rights arguments for natives would come later, 
Roberts’s 1848 address is notable for their omission. 
Progress is inherent in providentialism, and Roberts had clear ideas on this front. He is 
worth quoting at length because his view formed the basis for governmental policy over the next 
decades. For Roberts, progress involved proselytizing. 
And, as the political happiness or wretchedness of ourselves and our children, and of 
generations yet unborn, is in our hands, nay more, the redemption of Africa from the deep 
degradation, superstition, and idolatry in which she has so long been involved, it 
becomes us to lay our shoulders to the wheel, and manfully resist every obstacle which 
may oppose our progress in the great work which lies before us. The Gospel, fellow 
citizens, is yet to be preached to vast numbers inhabiting this dark continent, and I have 
the highest reason to believe, that it was one of the great objects of the Almighty in 
establishing these colonies, that they might be the means of introducing civilization and 
religion among the barbarous nations of this country; and to what work more noble 
could our powers be applied, than that of bringing up from darkness, debasement, and 
misery, our fellow-men, and shedding abroad over them the light of science and 
christianity.
4
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In a sense, political redemption subsumed euangelion.
5
 Just as many Liberians had been 
redeemed from physical bondage, the native populace could be saved from spiritual and cultural 
bondage. Although Roberts trumpeted religion and civilization, in practice the emphasis on the 
second eclipsed the first. 
What is striking is how high Roberts elevates the stakes. According to Liberia’s first 
father, the so-called barbarity of natives was the perceived obstacle that opposed our [read 
national] progress. Political stability and commercial success depended on bringing natives into 
the fold, ostensibly on Liberia’s terms. In his first speech as president, he portrayed the venture 
as one’s sacred duty, one that came with a dire prediction. If Liberians failed to fulfill their 
duties—a paramount one being to incorporate natives—Roberts warned of a future return to 
chains as bondsmen and bywords among the nations of the world. However rhetorical his 
jeremiad, Roberts is espousing judicial providentialism in order to further historical 
providentialism. His is a form of national providentialism, the idea that Liberia is chosen, 
correlative, and covenantally obligated. That is, Liberia is designated by God to advance 
universal freedom as the new Israel and must spread God’s blessings to others or be ruined. 
 
President Roberts’s Republicanism 
Along with a deep sense of providentialism, Roberts cherished republican ideology. He 
was a staunch proponent of republican government, and he never tired of espousing its merits in 
his official presidential speeches. Over the years he outlined four pillars of republicanism: (1) 
majority consent, (2) legal compliance, (3) moral adherence, and (4) social altruism. According 
to Roberts, these principles were vital for a stable society and national prosperity. His political 
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philosophy further shaped his perception and policy toward natives, leading him to adopt a firm, 
uncompromising stance in his government’s dealings with them.  
Roberts was a fervent believer in the protection of individual rights. Two days after his 
inauguration, Roberts spoke to the legislature in his first annual State of the Nation address. He 
devoted the first part of his speech to a discourse on the building of a political society. 
Individuals possessed alienable and inalienable rights for Roberts. On the one hand, inalienable 
rights were fixed in nature, and no legitimate state could deprive its citizens of these fundamental 
rights.
6
 On the other hand, alienable rights were fluid, and persons could surrender them to the 
state for the commonweal. These more ephemeral rights included customs, manners, 
occupations, modes of thinking, and Volksgeist (i.e. genius of a people). Roberts believed that 
Liberia, with its republican form of government, could protect inalienable rights. He explicitly 
rejected Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s state of nature, arguing that history and philosophy had 
prepared Liberians for this moment of self-governance. 
Roberts’s defense of republicanism rests on his faith in majority rule, the first column in 
his political structure. He defined tyranny as law enacted by a minority. Predictably he opposed 
it, because it violated his contractual notion of consent—which demands the good of the whole 
or, in this case, the majority. A society can have only one supreme authority and, for Roberts, 
minority rule represents a competing power that will undermine republican government 
altogether. It is imperative that every community member conform to the majority’s will in 
matters pertaining to alienable rights. By voluntarily leaving a state of nature and entering into a 
free society, citizens are morally obligated to subordinate their individual interests to the 
collective good. 
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Under this arrangement, little if any room exists for minority rights. Roberts understands 
rights quite narrowly by modern standards. As much as he reveres inalienable rights, he restricts 
them to a few basic ones such as individual liberty, freedom of religion, and security of person 
and property. Everything else is open for debate and subject to majoritarianism. 
Roberts affirmed equal rights so long as it referred to inalienable rights. Moreover, as he 
expressed it, good governmental policy was one in which “equal justice has been done to every 
citizen of the Republic.”7 It was a members-only ordinance in 1848, and natives fell outside that 
domain. As shown earlier, Roberts did not abandon them completely. It was Liberians’ duty to 
bring them into the fold through evangelism and civilizationism. Yet the onus fell upon natives 
to leave their state of nature and eschew alienable rights like culture and tradition. The exchange 
was neither fair nor realistic but, in Roberts’s mind, it was legally justifiable, philosophically 
tenable, and divinely approbatory. 
Another dynamic is at work, though. Seen through the lens of solidarity, Roberts’s stance 
becomes more fathomable. Philosopher Tommie Shelby has outlined five characteristics of 
group solidarity: identification with the group, special concern, shared values or goals, loyalty, 
and mutual trust.
8
 To some degree, Roberts’s approach combines all five elements. 
Roberts is admittedly ethnocentric in that he prioritizes Americo-Liberians over against 
their native neighbors. Sociologist Oliver Cox argues ethnocentrism is social feeling that draws a 
                                                          
7
 Joseph Jenkins Roberts, “Annual Message to the Legislature,” 5 January 1848, in D. Elwood Dunn, ed., 
The Annual Messages of the Presidents of Liberia, 1848–2010: State of the Nation Addresses to the National 
Legislature, from Joseph Jenkins Roberts to Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, vol. 1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co., 
2011), 28, emphasis added. 
8
 Tommie Shelby, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2005), 68-70. 
  
76 
 
group into community.
9
 Taken prima facie, it is not itself pejorative. We-ness does not 
necessarily devalue Otherness. Furthermore, the minority can be just as ethnocentric as the 
majority. Cox differentiates ethnocentrism from cultural intolerance, the disapproval toward any 
group refusing to conform to societal norms.
10
 Even here, while deprecatory, it is not 
automatically deplorable. Coercive regulation and enforcement are integral to any sociological 
formation.
11
 
To censure Roberts for religious and cultural proselytizing is problematic, too. In The 
Racial Contract, Charles Mills decries a polity that uses ideological conditioning to enforce its 
racial (or ethnic in this context) composition.
12
 Yet as Lucius Outlaw argues, sociocultural 
conditioning is the primary means by which to reproduce a group and achieve a sense of 
immortality. In other words, group survival depends on natal norms, which includes ideology. 
This indoctrination is at the heart of ethnicization.
13
 And it is intimately connected to 
nationalism, in which “we speak of ‘nationalism’ as the complex of thought and action (ideology 
and social movement) that a people articulate and practice on behalf of their own freedom and 
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distinctiveness.”14 As surveyed in the last chapter, black nationalism in the nineteenth-century 
involved black uplift and its attendant ethos and values. 
The problem surfaces when nationalists, or any group for that matter, assign invidious 
value to racial or cultural traits that are otherwise benign. Personal attire, dietary habits, living 
accommodations, musical and literary taste, along with other minutia became the sine quibus non 
of civilized identity. Africanness—be it names, traditions, or lifestyle—was odious by virtue of 
the totalization of western culture. Unlike white racialists, Roberts avoided invidious biological 
essentialism; but he and many Liberians created fixed, objectifying identities that victimized 
natives through natal alienation and psychosocial/cultural violence. 
Legal compliance stood as the second pillar of Roberts’s republicanism. His continual 
rows with foreign traders underscore the importance he placed on this principle. In 1842 then-
Lieutenant Governor Roberts had objected to a British trader’s claim of sovereignty in a southern 
territory claimed by Liberia. Property rights were subordinate to political considerations, Roberts 
insisted. This palm oil dealer, Captain Spence, claimed to have purchased Bassa Cove prior to 
the natives’ sale of the land to Monrovia. Hence, he refused to recognize Liberia’s authority 
because it conflicted with his ownership claim. Roberts adopted a two-prong argument. First, he 
elevated governmental authority above private property rights. Spence’s property title amounted 
to a land lease, the governor argued. Spence’s rights allowed him to enjoy a limited set of 
benefits deriving from land tenure. As a tenant, he could build on the property and make use of it 
as he saw fit. But he was still subject to the sovereign power of the state. His “right of soil” did 
not supersede government’s management. Just because he held land, he was not a power unto 
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himself. Second, Roberts attacked the property dispute as a covert bid for rival political power. 
Roberts saw the quarrel as undermining the very existence of his commonwealth. He resorted to 
a wedge argument. If outside traders could remain “above the law” and “beyond our judicial 
control,” they could introduce “foreign merchandise”—that is, rum—capable of spreading vice 
and immorality among the populace. Liquor would destroy peace and order and could 
“annihilate” the government. And if traders could import unregulated alcohol, they could 
reintroduce slave trafficking next. Governmental oversight protected the public from the 
potential tyranny arising from an individual’s or cartel’s carte blanche. Roberts applied the same 
principles to tribes. In ceding land to Monrovia, they also relinquished judicial control. They 
were subject to Liberia’s laws, including taxation and trade regulation.15 
But such notions as private property, perpetuity agreements, and contract representation 
were completely alien to most natives. In his 1856 history of the region, J. Leighton Wilson 
observed that tribes regarded land as a communal resource. For the Grebo, all property was 
considered “common stock” that no one person or family could expropriate or divest. Likewise, 
the Kru possessed “no idea of the appropriation of land by individuals except for temporary 
purposes.”16 Any sale to outsiders was never regarded as permanent; it was a limited lease 
intended for a specific purpose like building a farm or factory. So in his argument against the 
British trader Spence, Roberts borrowed a native understanding of property sale: Spence was not 
the permanent landowner and therefore not the final arbiter in taxation disputes. But Roberts was 
committing equivocation, a semantical ruse that privileged Liberians, because he claimed his 
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government’s treaties with tribes gave it judicial preeminence in territorial and tax matters. 
Wilson is incisive here, by distinguishing between occupancy and ownership: 
The people, by common consent, may sell any portion of it [land] to a stranger . . . but in 
their minds this transaction, even when subjected to the formality of a written contract, 
amounts to little more than a general consent to the stranger living among them and 
enjoying all the rights of citizenship; and with the expectation that the land will revert to 
themselves, as a matter of course, should he die or leave their country. In some cases, 
when they have transferred a portion or the whole of their territory to a foreign 
jurisdiction, it is not probable that they have had a correct apprehension of the nature of 
the transaction, whatever pains may have been taken to make them understand it; and 
they never do comprehend it fully until the contract is carried into execution, in 
connection with their own observation and experience.
17
 
 
Liberia added territory piecemeal because it had to negotiate with separate chieftains and tribal 
families. But in native practice, individual action rarely superseded communal deliberation. Even 
chiefs had to have their tribe’s backing for a land deal to be recognized. For example, the Kru 
made collective decisions by assembling all the men and holding a discussion. They resolved 
matters organically, without a formal vote or electoral procedure. Even with a king, they were “a 
pure democracy” in praxis, though Wilson conceded that the Western term failed to capture the 
process in full. In any case, Roberts was no fan of democracy, calling it a “wretched” product of 
an “ignorant community” that could only lead to anarchy. It was a threat to “the purity of our 
republican institutions,” he asserted, and it must be blunted through village education.18 Liberian 
leaders portrayed themselves as sincere in their negotiations for territory, and tribes as fully 
cognizant of those terms. In some cases, however, it is clear that fundamental differences in how 
Liberians and natives conceived key concepts set the stage for future exploitation and wars. 
Tribes learned about rights and representation, but they often paid dearly for that education. 
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A major flaw in Roberts is his denial of self-determinism for natives. If they were a 
people who acknowledged Monrovia’s authority, he might refer to them as “a nation inside the 
country.” But if they sought formal ties and recognition from “foreign powers,” Roberts 
denounced them as “savage tribes occupying territories in the dominions of civilized nations.” 
Autonomous action was a prerogative afforded to the civilized alone.
19
 
In a savvy maneuver, Roberts connected land acquisition to antislavery efforts. In his 
second public address as president, he boasted, “We have extinguished the native title to all the 
lands lying between Grand Cape Mount, and the northwest boundary line of ‘Maryland in 
Liberia.’” A couple holdout tribes were willing to sell their land, he reported, if Liberia would 
grant them protection from hostile neighboring tribes. The only resistance came from slavers, 
who lobbied hard for chiefs to reverse their decision. Roberts depicted obstructionism as a futile 
attempt to hold back the progressive tide of antislavery. As he framed it, supporting geographical 
expansion was the same as striking a mortal blow against human enslavement.
20
 
Roberts defended Liberia’s recent military expeditions against natives as humanitarian. In 
assuming a peacekeeping role, the country was suppressing the “horrors of African warfare.” It 
was a considerable financial sacrifice on Monrovia’s end to have “interposed its authority.” But 
what else could Roberts do but respond to native appeals and “settle these difficulties”? It was 
the “just” thing to do. In hindsight, martial intervention planted the kernel for future complaints 
that Monrovia stoked unrest by continually meddling and taking sides in native disputes. But in 
1848 the benefits were obvious to Roberts. Despite his altruistic rhetoric, solidifying territorial 
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claims and repelling foreign interference were unstated aims in his warring against nearby 
tribes.
21
 
Roberts saw war as a wholesome evil capable of producing good results. He pointed to 
Greece as an example of a people whose continual warfare roused them to greatness: “Their 
prosperity, their power, their splendor grew from the all-animating spirit of war.”22 Roberts 
denied desiring war, but he defended its practice in cases of national security. 
There are some among us, I know, who tremble at every occurrence that in any degree 
threatens to interrupt the even course of our political affairs. They fear that it may put an 
inevitable stop to the further progress of the government, and ruin irretrievably our future 
happiness, and deprive us of those civil and religious blessings which the early veterans 
in the cause of freedom here, and ourselves have called forth from this savage land. . . . It 
is true patriotism, boldly to front every difficulty;-and with a determined purpose 
overcome every obstacle which may oppose our progress; then we shall defend our 
natural and national rights, with dignity and success.
23
 
 
His justifications for going to war are enlightening. Roberts held to the doctrine of preemption in 
the name of prevention. That is, he was willing to declare war on surrounding tribes if they 
impinged on basic rights (like life and property) or impeded national progress (like political 
jurisdiction). Notice that the litmus for warfare no longer required an existential threat. In the late 
1840s and early 1850s Liberia did not face a crisis for survival like it had in the 1820s. Survival 
was not the pressing concern; supremacy was. From a military standpoint, traders were more 
nuisance than menace. But because they often came from European nations, they represented a 
threat to Liberia’s autonomy if the mother country intervened on their behalf. Repeatedly 
throughout his speeches, Roberts would question the intentions of foreign powers, particularly 
France and England, and whether they would respect the laws and sovereignty of Liberia. While 
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traders were a potential external liability, Roberts treated natives as an internal, existential threat 
in the sense they endangered Americo-Liberians’ way of life. Because national rights, religious 
blessings, and future happiness—ephemeral qualities to be sure—hung in the balance, war was a 
necessary evil to ensure survival of the salubrious. 
Militia expeditions were common occurrences at midcentury. A major offensive ensued 
in March 1848 against an alliance of native tribes in central Liberia. With the benefit of French 
naval cannons, a Liberian militia routed the Spanish-backed rebels. In his 1849 annual address, 
President Roberts proclaimed resounding success. The victory, he crowed, “demonstrates that 
men, animated by an ardent zeal for the sacred cause of liberty and humanity—and trusting in 
the Divine support, are capable of the most glorious achievements.” That Liberians had earned 
their providentially sanctioned manliness at the expense of indigenous lives, for Roberts, was of 
little consequence. The dispatched aborigines had been Spanish lackeys, “ruthless and inhuman 
slave dealer[s]” guilty of “diabolical avarice.” The battle had further consolidated Liberia’s 
dominance, and Roberts was pleased to announce it had now amassed over three hundred miles 
of uninterrupted coastline. The lone holdout was the Kru tribe, who wanted to maintain their 
littoral toehold for sea trading. War with the Kru was less than a decade away but, at the time, 
Roberts was optimistic he could continue to accumulate land, preferably by negotiation but by 
force if necessary. The Kru’s neighbors, the Grebo, were just as disruptive. Already a chieftain 
had attacked a couple settlements in Grand Bassa, and other area chiefs were stockpiling rifles 
and gunpowder. Roberts called for an economic embargo and a military expedition against the 
tribes in order to destroy their trading factories. He urged a strong response in order to suppress 
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rebellion and act as an effective “antiwar” deterrent.24 Regular outbreaks of revolt and repression 
would cycle over the next several decades, making Liberia’s bid to establish its legal and 
territorial jurisdiction a continual battle. As Roberts discovered, ordnance did more to control 
troublesome tribes than did ordinances.
25
 
 In addition to majority rights and legal compliance, moral adherence constituted the third 
pillar for republicanism. Righteousness required a shepherd, and Roberts saw Christianity as 
capable of fulfilling the role. In line with civic virtue theorists of his era,
26
 Roberts had no 
compunction about the state promoting Christian religion, so long as it avoided 
establishmentarianism: 
While I am no advocate for a union of church and state, I am also no sympathizer with 
those political theorists who maintain that it is not the province of civil government to 
interpose in matters pertaining to morality or religion. Civil government is ordained by 
God, and for His glory; and, as righteousness exalteth a nation, it is the duty of the civil 
authority . . . to repress vice, immorality and profaneness, and whatever else is manifestly 
injurious and disturbing to the good order of Society and dishonourable to God.
27
 
 
The reformation of questionable native practices, then, was a civic duty and moral obligation. 
Until heathen tribes were acculturated and “Liberianized,” they disrupted civil order and 
impeded national progress. Homogeneity would yield headway. “When we shall have firmly 
established our civil institutions upon the inflexible principles of justice, morality and religion,” 
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Roberts predicted, “no power on earth can successfully hinder us in the progress of national 
greatness.”28 
He had tied political and commercial advancement to Christianity’s spread from the early 
1840s onward. He argued the settling of “christian colonies” would convert “heathen and 
barbarous” natives, suppress the entrenched slave trade, establish jurisdiction over tenuously 
held territory, and protect against “improper interference” from unsavory traders and foreign 
powers.
29
 By stamping out the slave trade, he was removing foreign interests from the region and 
thereby eliminating real existential threats from within Liberia’s borders. In some respects, 
Roberts viewed the diffusion of missionary work as a pacification program of sorts. If he could 
achieve buy-in from surrounding tribes by reorienting their spiritual and civic values, he could 
turn them against traders he deemed to be enemies of the state.
30
 
In a bid to win the hearts and minds of natives, Roberts called for more aborigine schools, 
ones that would specialize in teaching husbandry, agriculture, and of course Christian living. 
“This is an important work,” he admonished, “the work of civilization—and ‘civilization and 
religion must go hand in hand;’-the plough and the Bible must go together.” By “changing the 
manners and customs of the natives,” Liberians could nurture piety and political stability, which 
Roberts predicted would lead to a happy, productive blend of peoples.
31
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President Benson’s Manifest Destiny 
The next president, Stephen Benson, was much more conciliatory in his public 
proclamations. He praised aborigines for their societal organization, political governance, and 
dutiful observance of their own laws and customs. In an interesting twist, he heralded them as 
forming the kernel of a great nation—save for their participation in the abhorrent slave trade. 
Their peddling of captured Africans had corrupted them, and it had subverted their social and 
domestic institutions. His commentary is an inversion of the criticism leveled against Americo-
Liberians, many of whom Anglo-Americans deemed corrupted by their “debased” experiences as 
former slaves. Yet to Benson, the remedy for effacement was the same as the colonizationists’: 
civilization and Christianity would serve as locks within a canal, raising aborigines to the same 
“perfect level” as Liberians, whereafter they would flow together in a merged channel of politics, 
religion, and enlightened society.
32
 United as one people, Liberian and aborigine would steer a 
great country. 
Furthermore, Benson saw religion and letters as buoys capable of delimiting the nation. 
His wish was that they be constitutive of the singular identity he hoped for Liberians, citizen and 
native alike. Shared language and moral sentiments comported with Johann Gottfried von 
Herder’s conception of a nation being defined linguistically and culturally (rather than 
racially).
33
 Like Roberts, Benson admonished his fellow Liberians to educate and evangelize 
their native neighbors. While his concern for “backward” brethren may be commendable, it 
could also be undesirable due to its inherent intrusiveness. “If I have special responsibilities to 
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my co-nationals,” philosopher Ross Poole observes, “it is also the case that I have a special 
involvement in what they do.”34 Because Benson viewed aborigines as future consorts in nation 
building, his concern for their welfare surpassed a mere duty to proselytize; it made him a vested 
partner in ensuring their moral fitness.  
Like most Americo-Liberians, Benson had ingrained in him the idea of racial 
exoneration: “We must show by our morals, our intelligence, our energy and patriotism,—a 
word, by our progress in the general pursuits of civilized life, that we are reasonably advancing 
to an honorable national maturity.” As much as Benson desired unity with natives, he also 
needed them for another purpose. Progress requires a benchmark, and in this case, heathen 
Africans were the base measurement. In her essay on whiteness and literary imagination, Toni 
Morrison writes: “Africanism is the vehicle by which the American self knows itself as not 
enslaved, but free; not repulsive, but desirable; not helpless, but licensed and powerful; not 
history-less, but historical; not damned, but innocent; not a blind accident of evolution, but a 
progressive fulfillment of destiny.”35 Like white Americans, Americo-Liberians demonstrated 
the depth of their growth by their spiritual/intellectual/political distance from Africans. In 
Benson’s recount of Liberia’s founding: “patriotic pioneers” had achieved final victory “on this 
sacred hill” by defeating “a ruthless savage foe” and thwarting “their diabolical efforts of 
extermination.” Here is Africanism deployed as inhuman savagery, which serves as the staging 
ground for Liberians’ quintessential identity as a people. Facing ignominious extinction, they 
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vanquish their barbarous foe and preserve civilization for both their descendants and their 
adopted homeland.
36
 
Roberts had steeped his origin story in providentialism and, while Benson also 
acknowledged divine will, he emphasized Liberia’s manifest destiny even more. The founding 
patriots represented only one period in a succession of eras, a “triumphant march” that advanced 
“the blessings of civilized and religious life.” The victory in 1822 preceded the 1847 Bill of 
Rights, which antedated the 1861 forcible removal of the slave trade from the region. The next 
step was the “leavening” of the entire republic, “every part and particle” to borrow Benson’s 
wording. The separatism of the 1820s was to give way to the assimilationism of the 1860s. It was 
containment through inclusion, and Benson desired inclusion beyond the domestic. Membership 
into the Western world depended on a nation’s degree of perceived development. “Progress in 
the general pursuits of civilized life” would provide the requisite growth, Benson hoped, for 
entrance into the international community.
37
 
It would be unfair to characterize Benson’s call for evangelism and civilizationism as 
disingenuous. However, it is at times an example of ethical solipsism, the tendency to hold the 
interests, projects, and values of one group as the main ones or the only ones worthy of 
significance.
38
 Case in point: Benson argued that evidence for civilization could be found in 
Liberians’ engaging in commercial development, particularly in exploiting the environment 
through logging, mining, and expanded farming. “Stately forests extending to our far interior” 
must be “levelled”; and “the heart of the earth” should “be torn up . . . in quest of its rich 
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materials.”39 For Benson, the pursuit of individual riches was concomitant with creating “a great 
and permanent prosperity” for Liberia. But doing so clashed with native interests. The national 
economy rested largely on the export of goods obtained from the interior trade. Natives supplied 
the bulk of ivory, camwood, and palm oil; and Benson was anxious to wean Liberians from their 
dependence on the trade. He feared it could jeopardize national prosperity and independence, 
especially if natives boycotted or bypassed Americo-Liberians during times of hostility.
40
 As 
seen previously during the Roberts administration, territorial cession deprived natives of rights. 
Because Benson viewed Liberia as terra incognita, they lost timber and mineral rights, too. 
 
President Warner’s Commercial Nationalism 
Daniel Warner, the third president, devoted his attention to the flagging economy. By 
1864 the U.S. Civil War had dried up monetary donations to Liberia, and Warner preached 
retrenchment. In contrast to the naked ambition of past presidents, Warner attempted to rein in 
outsized expectations. He scolded the legislature for spending too much in apportioning 11 
percent of tax revenues for its own operations. By creating new governmental offices and by 
increasing their own salaries, representatives were shortchanging native education, forcing 
several mission schools to shutter their doors. Liberia was not America, he lectured, and could 
not afford to emulate its bureaucracy or expenditures. At the same time, he called for 
government subsidies to farmers, the bone-and-sinew of the country. They furthered national 
independence by being the breadbasket for the rest of the citizens. In exchange for federal 
assistance, though, farmers were to follow “a proper division of labor.” Warner wanted to 
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establish a quota system for farmers: a set number would raise cattle for consumption, while a 
fixed percentage would grow only coffee, cotton, vegetables, or sugar cane.  Moreover, he 
wished to extend job quotas to other occupations. Although not proposing a formal command 
economy, he did believe a more centrally planned economy would aid Liberia in achieving self-
sufficiency in its finances and domestic industries.
41
 
 Along those lines, he voiced impatience at the glacial pace in assimilating the 
surrounding tribes, who he felt did not fully appreciate the benefits before them. “I think the time 
has come when greater efforts be put forth by the Government to teach them our fraternal 
connection with them, and the nature of the feeling which should subsist between us.” In his 
opinion, the state needed to take a direct role in the civilizing project for political and 
commercial reasons. Warner wanted to build a mighty African nationality, with Liberia the most 
powerful and prosperous republic on the continent. To achieve that, he needed to meld a 
cohesive workforce and to open unfettered access to interior trade. “As long as we maintain a 
distance from them [tribes],” he warned, “it will be impossible to civilize them, and jealousy and 
war will always, as they have hitherto done, form the middle wall between us.” But natives were 
already accusing Warner of building walls, not tearing them down. Recent passage of a port-of-
entry law had inflamed several seaboard tribes, who had been passed over for seaports. They 
charged Monrovia with economic interference and political favoritism, gripes with which even 
some Liberian citizens concurred. Pointing to the U.S. Civil War, Warner warned that rift in 
opinion could only lead to disunion. He advised Liberians to trust in God and put away “trifling 
differences.” If cutting off a hand or plucking out an eye would ensure Liberia’s success, 
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however, Warner expressed his willingness to see it accomplished, a not-so-subtle hint that 
opponents risked retribution for their insubordination.
42
 
 Civilization for Warner was a “mode of living and working.” The bottom line was of 
utmost importance, and he was determined Liberians meet it both physically and fiscally. 
Continuous improvement remained his encompassing theme: “Let our motto be onward.” He 
reproached anyone who shirked manual labor or who failed to employ their physical abilities. 
“Each month, week—nay, each day of our time should produce and add something of material 
wealth to the country.” Warner championed commercial advancement because in 1866 the 
political scene was a mess. He warned against the “dangerous gangrene” of party jealousy and 
discord; and he fretted that unchecked “party-spirit” would hinder national growth and 
improvement, leading to eventual disunion and disintegration. “[T]he discordant spirit of politics 
must be changed into that of peaceful and moralizing husbandry,” he advocated. In a decade of 
disagreement, Warner pinned hope on economic development to allay concern and deflect 
criticism.
43
 
 
President Payne’s Civic Nationalism 
Warner’s successor, James Spriggs Payne, echoed alarm over the political strife between 
the Republican Party and the True Whig Party.
44
 He cited Abraham Lincoln’s assassination as 
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the logical end of “ultra party spirit,” which had no place in republican government. Liberia 
needed to exhibit unity because, as Payne characterized, it was a lonely Christian outpost in 
danger of being overwhelmed politically and culturally by surrounding heathen empires, which 
imperiled the “purity” of its institutions. Concerning natives, Payne was Warner with a harder 
edge: 
 The position we occupy, as a Christian government on this coast, imposes a system of 
duty upon us in relation to that section of our population which is in a heathen condition. 
Holding the opinion that it is time that the Republic should more directly extend its 
influence, its immunities, and responsibilities to them, the impressions made upon our 
aboriginal population should teach them obedience, order, and respect for the authority 
of the Republic, thus preparing them for a full participation in the rights of citizenship.
45
 
 
The world was watching Liberia in its infancy, Payne warned, and it needed to do everything in 
its power to preserve its identity and prepare its indigenes. The duality is jarring: natives were 
both potential corrupters and prospective converts. To meet the threat and assimilate the target 
required an end to Americo-Liberian sectionalism. In order to extinguish the danger, Payne 
preached civic virtue—particularly righteous resolve and pure motives—but he translated them 
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in expressly political terms. Holding elevated sentiments within a Christian civilization, for the 
president, meant practicing restrained moderation and abstention from “erroneous ideas of 
political freedom.”46 With the U.S. Civil War still fresh in the minds of many, Payne wished to 
project an image of political unity, civilized sobriety, and strong deterrence to the outside world. 
 
President Roye’s Economic Nationalism 
Payne had reason to worry about divisiveness, because his successor presided over one of 
the most acrimonious and turbulent times in nineteenth-century Liberia. Edward Roye was the 
first “outsider” president, heralding from the Republican Party. His political base was located in 
Clay-Ashland, and he interwove the theme of overcoming poverty into his inaugural address. 
“Servile antecedents” had impoverished the Negro, who had been robbed of the fruits of his 
labor in America. But he was now free in Liberia, and his prospects rested on his character and 
ability. Pursuit of riches was the next step, Roye advised. Prosperity was proof of the Negro’s 
potential. Repairing the race’s reputation, Roye concluded, required affluence. He argued that “if 
we remain poor in a country rich by nature in the profusion of its production, it must be a great 
dishonor.” Exoneration demanded wealth acquisition beyond the few or exceptional. Roye 
embodied what the race could accomplish. He was the richest person in Liberia, a self-made 
tycoon who had accumulated a small flotilla of ships that traded up and down the coast. But his 
personal success needed to extend to others. Individual achievement necessitated group 
amelioration. In a veiled shot at the True Whig Party, Roye eschewed amassing “riches and 
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honors” in favor of aiding the “poor and ignominious masses around [us].” Here Roye was 
referring to the surrounding natives. What would help them most? In one word, civilization.
47
 
Roye repeated the Fortunate Fall Thesis in stating that slavery had benefitted Liberians, 
who now returned “as the missionaries of a Christian civilization.” More than any other president 
before him, Roye linked Liberia’s mission with African redemption: “I believe that the object of 
our residence on this coast is to bear some humble part in bringing about the fulfillment of that 
cheering prophecy, that Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hands unto God.” But for Roye, prophetic 
fulfillment meant profitable development
48
: 
I believe that the erection of a railroad will have wonderful influence in the civilization 
and elevation of the native tribes. The barriers of heathenism and superstition will 
disappear before the railroad and its concomitants, as frost, snow, and ice dissolve 
before a summer’s sun. This is one of the most efficient means by which God’s promise 
made concerning Africa is, in my opinion, to be fulfilled.
49
 
 
Roye is advocating entrepreneurial activity in order to recruit natives into the national fold. Thus 
he proposes financing such public improvements as schools and roads, and he lobbies for 
services like a railroad. Liberians would benefit, too. Internal development is an extension of 
free-labor principles, where the common denominator is acquiring wealth by increasing the value 
of land through technical improvements.
50
 In this case, building a railroad facilitates capital 
                                                          
47
 Paragraph quotations from Edward James Roye, Inaugural Address, 3 January 1870, Monrovia, Liberia, 
in African Repository 46 (1870), reprinted in Dunn, The Annual Messages of the Presidents of Liberia, 1:77-78. 
48
 Ibid., 1:78, 76. 
49
 Ibid., 1:80, original emphasis retained. 
50
 See Gavin Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War 
(New York: Basic Books, 1986), 20; see also Gavin Wright, Slavery and American Economic Development (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006), 58-60. 
  
94 
 
flows to the coast while expanding the spatial and economic control of Liberia into the 
hinterland.
51
 
Natives would agree to this arrangement, Roye believed, in exchange for market 
participation. The capitalist-minded statesman believed the profit motive would stir the “natural 
instincts” within natives, not the racialized cultural choices of Blyden’s natural instincts but the 
individualized self-interest inherent in Adam Smith. Roye predicted that in their desire for 
economic gain, natives “will readily consent to do all the manual labor in the construction of 
railroads, for comparatively small pay, kind usage, and enough to eat.” The railroad’s completion 
would transform the natives into “the best of customers,” which in turn would attract foreign 
capitalists to “build up Liberia” to order to “illumine” the rest of Africa.52  
Thus, Roye aimed “to produce general content and happiness in the country, by 
improving the condition of the masses.” Amelioration would come through a rise in market 
commodities—namely, the outflow of exports, the inflow of imports, and the introduction of 
specie. By bringing these innovations to indigenes, Liberia would create “the incentive of self-
interest,” which would bind the nation, spur immigration, and woo foreign investors.53 
Roye rejected a bifurcated society in which Liberia’s leaders ignored the wellbeing of the 
native majority. He underscored his vision of the good society with the poignant words: “Surely 
we are here to take our native brethren by the hand, and teach them how to live, until there shall 
grow up on this continent a Negro community, prosperous, educated, civilized, and Christian, 
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whose voice shall be heard and respected in Europe, Asia, and America.”54 His pressing 
problem, however, was chronic underinvestment. He needed a way to expand the economy 
without deepening the deficit. He cautioned against the dangers of debt, warning that if left 
unchecked, it could result in national bankruptcy.
55
 Because the chief source of revenue was 
custom duties, the economy depended on augmenting consumption. To do this required 
improvement of the native and shipment of commodities into the interior. Developing character 
and commerce was Roye’s strategy for quickening the spirit of cooperation between Liberian 
and native. 
Roye was always going to have an uphill battle in realizing his economic dream. As will 
be seen in the next chapter, political jealousy, geopolitical intrigue, and imprudent financial 
policy drove a stake through Roye’s railroad plan. The need for manpower, logistical planning, 
and capital investment far surpassed the resources Liberia could muster. Furthermore, the role 
for natives was idealized and outsized. Yes, Ethiopia could find redemption but, under Roye’s 
scheme, it required her people to do all the heavy lifting. Roye called Liberia a “garden-spot” 
that could become “a paradise by labor, and by the application of the arts and sciences.”56 No 
matter how progressive Roye billed himself, the truth remained that natives would have to 
supply the manual labor, while Americo-Liberians provided the expertise. Roye was replicating 
Crummell’s hierarchal emigrationism in the workplace. It was an unfair labor division, and few 
natives were eager to buy in as customers. 
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President Payne’s Patriotic Rejoinder 
James Payne, who served a second presidential term in the midseventies, acts as a fitting 
bookend to Roberts. In the years following Roye, Payne sounded alarm over Liberia’s precarious 
financial condition. Economic mismanagement under Roye’s administration had emptied the 
treasury and engendered “a crisis.” Emboldened natives were out for revenge after Liberia had 
driven out their slave trade. A “heathen confederation” of rebellious Greboes had organized to 
challenge Liberia’s authority and threaten its security. As the next chapter will discuss, educated 
Greboes had spearheaded the alliance in an effort to negotiate their imbalance of power with 
Monrovia. Roye had moved too fast, too soon in partnering with natives, believed Payne, who 
trumpeted a Liberia-first policy, one which prioritized the needs of citizens above those of 
aborigines. He complained that mission schools “exclude[d]” Liberian children and devoted 
more attention to “heathen brethren.” “[T]hey are becoming rapidly intelligent,” he fretted, “with 
no corresponding increase of good feeling towards the civilized.” He juxtaposed this indigenous 
deficiency with a call for citizens to combine “all the energy, love of country and mental ability” 
in service of the country. Why were Liberians obligated to do so? It was because “the country 
[was] allotted to us by Divine Providence and bequeathed us by the brave and good men who 
preceded us.”57 
What intrigues is Payne’s reason for alarm: that natives lack “good feeling towards the 
civilized.” Aborigines have neither the proper sentiment nor the correct object in view. In short, 
they do not possess the requisite “love of country,” Payne complains. Political theorist Maurizio 
Viroli differentiates patriotism from nationalism this way: patriotism sustains commitment to the 
idea of the republic while nationalism promotes adherence to cultural, ethnic, or religious 
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homogeneity.
58
 Payne is espousing the latter. His “love of country” is nationalistic because it 
“preaches the necessity of defending the country’s culture and history as values to be retrieved 
and defended in their entirety, as goods to be cherished because of their distinctiveness and 
particularity, because they are ours.”59 Heritage and holy duty dictate Liberians oppose natives 
on the grounds that they are not “us.” Even though indigenes have Westernized education, they 
do not have the affective virtues or cultural and spiritual rootedness. “The alien feeling” and 
“mistrust of the mother county” are divisive counterpoints that “Providence admonishes us . . . to 
correct.”60 Payne’s subjective standard of sentiment is a slippery target and a near impossible bar 
to surmount. It testifies to why assimilation was so difficult for the majority of natives to earn or 
even yearn to accomplish. But it also exposes the narrow and nonreciprocal nature of Payne’s 
affective feeling. 
Martin Delany serves as a counterweight here. From the last chapter, one will remember 
that Delany defined patriotism as “love for all men,” characterized by impartiality and equal 
eligibility.
61
 His patriotism is unalloyed concern for fellow humanity, marked by purity and an 
absence of sophistry. Payne’s love of country it is not. Moreover, Payne lacks Delany’s 
sympathy, or compassionate identification with another group’s misery. Just as in America, a 
(self-defined) majority both delimits and disdains the native “minority.” Yet Payne’s maneuver 
unmasks the defects in Delany’s emigration thought, as well. How does a minority earn the 
majority’s sympathy? For Payne, the answer is political loyalty and cultural conformity. 
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Delany’s answer is self-governance but, as one will recall from The Condition, Elevation, 
Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States, the basis for it is in 
controlling territory. That is precisely what is in dispute as Greboes and Liberians fought to evict 
one another from towns and farms. It is difficult for Liberians to have sympathy, when the 
conduit to it is also the source besetting it. Ensconced safely in the U.S., Delany had the liberty 
to be both expansive and magnanimous, a luxury Payne did not feel he could afford. 
The president was the reaper intent on cutting down Grebo rebels with a sharpened 
scythe. Roye’s “garden-spot” cooperative had yielded a field of tares, and it was time to winnow 
the harvest. For Payne, it started by uprooting native education, which had “sown the seed of 
discord, alienation, disunion and insubordination, which begins to bring forth its bitter fruit and 
which a gracious Providence admonishes us to destroy!”62 Education should be accessible to “all 
citizens, recaptives and civilized Africans included.”63 Schooling was a privilege, then, granted 
only to Liberians and the like-minded.
64
 
Payne slips into hyperbole but with strategic deliberateness. Liberia had to crush the 
confederation, he counseled, or risk the spread of “insubordination.” The threat was not merely 
political but also existential, because the Greboes’ alleged objective was “repossession of the 
territory at the cost of exterminating the entire civilized population.” As he declared: “It is a war 
against civilization and Christianity.” But in the background lies Payne’s worry that “[t]he right 
of the government to other territory will be questioned.” Native unification posed a threat as a 
rival political structure that could tempt France to intervene on behalf of the breakaway Greboes. 
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Publically the president took pains to stress his actions were solely in pursuit of justice and “to 
maintain a Christian state amidst the grossest barbarism.” He positioned the government as the 
chief guardian of religion and culture: it had protected the property of mission societies in 
Maryland County, ransomed a missionary hostage from the clutches of “a gang of savages,” and 
defended civilized settlements from repeated attack. In Payne’s estimation, Greboes were both 
hateful and ungrateful. Above all, they were outside the bounds of civilization. Payne employed 
harsh, separatist language in an attempt to preclude civilized Europeans from entering a political 
and military pact with natives. Never mind that notable confederates had been educated at a 
Protestant Episcopal school. By not “identifying themselves with us” politically and 
sentimentally, they had proven themselves both traitorous and treacherous. Payne’s bellicosity 
reverted back to the adversarial language Roberts had employed in his 1847 inaugural address. 
Like the first president, Payne was attempting to rally the nation against an external threat. But 
this time, the olive branch he extended to natives was reed-thin. Disband the confederation or 
risk effacement. To Liberians, his message was just as clear: Band together or face extinction. 
Presidential rhetoric had come full circle; it was once again nationalism with a bunker 
mentality.
65
 
 To be fair, Liberia was not governing in a political vacuum. As mentioned earlier, the 
Spence trader affair exposed the difficulty Liberia faced in getting other nations to respect its 
autonomy and authority. International contempt, particularly from France and Britain, imperiled 
Liberia’s geographical boundaries.66 The refusal of other countries to recognize its territorial 
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claims or obey its commercial laws forced Liberia to reexamine its status as a colony of the 
American Colonization Society. 
 
American Colonizationists’ Idealism 
The ACS had grand plans for Liberia. Just as colonizationists had multiple reasons for 
supporting emigration to Africa, they articulated different expectations for what they hoped 
Liberia would achieve. On the tactical level, they appraised the colony as a guarantor against the 
expansion of the slave trade. On the logistical side, they treated Liberia as a safe haven for the 
recovered slaves known as recaptives. For the humanitarian dimension, they envisioned the 
settlements as forming a Christian beachhead to propagate the Gospel. On the business end, they 
viewed emigrants as a source for raw goods and a market for American commodities. Perhaps 
the chief reason for aiding colonization in Liberia, however, was the white aspiration for black 
uplift. 
Historian Nicholas Guyatt has argued that most white colonizationists believed in the 
principle of Negro degradation, the idea that “[s]lavery had stripped blacks of skills and industry, 
perhaps even of virtue.”67 For those blacks lucky enough to be free, pervasive white prejudice 
still took a psychological toll, hindering them from reaching their moral, mental, and vocational 
potential. On one hand, colonizationists could affirm Negro equality and ability, because 
inferiority was the extrinsic product of slavery and not an intrinsic defect. Remove slavery, and 
the deficiencies would disappear, colonizationists posited. On the other hand, the vexing 
question was how deeply the degradation ran. Should America abolish slavery, the result would 
still not be an equal society, whites feared, because blacks’ development had been stunted for 
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generations. Removal to a far-off land would serve both races best, colonizationists decided. It 
would protect whites from the specter of reprisal or racial amalgamation, and it would give 
African Americans the time and space to grow into their potential. 
Paired with the idea of degradation is the notion of redemption. Colonizationist Leonard 
Bacon articulated this faith in an exilic, salvific transfiguration across the Atlantic. While in 
American chains, blacks were degraded to such a degree that Bacon viewed them as embodying 
original sin itself. Just as sin separated humanity from God, slavery “alienated its victims from 
their fellows and brethren by promoting deception, self-indulgence, envy, and violence.”68 And 
the somatic nature of sin, for Bacon, ensured that free blacks continued to suffer under social 
death. The soteriological solution was dying to sin and being raised to life anew. Transporting 
blacks to Liberia produced a similar rebirth. No longer were they under the death penalty for 
existing under both the dominion of enslavement and the deprivation of equality. They had 
experienced internal transformation with a new birth in a new land. Not only had they escaped 
the sinful clutches of oppression, African Americans emigrants had the opportunity to be 
ambassadors for spiritual, cultural, and political redemption. They could grace an entire 
continent with the good news—be it the gospel of commerce, civilization, or Christianity. 
This was the intellectual and theological climate from which Americo-Liberians emerged 
to live as free citizens. Many felt obligated to live up to the ideals of their colonizationist 
benefactors. But then reality hit in the form of border disputes, revenue debates, trade 
disagreements, county rivalries, and wars with neighbors. As historian David Brion Davis 
assesses: “Liberia’s mission was so abstract and grandiose that it almost precluded serious 
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discussion of capital investment, technological assistance, labor skills, and markets.”69 This 
statement certainly applied to Liberia’s worsening relationship with Great Britain, whose Sierra 
Leone merchants rebuffed Monrovia’s repeated attempts to regulate tribal trade within Liberian 
borders. 
 
Liberia’s Path toward Independence 
Consequently in 1845, Governor Joseph Jenkins Roberts engaged in a six-month 
correspondence with the ACS Board of Managers on the topic of independence. Britain objected 
to Liberia’s policies as illegitimate because Liberia was acting with the imprimatur of “sovereign 
and independent states,” when it was merely “a private enterprize” of traders belonging to a 
nongovernmental organization, the ACS, which had no diplomatic standing in the community of 
nations.
70
 Roberts clarified the relationship between Liberia and the ACS. The society had 
purchased the original land from natives and held the title in trust for Liberians, who had formed 
their own government and body politic. According to Roberts, the ACS acted in a consulting role 
by appointing “an officer . . . to aid them in the administration of government.”71 The Liberian 
legislature initiated bills, passed laws, and submitted them to the ACS for approval. Although the 
Board of Managers could recommend legislative measures, it could not impose them on 
Liberians, who retained the right of adoption and enforcement. Roberts argued that the 
community had been governing itself for over two decades. Furthermore, he pointed out that 
foreign traders had not hesitated to avail themselves of Liberian tribunals for redress, rather than 
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to petition an outside body. Any governing assistance the ACS provided was technical and 
advisory in nature. He did acknowledge financial reliance on the society, though. “[T]he 
dependence of these colonies upon the American Colonization Society,” Roberts insisted, “can 
only be viewed as a pecuniary, and not a political dependence.”72 Twenty-five years after 
Liberia’s founding, the ACS continued to be an important contributor to Liberia’s national 
economy by donating thousands of dollars in financial aid for new emigrants and annual salaries 
for missionaries and teachers. A critic like Martin Delany saw this as a fundamental weakness. 
As he lectured, “Always bear in mind, that the fundamental principle of every nation is self-
reliance, with the ability to create their own ways and means; without this, there is no capacity 
for self-government.”73 As seen in the last chapter, Delany affirmed self-reliance and self-
government as the basis for African nationality. Roberts would have concurred on the second 
point, and he was clearly working to effect the first. But praxis and principle do not always meet, 
and the governor estimated Liberia was losing tens of thousands of dollars annually in lost tax 
revenue. He stated that “her ports and harbors [were being] violated, and her commerce 
destroyed with impunity.”74 Emigrants had always needed infusions of capital from their 
colonizationist sponsors, and Roberts was not about to renounce ACS aid on the basis of 
Delany’s ethereal principles. 
What Roberts was willing to do, however, was dissolve the formal association between 
the ACS and Liberia. In exchange for pecuniary aid from the ACS, Liberia had originally agreed 
not to enter into league with other governments. But the equation had changed when Britain and 
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France deemed Liberia’s affiliation with the ACS as insufficient grounds for demarcating 
borders and instituting trade regulations. Liberia needed other countries to regard it as a co-equal 
and, after ACS approval and a public referendum, it declared its independence on 26 July 1847. 
 Yet the transition to sovereignty was not without controversy. The curated picture of a 
united front against savages and slavers had been a mirage, ever since Liberia’s national 
inception. The drafting of the 1847 Liberian Constitution told a far different story, one rife with 
political rivalry and territorial squabbles. 
 
Figure 1. Map of original Liberia. 
 
Eleven men from the three charter counties of Sinoe, Montserrado, and Grand Bassa 
gathered together in Monrovia during the summer of 1847 in order to draft a national 
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constitution.
75
 Six delegates came from northern Montserrado, four from central Grand Bassa, 
and one from southern Sinoe. A twelfth man, a nonvoting delegate, acted as the convention 
secretary. From the outset, the northern Montserrado delegation set the agenda. Composed 
primarily of merchants, the contingent from Monrovia lobbied hard for national sovereignty.  
Independence was not a foregone conclusion. The Grand Bassa delegates voiced their 
desire to preserve the Commonwealth and maintain the existing patron-client relationship with 
the American Colonization Society. They wished to retain the status quo because they feared an 
oligarchy of traders from Monrovia would wield inordinate political influence in a new 
government. Bassa Cove had been founded a dozen years after Monrovia, about fifty miles down 
the coast. Unlike Monrovia, manumitted slaves from Virginia and Georgia had settled Bassa 
Cove in 1834 under the auspices of the Young Men’s Colonization Society of Pennsylvania and 
the Colonization Society of the City of New York, who mandated the emigrants remain farmers, 
curb slavers, observe temperance, and avoid warfare against native Africans.
76
 As former slaves, 
they lacked the immediate capital and connections to enter the mercantile trade, accenting class 
and vocational differences with their northern compatriots. They further resented the intrusion of 
Monrovia into their colonial affairs, and they bristled when it tried to claim jurisdiction over 
Bassa Cove in 1836. Bassans pointed out they had their own constitution and bylaws, and they 
refused to recognize any authority beyond that of their parent societies. Another sticking point 
was Bassa Cove’s “doctrine of non-resistance.” Congruent with the wishes of the Pennsylvania 
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Colonizationist Society, Bassa Cove declined to send military aid to other settler colonies when 
asked. And with its total abstinence policy—which contrasted sharply with Monrovia’s tippling 
houses—natives soon learned to look elsewhere for their rum. Taken together, Bassans’ agrarian 
roots, “pacifist” tendencies, and temperance stance instilled in them a sense of moral superiority 
that at times could infuriate Monrovians. The “political jealousies” of the 1830s still smoldered 
at the 1847 Constitutional Convention.
77
 
Richard Murray, the lone Sinoe County representative, was much more inclined to 
support the Montserrado delegates.
78
 His support was understandable. Sinoe County was further 
down the southern coast than even Grand Bassa. It was more isolated than the other two 
counties, being bracketed by the Kru and Grebo, two powerful tribes whose intractability led to 
sporadic wars throughout the next half century. Sinoe had gotten its start in 1836 when the 
Mississippi State Colonization Society bought territory, aptly titled Mississippi in Africa, in 
order to sluice away its manumitted slaves. In the mid-thirties James Green—an affluent judge 
from Natchez, Mississippi—emancipated twenty-six of his slaves, leaving them $25,000 to settle 
in their ancestral homeland.
79
 Along with another forty-five emigrants, Green’s ex-slaves 
founded a settlement at the mouth of Sinoe River, which they named Greenville in their 
benefactor’s honor. The town was roughly 150 miles south of Monrovia and 100 miles from 
Grand Bassa. Because of its remoteness and uncleared vegetation, Sinoe County had difficulty 
attracting and retaining residents. The colonization society had sent emigrants to Mississippi in 
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Africa in order “to confer on Africa the blessings of knowledge, civilization and christianity.”80 
But ironically, many emigrants deserted Sinoe precisely because the county lacked those 
qualities. So in spite of their independent charter, Sinoens jumped at the opportunity to join the 
Commonwealth of Liberia in 1842, hoping for an influx of trade and settlers. With its main 
settlement of Greenville under eighty residents and its parent society now defunct, Sinoe County 
needed as much aid as it could get. The “unfrequent and irregular communication” with other 
counties, most assuredly, prompted Murray to seek a tighter union at the 1847 convention.
81
 If 
Monrovia dictated the terms, then so be it, because Sinoe’s future survival was at stake.82 
Delegates from Montserrado County, where Monrovia was located, appealed to racial pride in 
face of Grand Bassa’s loyalist opposition. Reminiscent of a young Martin Delany, Beverly 
Wilson championed black self-sufficiency. He huffed that the Liberian people could make their 
own constitution without the assistance of white people. Consequently, he refused to 
acknowledge the services of Simon Greenleaf, a white colonizationist and Harvard Law 
professor who had sent a proposed draft of what eventually became the 1847 Liberian 
constitution. Wilson was an ardent nationalist who had emigrated from Norfolk, Virginia, in the 
1830s. A freeman, he had made his livelihood as a carpenter and Methodist minister. Upon 
moving his family to Liberia, he established a mission outpost and school up the St. Paul River, 
about twenty miles inland from Monrovia. Few people had the temerity to question his 
patriotism. In 1837 he had mounted a vigorous defense of Liberia in the United States, and in 
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1840 he lost his eldest in battle when “savage” natives reportedly opened fire on his son under a 
white banner of truce.
83
 His eloquence and sacrifice cemented his reputation as a fellow 
countryman beyond reproach.
84
 
Hilary Teage, the author of Liberia’s Declaration of Independence, joined Wilson in 
rejecting any role for the ACS in the new political arrangement, urging everyone to refrain from 
mentioning the ACS again. After all, delegates had congregated to compose a constitution “for 
the people of Liberia, in their own country, on their own land.”85 Teage was a native Virginian 
who had emigrated to Africa as a teenager. Although trained to be a Baptist missionary, he 
abandoned the call in favor of a more lucrative occupation. He grew to become a prominent 
merchant in the palm oil trade and used his profits to purchase the Liberia Herald newspaper 
from John Russwurm. In 1835 Teage parlayed his increased visibility into a political 
appointment as colonial secretary. At only thirty-three years of age, the editor-cum-politician 
emerged as a star on the rise. His writing skills and political ambitions landed him the task of 
penning his country’s independence declaration. 
Teage’s document was an important milestone in Liberia’s asserting its autonomous 
statehood. Pursuant to English jurist Robert Phillimore’s 1854 definition, Charles Huberich 
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described the state as “a people permanently occupying a fixed territory, bound together by 
common laws, habits, and customs into one body politic, exercising, through the medium of an 
organized Government, independent sovereignty and control over all persons and things within 
its boundaries, capable of making war and peace, and of entering into all International relations 
with the other communities of the globe.”86 Liberia was a state, then, if it met five criteria: (1) 
defined territory; (2) permanent occupancy; (3) common law based on established legal custom; 
(4) common cultural denominators such as religion, language, and a shared lived experience; and 
(5) a structured government regularly exercising (a) internal authority within its borders and (b) 
external sovereignty through war declarations, land annexation, or treaty agreements. 
 Meeting these qualifications was crucial for Liberia, because France and Great Britain 
rejected its claim of satisfying the first and last conditions. Because it was a protectorate of the 
American Colonization Society, by extension Liberia lacked the “international character” to 
settle trade or land disputes with them.
87
 Or so these European nations contended. They were 
sovereign powers; Liberia was not. Therefore, they were bound to recognize neither Liberia’s 
territorial claims nor its commercial taxation of their vessels or imported goods. 
J. J. Roberts disagreed with this assessment, though he did not find it surprising. Liberia 
would have to endure a period of obscurity and opposition before it could ascend in stature. 
Roberts laid forth a roadmap that said as much. Like Edward Blyden, Roberts subscribed to a 
cyclical view of history. “All empires had to struggle in the feebleness of infancy,” he lectured, 
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“and by degrees attain their zenith.”88 According to Roberts, Liberia was well on the road to 
eminence. He compared it to Rome and the British Isles, in that the process was the same: early 
weakness followed by accumulated power, which was succeeded by extended territory 
culminating in universal respect. Land expansion, then, was a necessary step to national 
significance and international prominence. It lay on the path to glory and greatness.  
 Of course, this begged the question of whether native tribes possessed sovereignty over 
ceded land. In short, did they themselves constitute states? By Phillimore’s definition, they did. 
Liberia claimed title of its land based on treaty agreements with local kings starting in 1822. The 
issue turns to one of derivative sovereignty. That is, were these kings duly authorized under 
native law to cede sovereignty to Americo-Liberians? This question becomes especially relevant 
to those aborigines for which territorial sovereignty rested in the collectivity of the tribes. If land 
title belonged to the tribe as a whole, their king or representative could not divest the land 
without their consent. Otherwise, any derivative title and sovereignty transfer would be void. 
Alternatively, Liberia had the option of claiming sovereignty based on the principle of terra 
nullius. Derived from Latin, the term literally means “nobody’s land.” If land is abandoned or 
prior sovereignty relinquished, the land becomes open to acquisition through simple 
occupation.
89
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Territorial transaction was only one part of a larger divide for Roberts. As he saw it, the 
“African problem” was the incapacity of the race to rule themselves.90 Thus government was 
central to his vision for Africa’s future. For Roberts, the contribution of Liberia to the continent 
was “restoring to Africa a government, a name, and the blessings of civilization and 
Christianity.”91 The fledgling nation represented liberation from the slave trade, spiritual 
bondage, and savage barbarism. But without government, the other benefits could not happen. A 
strong, forceful government was paramount because it secured freedom, protected rights, and 
promoted moral living (itself seen as a safeguard of republican government). In Roberts’s words: 
“I am impressed with the belief that God has destined this republic to be the centre of attraction 
to her scattered children, who for ages have bent under the galling yoke of oppression in almost 
every quarter of the globe, and that He will gradually bring them into the enjoyment of perfect 
freedom in the bosom of Liberia.”92 Here Roberts invokes the imagery of New Israel, the 
covenant nation through which God would bless all the nations of the earth. But Roberts’s 
“nation language” also carries political overtones. It represents a move away from earlier 
emigrationists’ appeal to common racial and cultural reasons for returning to their ancestral 
homeland.
93
 Instead, Roberts iterates a pragmatic black solidarity focused on the furtherance of 
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state power. He envisions black publics coming together to address a common problem, the need 
for civilized rule in an unruly land. Governmental authority was his proposed solution.
94
 
 
President Roberts’s Republicanism: Part II 
In Roberts’s second stint as president in the 1870s, he clarified what he meant by a 
republican government. It was one in which “the supreme power of the state resides in the 
people” and whose representatives “conduct national affairs in a manner conducive to the 
common benefit, and the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people.”  
Integral to republicanism were proper respect for and submission to authority. Roberts delineated 
that “by republicanism we mean not a state of licentiousness; nor as subversive of order, nor a 
defiance of legal authority. We must convince mankind that we understand by a republic, a well 
ordered government endue[d] with energy to fulfill all its intentions, to act with effect upon all 
delinquents, and to bring to punishment all offenders against the laws of the state.” 
As seen throughout this chapter, Americo-Liberians had a complicated relationship with 
their native neighbors. On one hand, Roberts proclaimed they shared “a peculiar relation to us, 
and must be civilized, and the work is ours.” Whatever happened, he resolved they would not 
share the same fate as North American Indians, who were “swept into oblivion.” Why not? 
Roberts—not above articulating Moses’s mystical black nationalism when it suited his 
purposes—argued Americoes and Africans were of the same nature, one blood, and so they were 
brethren and fellow citizens. Left unspoken is the irony of using abolitionist language of equality 
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while erecting what was, some could charge, a nascent herrenvolk republic.
95
 Yet full installation 
was still decades in the making, and one may argue that Roberts’s insistence on equality 
precluded a deleterious distanciation that devolved into state-sanctioned apartheid.
96
 Natives 
were just as capable of uplift as were African Americans, Roberts resolved. Of course, the catch 
was that only “the best informed and more intelligent” of them realized their “degraded” state 
and the need for change.
97
 If it was not herrenvolk republicanism, it teetered on black bourgeois 
nationalism.
98
 
The solution for restive tribes was Monrovia’s passage of appropriate laws and 
regulations, which Roberts was confident would remove intertribal differences and, of course, 
cohere people to Liberia. Government was to assume a parental role, being “kind and mild, but 
firm and absolute.” Infighting was akin to family discord, an evil that threatened to hinder 
progress for years to come. Liberia faced intertribal conflict in both the north and south. The Vai 
and Golah skirmished in the north, while the Grebo drew arms in the south. 
One of the main impediments came from “bad foreigners” who corrupted natives’ morals 
and retarded their civilization. Roberts was referring to “unprincipled” traders who trafficked in 
slaves or rum. But the label also applied to any merchant who refused to pay duties to Monrovia. 
By 1850 Laurie Hamilton and one Captain Murray insisted their dealings with the Kru were not 
subject to Liberian taxation. They refused to dock at approved ports of entry, carried out direct 
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trade with the Kru, and ignored the requirement that they purchase special government licenses 
in order to trade. Roberts accused them of flouting international law, encouraging native 
insubordination, and inciting their insurrection. They were really harming natives by depriving 
Monrovia of funds it needed to underwrite education and civilization (i.e. infrastructure, mainly 
roads) among the various tribes. 
Corruption of natives was a familiar theme in Liberians’ arguments against foreign 
interference. What is interesting in Roberts’s speech is that he extends corruption beyond the 
moral realm of insobriety and insubordination to encompass the sin of un(der)development. 
Natives could not reach their full commercial potential in their dealings with shady European 
traders, Roberts insinuated. As exporters of true democratic capitalism, Liberians held the 
purported keys to future economic success for the region.  
Liberian traders and explorers were at the vanguard in perpetuating this idea. Political 
leaders in Monrovia appreciated these intrepid men because they served multiple functions, most 
of which were perceived as beneficial to the country. First, they collected knowledge about the 
land and peoples surrounding the largely littoral-bound citizenry. Second, they often acted as 
official emissaries for the government, delivering treaty and trade requests to tribal chiefs. Third, 
they popularized Liberia to the West with their diligent travel journals, which both piqued and 
sated the curiosity of prospective emigrants and the general public about the so-called Dark 
Continent. Fourth and perhaps most importantly, they helped establish a basis for Liberia’s 
future territorial claims. Missionaries like Alexander Crummell could serve a complementary 
role by extending soft power through instituting churches, establishing schools in the villages, 
and preaching against such evils as polygamy, animism, and the slave trade. 
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Opposition to slave trafficking was one of the earliest sources of friction between Liberia 
and surrounding tribes. The constitution devoted an entire section on the penalties for being 
involved in the slave trade. Any citizen or resident caught transporting slaves risked losing his 
livelihood and freedom. The government had the right to seize his vessels, levy a $1,000 fine, 
and incarcerate the offender up to five years. All Liberia-commissioned ships had the legal right 
and duty to board, inspect, and impound vessels found to be carrying slaves. 
Deterrence morphed into rounds of ever-tightening trade restrictions. Under the pretext of 
enforcing the ban on slavery, the government required domestic and international shippers to 
supply ship manifests and submit to inspections by revenue collectors. Under the additional 
auspices of discouraging the sale of rum, Roberts proposed the introduction of trade licenses for 
anyone who wanted to exchange goods with natives. Any citizen or other person in Liberia who 
traded on behalf of a foreign entity would need to purchase the license and also pay an annual tax 
of twelve to sixteen dollars. Yet not everyone was eligible for this status. The government vowed 
to sanction only those traders who were of “good character” and who would “promote the 
designs of the Government.” Unregistered “smugglers” risked forfeiture of goods, fourfold fines, 
and potential jail time. Anyone who resisted a customs officer’s authority would find himself 
slapped with a minimum fine of fifty dollars. 
Roberts viewed trade regulation as complementing missionary propagation. Monies 
generated from the licenses, he envisioned, would fund education of natives, while safeguarding 
them from “corrupting foreigners” and their “ardent spirits.” Furthermore, he predicted that the 
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natives would be amenable to the plan because of the anticipated benefits, namely “civilization” 
and the prevention of wars (which alcohol presumably fueled).
99
 
What undercut Roberts’s credibility was the charge of Liberians’ exploiting natives, 
which critics alleged amounted to little more than slavery. A prominent detractor, William 
Nesbit, blasted Liberians for their reliance on so-called “apprentices.” The apprenticeship model 
had started with good intentions but had experienced its share of abuses. Many interior tribes had 
viewed the original practice as a beneficial way for their children to gain a western education. 
The youth would live and work with Liberians in exchange for literacy and vocational training. 
But without firm rules in place, some Americoes found ways to exploit the system by loosely 
defining what constituted a trade or basic education. Despite the shameful abuses and 
embarrassing comparisons to chattel slavery, Liberians supported the continued maintenance of 
the apprenticeship system.  
In hindsight, the apprenticeship model led to serious societal problems. Historian Caree 
Banton sees it as contributing to the color politics of the twentieth century. In the case of 
Congoes—former Africans who Western navies liberated from slavers—Liberians discriminated 
against the darker-colored recaptives, declining to parcel out land to the Africans who relocated 
to the country. In the words of Banton, recaptives were seen as “uncultured and were thus a 
socially disruptive element for a Liberian society aiming to project black humanity and civility to 
the broader white world.”100 Banton argues that Liberians acculturated recaptives through the 
labor discipline inherent in field apprenticeship. It was American Southern-style sharecropping 
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under the guise of benevolent civilizationism. Along with the economic inequities of tenancy, 
recaptives enjoyed none of the same legal rights of their wealthier Americo-Liberians. Without 
land ownership, recaptives had to settle for a de facto second-class citizenship. 
Yet it is hard to castigate mid-century Americo-Liberians as colonizers on par with their 
European counterparts. That is not to deny that Americoes caused real suffering, material 
deprivation, and lasting enmity among its neighbors. Perhaps it is a matter of scale. In 
comparison to natives, the number of Liberians was miniscule. In 1847 citizens numbered a little 
over three thousand, with almost two thousand living in the vicinity of Monrovia. In the other 
two counties outside Montserrado lived a paltry eight hundred Americoes. Their numbers paled 
when placed beside the two million natives residing within the borders claimed by Liberia.  
Oppression on a national scale was neither visible nor inevitable in the nineteenth century. But in 
Liberia’s political and economic policies, one discerns the seeds for inequality planted. Every 
president of Liberia until Edward James Roye rejected economic autonomy and self-
determination for indigenous peoples. On one level, one can understand their reluctance as an act 
of self-interest in Liberia’s ongoing struggle for survival. Desperate to stave off European 
advances and intent on staking their claim to nationhood, many Liberians closed ranks and 
pursued nationalist aims that solidified their international position and accrued wealth and power 
for their elite. The attendant exceptionalism espoused by Liberia’s early leaders spawned 
entitlement among its citizenry and stirred resentment among those touted as their African kin—
a societal gulf that continued into the twentieth century and beyond. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
“I was in no humor for cant about kindred; I wanted my money”: 
The Lessons and Limits of Commerce in the Liberian Republic 
 
 
Benjamin Anderson was a trader and explorer during the 1860s and 1870s. He was 
renowned at home and abroad for his fearless forays into the dense hinterlands of Liberia. But in 
March 1868, he was having difficulty convincing King Bessa to let him and his expedition leave 
Bessa’s Mandingo town. The tribal chief kept delaying Anderson’s departure and exacting 
payment of goods for Anderson’s continued stay. When the Liberian trader offered money to win 
his release, Bessa laughed and told Anderson his money “no got feet this time.” Anderson railed 
against Bessa’s men for stealing his goods, intimidating his porters, and inhibiting his travel into 
the interior. He complained that the “barbarians” were abusing and humiliating him because the 
Liberian government at Monrovia failed to exert sufficient control over them. And he vowed to 
return with troops and burn the village down. But Bessa was unmoved. He accused the outsiders 
of disturbing the peace, interfering with his slave trade, and “endangering” the lives of his 
people. The Mandingo and Liberian were at loggerheads over who would dictate the trade, 
travel, and territory inside the country. The tense standoff was illustrative of the uneasy relations 
between natives and Liberians throughout their history. Commercial success was something that 
both sides wanted. But as Liberia came into its own as a nation, it faced mandates that could 
often conflict: unify the people while staying solvent; grow prosperity for Liberians while 
extending it to millions of natives unfamiliar with capitalism; and exercise flexible financial 
governance while projecting developmental sturdiness to the outside world. Rhetoric and reality 
collided, forcing Liberians to make pecuniary choices that were less and less in natives’ best 
interests. To borrow King Bessa’s phrase, Liberia found that commerce—as a unifying, 
  
119 
 
mobilizing force—“no got feet” and lost traction in quelling the internal dissensions that 
appeared over the second half of the nineteenth century.
1
 
It had not always been this way. Early on, Liberians had hoped to use commerce as the 
first pillar with which to anchor the republic. It was the engine necessary to fuel the economy, 
fund the government, and develop the country. But internal rivalries and external pressure 
conspired to keep Liberia’s commercial advancement at a standstill. What Liberians hoped 
would unify the nation was the source of contention because it pitted trader against farmer, 
Americo against native, and Liberian against European. The desire to expand Liberia’s 
commercial footprint led to charges of elitism, exploitation, and colonialism. 
 
Paul Cuffe’s Pioneering Vision 
The dream of Liberia as an economic and commercial power had been there from the 
beginning. Commerce had been a key motivation since the birth of the colonization movement in 
the U.S. Paul Cuffe was the embodiment of this vision. Born in 1759 to an Amerindian and free 
black who had bought his own freedom, Cuffe grew up in Massachusetts before leaving home to 
embark on a whaling expedition at age sixteen. With sailing now in his veins, he built a ship and 
began to trade up and down the eastern seaboard. He used to run the British blockade during the 
Revolutionary War in order to supply Quaker communities. After the war had concluded, the 
ambitious sailor assumed captaincy of his own whaling schooner. He soon parlayed his profits 
into building more ships until he had amassed a small fortune and established a shipping empire. 
With sizable interests to protect, Cuffe petitioned for tax relief in 1780 on the basis that he was 
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being taxed without representation (since blacks were prohibited from suffrage). Denied relief or 
representation, he refused to pay property and poll taxes, which landed him a short stint in jail. In 
1808 Cuffe converted to Quakerism and met fellow Friend, James Pemberton, who encouraged 
Cuffe to view Africa as a potential site for evangelism and settlement. Pemberton connected him 
with the African Institution of London, a philanthropic society dedicated to the British colony of 
Sierra Leone. 
In 1811 Cuffe sailed for Freetown, the chief town in Sierra Leone. His maiden voyage to 
Africa was indicative of his Christian commercialism, as he brought beef, Bibles, and other 
goods to the continent. During his visit, he explored the possibility of establishing a whaling 
fishery in the coastal waters surrounding the colony. Shuttling between London and Freetown, he 
lobbied for commercial shipping rights, even establishing the Friendly Society of Sierra Leone, 
whose aims were to promote unfettered trade between the colony and motherland. Bureaucratic 
red tape and diplomatic tensions between Britain and the United States ultimately scuttled his 
attempts, but Cuffe had found in Africa what he had been seeking: a location ripe for Christianity 
and rife with commercial opportunities. Returning to the U.S., Cuffe immediately began to 
organize emigration societies in Philadelphia and New York. In Baltimore, he reached out to 
Daniel Coker, then a teacher in an all-negro school. His efforts resulted in the formation of 
African Institutions devoted to the cause of black emigration to Africa. 
Unfortunately for Cuffe, the War of 1812 intervened to halt his momentum. With 
England and the U.S. at war, he found his emigration efforts stymied. In 1814 he introduced a 
memorial to the U.S. Congress asking that it lift the commercial embargo so he could transport 
African-American emigrants to Africa, where they could “promote habits of industry, sobriety, 
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and frugality, among the natives of that country.”2 Although the Senate approved his bill, his 
effort fell short in the House by seven votes. Nor was the English government any more 
sympathetic, refusing to offer protection should he visit Sierra Leone. Undeterred, Cuffe 
transported thirty-eight emigrants to Sierra Leone in 1816, where he exchanged his tobacco 
cargo for camwood. 
More than other emigrationists or colonizationists, Cuffe saw African settlement as the 
chance for African Americans to build a transatlantic trading empire between Africa, England, 
and the U.S. Cuffe died in 1817—an inopportune time for the emigrationist cause. Had he lived, 
he may have had the stature and credentials to sway some prominent opponents of colonization. 
His vision for building a viable commercial stronghold in Africa would live on, though the 
argument was never as compelling nor as paradigmatic as with Cuffe. 
Other colonizationists attempted to carry the banner of business. Rather than tout black 
uplift as Cuffe had, they often resorted to self-serving rhetoric. Thus transplanted African 
Americans would be “a frugal, active, industrious people” who would supply the U.S. with such 
tropical products as rice, corn, cotton, sugar, and coffee while serving as a new market for “our 
spare manufactures, and our spare productions.”3 If framed as “a question of dollars and cents,” 
Liberia offered “infinite benefits” compared to the speculative gold rush in California.4 Another 
colonizationist urged the U.S. to recognize Liberia for its trade potential. He pointed to London’s 
acknowledgement of Liberia’s nationhood. More than philanthropy motivated England. Driving 
British diplomacy was “her great national characteristic—trade, TRADE, TRADE. This is what 
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the Anglo-Saxon conquers by and conquers for.” Yes, Liberia was as “small as a musquito [sic]” 
but if England paid attention to its “hum,” so too should the United States. Trade and the right to 
make money, he argued, were complementary reasons to recognize Liberia’s independence.5 The 
secretary and treasurer for the American Colonization Society, William Coppinger, also wrote an 
editorial in the Christian Observer in which he sounded the alarm over the growing English trade 
monopoly in Africa. England was gaining an advantage by exporting each year over £5,000,000 
of goods to Africa and importing more than £800,000. Liberia alone was purchasing $120,000 of 
English goods per annum, and it was exporting nearly the same dollar amount. As Coppinger 
concluded, American trade to Africa was paramount: “Ours are emphatically a commercial 
people, and to enable them to enter into competition with the English traders, demands the 
earliest and most serious attention.”6 
Emigrationist Martin Delany was another vocal supporter of Negro industriousness. A 
fierce critic of the American Colonization Society, he still agreed on the need for African 
Americans to hone their commercial skills. He raised the need for “educational and business 
qualifications” for colored people.7 In The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the 
Colored People of the United States, he extolled Africans for their industry, husbandry, and 
artisanship. Interior Africans rivaled the West in masonry, architecture, and civil engineering, 
Delany claimed. Their aptitude for work, then, had made them superior candidates to replace 
Amerindians in New World mines and fields. As Delany advanced, white Americans grew 
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wealthy off the ability of imported Africans to cultivate and harvest rice, hemp, cotton, indigo, 
and tobacco. Thus enslaved Africans were “the bone and sinews of the country.”8 In subsequent 
chapters Delany presented the case for the financial and commercial contributions of African 
Americans—all of whom remained disenfranchised and unable to change their sociopolitical 
condition. Oppression had made staying in the U.S. untenable. Delany cited the Jewish exodus 
from Egypt and the Puritan separation from Britain as prime examples of successful migrations 
to a new land. The time had come for American colored people to make the same move, he 
contended. And one of the first places Delany considered was Liberia. 
 
Emigrationists’ Dueling Literature 
Delany loved the idea of an independent Liberia, but he decried its utter reliance on U.S. 
colonizationists for funding and diplomatic guidance. Were Liberia not “a mere dependency of 
Southern slaveholders, and American Colonizationists,” he would consider it an ideal emigrant 
destination, especially because of its extensive educational opportunities.
9
 But its continued 
obsequiousness led Delany to deride its government as a mockery and its president a parody of 
power. The eastern coast of Africa held far greater promise, Delany concluded, because of its 
commercial potential. Mineral wealth, intersecting trade routes, and future railroad prospects 
would “make [the location] the GREAT THOROUGHFARE for all the trade with the East Indies and 
Eastern Coast of Africa, and the Continent of America.”10 Thus in 1852 Delany dismissed 
Liberia for its lack of political backbone and commercial development. 
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In part to rebut Delany, the ACS sent Daniel H. Peterson the following year to report on 
Liberia. In 1854 Peterson published The Looking-Glass: Being a True Report and Narrative of 
the Life, Travels, and Labors of the Rev. Daniel H. Peterson, a largely glowing tract in favor of 
Liberian emigration. He recited a litany of common complaints against living in the U.S., 
including the inability of free colored people to find employment because of prejudice. In 
contrast, he depicted Liberia as an open door: “In that country is a field large enough for the 
employment of all your talents in every way and shape, either moral, religious, civil or military. 
There no door will be shut against you, but all is as free as the air of heaven.”11 Repudiating 
Delany’s charge of an unhealthy climate, Peterson declared Monrovia to be “perfectly healthy.”12 
Moreover, because the city sat on a vast bed of iron ore, he observed that enterprising emigrants 
could reap “a fortune in a few years from minerals and the natural productions of the earth.”13 
Farmers could prosper there, too, because of the natural fertility of the soil. Whereas Delany had 
called African slaves as “the bone and sinew” of the U.S., Peterson heralded free farmers as “the 
bone of sinew” of Liberia.14 Such artisans as bakers, butchers, tailors, carpenters, and 
blacksmiths—he predicted—would accrue financial gain in short order. 
Furthermore, Peterson hinted that emigrants could soon take advantage of an educated, 
native labor force. As he lectured: “The only way to redeem Africa is to settle it as soon as 
possible. Take hold of the land, cultivate it, and in employing the natives, cultivate their minds at 
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the same time that the land is rendered fruitful.”15 Here he meant more than Christian 
evangelism, having just praised one missionary for teaching his native pupils such trade skills as 
tailoring, smithing, and carpentry. 
Delany did not waste time in countering Peterson. In his 1855 introduction to William 
Nesbit’s Four Months in Africa, Delany disparaged Liberia as “that miserable hovel of 
emancipated and superannuated slaves, and deceived colored freemen, controlled by the 
intrigues of a conclave of upstart colored hirelings of the slave power in the United States.”16 In a 
sense, “true Liberians” were still “the servants and slaves of the whites” by aping their former 
masters in wicked and unprincipled practices.
17
 For evidence, Delany aspersed missionaries for 
their “injurious” involvement in trading rum, cheating natives, and “probably dealing in 
slaves.”18 Delany warned that such missionary endeavors would soon be followed by military 
operations to overthrow the country. 
William Nesbit’s account was no less condemnatory. In Four Months in Liberia, he 
proceeded to launch an ad hominem attack against Monrovia’s residents for being religious 
hypocrites, exploitive traders, and de facto slave masters. Their dealings with the natives, Nesbit 
decided, were most unchristian due to their unfair trade practices in exchanging cheap rum and 
trinkets for camwood and palm oil. For all the talk of black independence and economic growth, 
Liberians were dangerously dependent on native crops and labor to sustain their unearned 
lifestyles.  
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If Monrovia was inferior to the meanest village in the U.S., outside the capital Nesbit 
found conditions hopelessly primitive. Mud huts, uncleared farmland, and unnavigable rivers 
made living and traveling conditions deplorable. Nesbit scoffed at the alleged state of 
agricultural advance: “There positively is not, nor never [sic] has been a plow, a horse, or a yoke 
of oxen, used in all the country. No man there has now or ever had, five acres of land cleared and 
in cultivation, and I am one of those who believe that it is impossible to clear the land, owing to 
the dense and rapid growth of the bush.”19 Most Liberians were too busy engaging in unethical 
trading to bother investing in agricultural or resource development, he lamented. 
Samuel Williams took exception to Nesbit’s broadside in his 1857 Four Years in Liberia. 
Written as a direct response to Nesbit’s defamatory charges, the book sought to set the record 
straight on Liberia. Characterizing Nesbit a dishonest malcontent, Williams refuted the majority 
of Nesbit’s allegations. 
Williams conceded, however, that Nesbit was not altogether incorrect in some of his 
assessments. Too many colonists were money-driven and took advantage of native naïveté. More 
Liberians were traders than necessary, and agriculture suffered as a result. Manumitted slaves 
from U.S. southern states had not yet learned the value of industry and had adopted “southern 
habits” of owning servants to wait on them. And some immigrants mistreated their servants. All 
these deficiencies Williams readily acknowledged. 
But the Liberian apologist was quick to dispute the notion of an undeveloped land. 
Productive farming was beginning to take hold. Coffee farms and sugar plantations were 
sprouting along the St. Paul River. Rice, cassava, and fish were harvested in abundance near the 
Junk River. Settlers outside Monrovia had cleared and planted tracts of farmland up to twenty 
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acres. Furthermore, the Liberian government was making inroads with the neighboring 
aborigines, instituting free trade regulations and mediating intertribal disputes. Williams likened 
Liberia to ancient Carthage, which would one day impart its laws, religion, and civilization to the 
continent. Outreach to the natives “depend[ed] wholly upon Liberia’s prosperity” and Williams 
would brook no libel from “a most inveterate hater of colonization.”20 
Four Years in Liberia exuded credibility because Williams had traveled to the interior, 
whereas Nesbit had not. Williams’s account sparked a trend toward exploration into the African 
hinterland. Part of this movement stemmed from growing curiosity of prospective emigrants and 
the general public about the African continent. Yet another reason lay in Liberia’s concern to 
establish a basis for its territorial claims. With British Sierra Leone to the northwest and French 
Africa to the southeast, Monrovia was keen to lay legal claim to interior lands before Europeans 
did. Explorers sometimes doubled as quasi-diplomats. They were paid government agents and 
often carried Liberian flags to present to chieftains with whom they entered into friendship 
treaties. 
 
The Economic Role of Missionaries 
Some travelers were missionaries, like Alexander Crummell, who visited villages in 
hopes of preaching the gospel, instituting churches, or establishing schools. With an eye to 
supplementing his missionary income, Crummell was cognizant of potential revenue streams. As 
soon as he arrived in Liberia in 1853, he began to describe the natural resources and native 
industries. He identified gold, cotton, timber, ivory, and palm oil as viable exports. He noted 
with approval about the numerous looms and large markets in the interior. And he was quick to 
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assess the “capability” of various tribes.21 Hence, the Kru were skilled sailors, the Mandingo 
intelligent traders, the Grebo able blacksmiths, and the Vai industrious farmers and weavers. 
These were foundational abilities on which he could build up the “future prospects of 
civilization.”22 
Civilization had commercial import. For Crummell, Edward Blyden, and other Liberians, 
the interior represented a sphere of development, a space for settlement, and a populace ripe for 
recruitment. Immigrants knew that internal development required external trade. That is, they 
needed interior goods to exchange with foreign shippers for supplies and income. Profits could 
then be used to build roads, trade depots, and more settlements. The interior also represented the 
promise of geographical expansion. A move inland provided more room for additional 
immigrants and opened up fertile land for them to farm. And especially for Blyden and 
Crummell, the interior held hundreds of thousands of native inhabitants who, if assimilated 
through “civilization,” would unite African and Americo-Liberian into one nationality. 
Commerce was critical to this integration. John and Jean Comaroff write of the dual 
conversion that western missionaries brought to the mission field. Conversion embodied not just 
doctrinal assent but also commercial assimilation. It required becoming part of the “sacred 
economy” of a civilized society. As the Comaroffs put it: 
Economy here was a part of a sacred order that described the production of value and 
virtue in the world; an order in which individual exertion and righteousness gave shape to 
civil society and earned divine credit. In the mission field, this vision had pragmatic 
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implications: converting heathens required changing their sense of worth—and their 
mode of producing it—so that they might lay up treasures on earth and in heaven.23 
 
In short, missionaries had to show the “heathen” that they were both sinner and consumer. As 
Crummell stated, it was about getting “their habits, civilized necessities, and acquired wants [to] 
assimilate to ours.”24 God’s kingdom and Liberian citizenship depended on it. And for the 
pecuniary proselytizer, “assimilation involved the regulation, education, and labor discipline 
associated with civilization.”25 Liberian explorers were adept at spotting the third. 
 
The Commercial Role of Explorers 
 In the latter half of the fifties, both James Sims and George Seymour traveled extensively 
throughout the interior. Born a free black in 1832, Sims emigrated at age twenty from Virginia to 
Liberia, where he was a grocer who dealt in foodstuffs. In 1858 he embarked on a ten-month, 
privately funded expedition into the interior, looking to engage in the lucrative ivory trade. 
Seymour was also a free black who arrived from Connecticut in 1841 at age twenty-two. He 
owned a blacksmith shop, raised cotton and coffee, and operated a short-lived saw mill. He 
undertook two trips into the interior, the first in 1855 ostensibly to find camwood for his new 
mill. The second trip had the government’s imprimatur, and he traversed the interior for eight 
months. An official Commissioner of Interior Roads and Exploration, Seymour was to map out 
paths, rivers, and villages while listing natural resources and native industries he observed along 
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his journeys. He also had the right to negotiate treaties, establish trade links, and purchase 
territory as the opportunities arose. 
 Sims traveled more than 150 miles into the interior, visiting villages located within a ten-
mile vicinity of the St. Paul River. Because he brought gifts for local chieftains, he was largely 
well received. Sims would judge the degree of “civilization” based on villagers’ housing, 
industry, and agricultural output. The “higher order” people were those who were honest, 
peaceful, respectful, hardworking, and adhered to a regular schedule.
26
 He singled out one tribe 
in particular, the Mandingoes, for being “decidedly . . . superior” because they respected industry 
and private property by criminalizing theft and indolence.
27
 Nor did it hurt that they lived on 
fertile land with a vast camwood forest nearby. A neighboring tribe was known for their woven 
cloth, but Sims felt that having a nearby Liberian settlement would encourage them to eschew 
cloth weaving in favor of raising more cotton to sell to the Liberians. 
 Sims believed that the prospects of free trade would spur interior aborigines to welcome 
the Americo-Liberian expansion of settlements onto their territories. The problem rested in a 
band of tribes that resided between the coast and interior. They interdicted free passage of goods 
to the coast, and they forced native merchants to give up their goods on pain of enslavement. 
These Mohammedan bandits were “roguish, thieving knaves” for preventing interior tribesmen 
from trading with Liberians.
28
 In Sims’s estimate, they robbed other natives and kept coastal 
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immigrants from “vast riches.”29 The interior would undoubtedly fete Liberians, he thought, if 
they smashed the blockade. 
 Sims proffered another irresistible advantage. Liberians had the additional appeal of 
possessing education, which interior tribes were keen to master. Sims found himself often 
mobbed by eager natives. As he revealed, “the great secret was simply this—I was a ‘white 
man’—white because I was a ‘Merica man’—‘Merica man, because I Sarvy [learn] book,’ and 
every body who ‘Sarvy book,’ except the Mandingoes, are ‘white.’”30 In other words, natives 
respected Sims because they regarded him a white American who knew how to read. If they 
could learn to speak and read English, the hope was that they could acquire the ability to trade 
with Americo-Liberians and Westerners for material goods and armaments enjoyed by their 
Mohammedan enemies. 
 Seymour’s published travel diary accomplished much the same purpose as Sims’s work. 
It was designed to showcase the benefits of moving into the interior, assimilating native 
populations, and supporting the U.S. colonization movement. Seymour adopted a more direct 
land route in his travels, starting fifty miles south of Monrovia and trekking close to two hundred 
miles into the African heartland. 
Seymour took the liberty of naming landmarks along his travels, especially at locations 
he thought would be ideal for settling. So he christened an expansive plain with native cotton 
fields “Benson’s View,” which he thought “a most delightful location for an American 
settlement” because of its plentiful timber, granite, and brick clay. Palm trees covered “Mount 
Roberts” with navigable rivers nearby. Palm trees, rice paddies, and iron ore deposits dotted 
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“Mount Nancy,” so named for the Liberian first lady. And he deemed “Mount Stephen”—titled 
after President Stephen Benson—a good place for Liberia’s capital, with its wagon roads and 
accessible waterways. If naming implies ownership or control, Seymour was quick to claim 
geography for his fledgling nation.
31
 
Although natives already inhabited these places, Seymour felt it “the duty of the Liberian 
Government to extend her influence beyond the limits of her own territory.”32 In “occupy[ing] 
the religious desolations of Africa,” Liberians would educate the heathen, check the slave trade, 
and effect moral and mental improvement.
33
 These contributions would create native demand for 
increased Liberian involvement, he surmised. In a revealing moment, the government 
commissioner logged: “I will venture the remark, that the civilized world cannot add to the 
happiness of these people unless they advance mentally; for they have all the common wants of 
life in abundance.”34 Interdependence required inculcating a consumer mindset within the 
blissfully oblivious native. It may not have necessarily been Seymour’s intent to foster an 
exploitable dependency. Rather, for these explorers, their faith in commerce was unwavering. It 
could civilize and sanctify the “benighted” African. Capitalist enterprise was the road to civility 
and productivity, and they believed that following it would curb sloth and slavery. Trade was 
seen as the antidote to personal and societal unfreedom. It was also a move to commodity 
acquisition: Liberians would obtain staples and profit to fuel their national economy, while 
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natives would procure religion, education, and domestic goods to transform their insular lives. 
As Seymour recognized, commercialism needed civilizationism to proceed first. 
 
Martin Delany’s Reassessment and James Skipwith’s Predicament 
Across the Atlantic, Delany was having second thoughts about Liberia. In the same year 
that Sims’s and Seymour’s travel narratives were published, the black nationalist assumed 
leadership of an exploratory expedition to Africa. A series of Negro conventions in the U.S. 
during the 1850s had spurred interest in further exploring Africa as a viable site for emigration. 
The trip took Delany to Liberia, Abeokuta, and Yorubaland. He signed “treaties” in Abeokuta, 
which granted him land for African American immigrants to settle and farm. 
Upon his arrival in Liberia, Delany grew more circumspect and nuanced in his criticism. 
Able to see the country firsthand, he tempered his tone. The republic was in a state of 
improvement, he decided, after reviewing its industries and infrastructure. Farms were growing 
crops of rice, coffee, ginger, pepper, and sugar cane. And they were buying ivory, camwood, and 
palm oil for export. Agriculture still lagged, though, for want of horses. And public 
improvements were deficient, to put it charitably. Liberia boasted no wharves, paved streets, or 
municipal roads save one. There were no notable edifices or marketplaces in Monrovia, which 
was little more than a rude, rundown town. 
And therein lay the problem. Liberia had neither the capital investment nor the gross 
national product to invest heavily in internal improvements. It took some modest steps: loaning 
farmers up to five dollars for each cultivated acre, paying the expense of importing limited farm 
animals and machinery, funding the initial startup costs of a sugar mill. Yet to quote immigrant 
James Skipwith in the fifties: “[T]hir is…But very little Cash the President says that the 
Govement will in a few mounts Be out of det and at which time we hope to Be a happy 
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Nathinon.”35 Until then, individuals were on their own. The dearth of roads hampered the ability 
of frontier settlers in getting their goods to market. Skipwith complained that hauling foodstuffs 
forty miles ate up any potential profits: “the Prophes is that is made is nothing so you see that the 
People comes to this Country Poor & thay remaine Poor.”36 And no one found it cost-effective to 
move Skipwith’s cotton until he could produce it in higher quantities.37 Delany could criticize 
the underdeveloped state of agriculture, but aside from weather and price fluctuations, farmers 
faced enormous obstacles just in delivering their goods. 
 
Liberia’s Growing Class Stratification 
Skipwith’s hope for “a happy Nathinon,” moreover, glossed over growing rifts in 
Liberian society. By the midforties, an informal caste system had emerged. At the top were the 
elite, affluent Americoes who had emigrated in the 1820s as free blacks from the United States. 
They had enough capital and education to establish themselves in business, usually as 
entrepreneurial traders. Because racial intermixture with American whites had dotted their 
lineage, many of the elite were lighter in complexion. Next in line were the rest of the African 
American emigrants, who had come from more modest economic backgrounds. These would 
have included artisans, farmers, and common laborers. Roughly half of them had been former 
slaves, whom their Southern owners had emancipated for the express purpose of their emigrating 
to Liberia. Most of the manumitted were illiterate and unskilled in professions other than 
fieldwork or domestic service. Recaptives, known as Congoes, formed the third social caste. 
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They had once been captives destined for transatlantic enslavement but had been rescued from 
bondage and returned to coastal Liberia. An amalgamation of Africans from different tribes, they 
had stayed in the country because it was a legal haven from the surrounding slave trade. 
Americoes were quick to ally themselves with the recaptives—or at least profess allegiance to 
their Congo “kin”—seeing them as a potential workforce and also as a buffer against the natives, 
especially the powerful Vai in the north.
38
 Finally, the lowest caste was the natives, who 
constituted the largest population in Liberia, around two million. Ostensibly the beneficiaries of 
Americoes’ Christian and civilized largesse, the indigenous were, in many emigrants’ eyes, more 
rivals than recipients. They competed for land and resources with the settlers; and their social 
norms clashed with the democratic, capitalist, and Western Christian values that Americoes 
propounded. 
During a forty-five year span from 1822 to 1867, Liberian society broke down roughly as 
follows: freeborn African Americans made up 31 percent of the population; emancipated slaves 
37 percent; recaptives 30 percent; West Indians 2 percent.
39
 These figures did not account for 
natives, who Liberian citizens regarded as outsiders. In theory, natives had the potential to 
integrate into society and become citizens; but Monrovia required three years of employment and 
proof of a “civilized life.” Citizenship commanded a high bar, and few natives realized the 
pecuniary benefits, given such stringent demands. In the mid-nineteenth century, upward 
mobility for the native was little more than an abstract proposition. 
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Many Liberians would have disagreed with this judgment. They often pointed to the 
practice of apprenticeships as an avenue for social advancement. Any boy under twenty-one or 
girl under eighteen was eligible for indentured service. Many interior tribes viewed the practice 
as a beneficial way for their children to gain a western education, which settlers were obligated 
to provide to their hired help. Hence an influx of aborigine youth came to live in Liberian 
households as domestic apprentices. 
 
The Problem with Apprenticeships 
Yet strings were attached. Natives could be assimilated, but often with a heavy hand. 
Youth could not live in a Liberian home (i.e. Monrovia) unless indentured for a term of service. 
They faced a fine between one and five dollars if they were improperly clothed. Male apprentices 
between sixteen and sixty could be drafted into mandatory public works projects at the behest of 
government commissioners.
40
 The courts had the ability to hire out apprenticed children to any 
interested party, so long as the “master or mistress” promised to teach them literacy and a skilled 
trade. 
Crummell viewed integration as absolutely crucial to society. Apprentices—those natives 
and Congoes trained in Liberian schools and families—doubled the civilized population, he 
argued. Although they constituted “the lower crust of our civilized population,” he contended 
that they formed “an important and valuable accession to our population.”41 So while apprentices 
were mudsill, they were still foundational to building up civilization. 
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But some in the master class found ways to exploit the system. Because abuse persisted, 
the constitution created a special court to hear apprentices’ complaints about inadequate housing, 
insufficient food, or immoderate discipline. The provision stipulated a minimum clothing 
allowance so that apprentices could embrace “the principles, and . . . the habits of, civilized 
life.”42 Apprentices were registering their discontent by running away. Desertions were so 
common, the courts had to provide explicit recourse for “masters” to recover their help—a 
fugitive slave decree of sorts.  
This apprenticeship underbelly was why disapproval was so damning. Liberia faced 
critics on both sides of the Atlantic. In 1851 Frederick Forbes, an officer in the British navy, 
blistered the apprentice system, which he equated to slavery: 
For in Liberia there is as much, if not more, domestic slavery—that is the buying and 
selling of God’s image—as in the parent states of America, over which flaunts the flag of 
Liberty[.] It is difficult to see the necessity or the justice of the negro who escapes from 
slavery on one side, crossing the Atlantic to enslave his sable prototype on the other, yet 
such is the case: and so long as it lasts, notwithstanding the attractive reports that emanate 
from this new republic, it cannot be held as an example of future good, but, if possible, 
should be remodelled, even if at the expense of internal revolution, or even total 
annihilation. I doubt if many benevolent Christians in this country are aware, that the 
model republic is, in reality, a new name and form for slavery in enslaved Africa, and, 
until the system is altered, totally undeserving of the high support and liberal charity it 
receives from the benevolence of Englishmen.
43
 
 
Forbes described African apprentices as “pawns” who were every bit as enslaved as the U.S. 
negro, facing the same household duties and punishments.
44
 The officer went so far as naming 
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particular Monrovia residents who he judged slave masters.
45
 Colonization supporters defended 
Liberia against the charges. They pointed to the numerous slave factories closed and recaptives 
freed. All wars with natives arose out of the desire to exterminate the slave trade, they insisted. 
Additionally, they noted that apprenticeships were both legal and beneficial, with African 
children being placed under the care of “respectable” persons until adulthood, whereupon they 
could enjoy the “privileges of citizenship” and the “blessings of freedom.”46 Forbes’s critics cast 
him as both reckless and irresponsible in his criticism of the free republic.
47
 
Four years later William Nesbit published a similar critique in the prior-mentioned Four 
Months in Africa. Whereas Forbes had the weight of rank on his side, Nesbit had the credential 
of race as his advantage. A prominent African American from Pennsylvania, Nesbit would go on 
to serve as state president for the National Equal Rights League, which lobbied successfully for 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in the United States. In the 1850s Nesbit displayed the 
same intrepid willingness to blast Liberia over inequality. He berated settlers for replicating the 
U.S. slavery model by purchasing native children for domestic and manual labor. These so-called 
apprentices were often malnourished and underclothed during their employment, Nesbit claimed. 
They were made to live separately in rude huts called “negro quarters” and would frequently run 
back to the bush out of hunger or desperation. “I would a thousand times rather be a slave in the 
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United States,” he declared, “than in Liberia.”48 The abuse of child apprentices betrays the ugly 
truth: many Liberians looked upon natives as an exploitable source for cheap, if not virtually 
free, labor. 
Liberians were quick to commodify other underprivileged groups, as well. Vagrant, 
orphaned, and illegitimate children faced the bleak prospect of long-term, involuntary service. 
Monrovia passed laws that restricted Kru trading and mandated impressment for any natives 
living in the town, if they were not suitably employed by another citizen. Forced servitude also 
extended to the poor. Because concern arose over “idlers” who “wander about from one 
settlement to the other,” legislators authorized construction of a series of 1,200 square-foot 
“County Poor Houses” to hold the impoverished.49 Male “inmates” were remanded to work on a 
county farm, and crop proceeds deposited into the national treasury. Female “residents” were 
supplied with looms and sewing needles, and they were given wool and cotton quotas to meet. 
Everyone in the “labor asylums” was inspected quarterly as to “their improvement in morals, 
education, and mechanical arts.”50 Here amelioration corresponded to productivity. As Crummell 
argued, the measure of a person was whether the laborer produced. If so, he or she was deemed 
virtuous.
51
 
Recaptives were another troubling example of apprenticeships being misused. When the 
British and American navies returned recaptives to Liberia, citizens immediately pressed male 
                                                          
48
 Paragraph quotes from Nesbit, Four Months in Liberia, reprinted in Moses, ed., Liberian Dreams, 104. 
49
 “An Act for the Relief and Employment of the Poor,” §§3-4, 8, in The Statute Laws of the Republic of 
Liberia Passed by the Legislature from 1848 to 1879 (Monrovia: T. W. Howard, 1879), 174-75. 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 See Alexander Crummell, “The Dignity of Labour, and Its Value to a New People,” in J. R. Oldfield, ed., 
Civilization and Black Progress: Selected Writings of Alexander Crummell on the South (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1995), 72. 
  
140 
 
recaptives into apprenticeships, seven years in length for men or until age twenty-one for boys. 
Congoes were no longer slaves, but neither were they free. Liberation had devolved into forced 
labor, all in the name of antislavery. 
 Outside of Monrovia, apprentices often performed fieldwork. Located several miles north 
of Monrovia and along the St. Paul River, the towns of Caldwell, Millsburg, and New Georgia 
took up agriculture and formed what became known as the “Upper Settlements.”52 Many farm 
owners staffed their fields with native or recaptive laborers, who planted and harvested the crops 
much like African Americans had done in the U.S. South. With an endless supply of workers, 
planters could afford to pay minimal wages for manual labor. 
 The widespread use of field apprentices touches on another tension in Liberian society. 
For all the public rhetoric about the need for agricultural production, it was a tough sell for 
Americo-Liberians in the early years. Farming still retained the stigma of slavery in the U.S. 
South.
53
 Most of the earliest settlers were educated and hearkened from cities. Even many 
manumitted slaves aspired to advance beyond the fieldwork they had just left in America. Those 
few who wished to farm faced daunting obstacles. Nearly every emigrant caught malaria the first 
year and required at least a month to “acclimate” and recover their health. Swamps, jungles, or 
rocky terrain required farmers first to drain or clear the land, which was backbreaking work by 
hand. Horses and oxen required astronomical capital to import, and they usually died soon after 
arriving because of disease-ridden flies. The rainy season, which could dump more than 180 
inches from April to October, also disrupted crop planting and stymied agrarians used to farming 
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in a more temperate climate. They also had to adapt to raising different crops like rice, yams, 
coffee, cassava, and palm products. Once they progressed beyond subsistence farming, they had 
to worry about getting their crops to market. As mentioned before, without the necessary 
infrastructure of roads and canals, farmers could find transporting goods to be logistically 
difficult and cost prohibitive. 
 
Economic Disparities within Liberian Society 
In Liberia’s stratified society, merchants, ministers, and teachers stood at the apex. 
Merchants could triple their profits by bartering with natives and selling to EuroAmericans. The 
top half dozen traders were collectively worth around $100,000 in the 1840s.
54
 In addition to 
amassing land and wealth, traders accumulated political power. Of the first five presidents, three 
were prominent merchants. Ministers and teachers were coveted positions, too, because 
American colonizationist societies underwrote their salaries. Even after national independence, 
these societies were still important contributors to Liberia’s economy. Although no longer on the 
scale as during Liberia’s colonial days, colonizationist monies continued to pay the salaries of up 
to ten thousand people a year. Thirteen years after independence, Blyden estimated that 
colonizationist funding accounted for annual stipends of fifty to seventy dollars per person.
55
 
Freed from financial subsistence, ministers and teachers could often assume government roles 
because of their steady income and educational qualifications. 
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Farmers were less fortunate. They could not always count on Monrovia’s merchant class 
to share common class interests. For example, traders worked to enlarge their exports of ivory, 
camwood, and palm oil, which brought them in conflict with tribes competing in the same 
lucrative trade. This contest could turn hostile, endangering the lives of Liberians in more remote 
locations like Bassa. Many farmers felt that Monrovia prioritized their trading interests over 
agricultural pursuits, even though it survived on the crops Bassans raised. And a cultural gap 
existed between freewheeling Monrovia and more conservative Bassa Cove. The Pennsylvania 
State Colonization Society, reinforced by strong Quaker temperance sentiment, had founded the 
Grand Bassa settlement. Not surprisingly, residents frowned on Monrovia’s taverns, as well as 
traders who plied natives freely with rum. Bassans were reluctant therefore to seek independence 
from the ACS, because they feared financial domination, military neglect, and moral decay by 
Monrovia’s trading oligarchy. 
In a fascinating corollary, regional differences derived not simply from class disparity but 
also from the rising autonomy of colonizationist societies in the United States. The American 
Colonization Society had financed the original settlement of Monrovia in the 1820s, but its state 
auxiliaries expanded Liberia’s reach in the following decade. The Pennsylvania and New York 
State Colonization Societies founded a joint settlement down the coast at Bassa Cove in 1834, 
while the Mississippi State Colonization Society underwrote a town named Greenville in 1836 
further south in the Sinoe region.
56
 Meanwhile, the Maryland State Colonization Society 
negotiated the payment of $1,000 worth of goods for twenty-square miles of land near Cavalla 
River in 1834, which became the primary settlement of Harper. These subsidiary societies took 
the lead in establishing their own settlements in Africa because of an important development in 
                                                          
56
 For more on Mississippi in Africa, see Jo Mary Sullivan, “Settlers in Sinoe County, Liberia, and Their 
Relations with the Kru, c. 1835−1920” (Boston, PhD diss., 1978). 
  
143 
 
the colonization movement during the 1830s. The failed 1831 Nat Turner insurrection created a 
new urgency to prevent the growth of free black and manumitted populations in Maryland and 
Virginia. State legislatures began to earmark government appropriations in order to subsidize 
deportation schemes spearheaded by local societies, who no longer needed to rely on the 
guidance and benevolence of the ACS. Even better, they found they could receive more money if 
they funded African colonies directly themselves. The Maryland legislature designated $20,000 
for colonization and stipulated that any manumitted slaves after 1831 had to emigrate to Africa 
or leave the state. Philosophical differences cropped up, too. State colonizationists decided to go 
their own way after the parent ACS refused to affirm their stated goal of gradual emancipation. 
Because Maryland retained a high Negro population—with 38 percent of its total population 
being black and 23 percent of those being free blacks (or put another way, 9 percent of the total 
population were free blacks)—Maryland colonizationists were determined to reduce the black 
populace through manumission and deportation. The majority of colonists the Maryland 
Colonization Society shipped to Maryland in Liberia were artisans or agricultural laborers, many 
newly freed who arrived in Africa with less education and fewer assets than their Monrovian 
counterparts.
57
 In 1846 the society organized the Liberia Packet, a joint stock trading company to 
promote trade between the United States and Maryland County. But the scant fleet and lack of 
capital investment offered little competition to the Monrovian traders up north. White 
Marylanders were willing to pay to get rid of their “Negro problem” but, as a whole, they could 
not be bothered to invest in the emigrants’ future once blacks were gone. In contrast, the ACS, 
Massachusetts Colonization Society, and New York State Colonization Society continued to 
sponsor well-known Liberians like Blyden and Crummell well into the 1870s. Thus one can 
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argue that though the emigrants in southeast Liberia benefitted from a burst of funding, the 
monetary influx was short-lived and never compared to the sustained colonizationist money 
pouring into Monrovia. Over time, the swelling economic disparity guaranteed financial and 
political subservience to the capital and its ruling oligarchy. 
 
“The Native Problem” 
Another statistical inequality affected all Liberians, regardless of class: disproportionate 
population numbers. In its publications to the West, Liberians touted their newfound country as 
home to black rule, which it was. Yet compared to natives, the number of Liberians was 
miniscule. In the year of independence, 1847, the country boasted only 3,300 citizens.
58
 Over 60 
percent lived in and near the capital city of Monrovia. Subtract 500 assimilated African natives 
and only around eight hundred Americo-Liberian settlers populated the rest of the country 
outside the capital vicinity.
59
 In contrast, Blyden estimated in 1860 that two million African 
natives resided in the borders claimed by Liberia.
60
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Despite their numbers, the surrounding tribes were collectively disunited. They had 
arrived in West Africa separately and without the need to unify against a common enemy. Three 
waves of coastal migrants settled Western Africa in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The fall 
of the Mali Empire and overpopulation of the savanna pushed migration westward from the 
interior. Portuguese sailors visited coastal villages in 1461 and made regular trading stops 
thereafter. They exchanged gold, ivory, and slaves for such goods as glass, brass, iron tools, and 
clothing. The Dyula were the first tribe to take advantage of this new economy. They built a 
string of settlements and trading posts from the coast to the interior. They converted surrounding 
people to Islam, including the Vai, who came to inhabit what eventually became northeastern 
Liberia. Until the seventeenth century, the De and Vai dominated the coastal trade before the 
Mende and Temne of Sierra Leone ascended in political and economic might. In the eighteenth 
century Boporo was the seat of power, where six tribes, including the Vai and De, formed a trade 
confederation about sixty miles northeast of Cape Mesurado. Further down the coast resided the 
Bassa, Kru, and Grebo tribes, whose main occupation was agriculture. The Kru became skilled 
sailors, however, and served as seamen on European ships sailing up and down the coast. By the 
nineteenth century, these peoples had lived in the region for 200-250 years and had formed 
longstanding trading partnerships with various European merchants.
61
 
The arrival of and relative unconcern over African American emigrants in the first half of 
the nineteenth century had to do with the relative commercial insignificance of the region. The 
great trading centers for Europeans lay to the north in Sierra Leone and the south in French 
Africa. As a result, the American imports had comparatively little opposition except from 
scattered native tribes who lacked the political unity and economic clout to eject the newcomers. 
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Some tribes even welcomed the immigrants in the belief they would stimulate trade with the 
United States.  
Response to Americo-Liberians varied by tribe and sometimes differed by factions within 
a tribe. During the nineteenth century, five major tribes resided on the coast: the De, Vai, Kru, 
Bassa, and Grebo. The De were the smallest and weakest of the tribes. When the Americo-
Liberians arrived in 1819, King Peter was the reigning De ruler who ceded Cape Mesurado to the 
American emigrants, who promptly built their capital Monrovia on the site. The site had been an 
infrequent trading post for European traders, including the Portuguese, who had given the cape 
its name. The English had lightly explored the area in the fourteenth century, setting up a 
temporary outpost on the cape. But the Portuguese were the first Europeans to map the coast in 
depth in the fifteenth century. They gained such a monopoly on the pepper trade that the cape 
region became known as the “Pepper Coast” and “Grain Coast” (due to the abundance of pepper 
grains
62). In a bid to break Portugal’s control of the pepper trade, the Dutch and English began to 
send their own ships to West Africa in the sixteenth century. In addition to pepper, traders found 
aborigines willing to barter gold and ivory, so much so that the area also became known as the 
Gold Coast and Ivory Coast. Yet Cape Mesurado was gaining another moniker, too—the Slave 
Coast. By the seventeenth century, Mesurado was trafficking in slaves, as the Karou tribe sold 
captives to the Dutch, French, and English. A permanent European colony never materialized at 
the Cape Mount, in part because Dutch and English traders made the mistake of trying to cut out 
the middlemen by capturing slaves for themselves. As a consequence, the littoral tribes were 
unified in opposing a perpetual European presence on African soil. They would tolerate trading 
outposts but not lasting settlements. Eventually the English coalesced to the north at Freetown, 
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and the French adhered further to the south along the Ivory Coast. But no Westernized people 
established roots in the Cape Mount region until African Americans did so in the early 
nineteenth century. Their African heritage, small numbers, and privately sponsored enterprise 
raised little fears among the De, who initially hoped to boost trade as the emigrants trickled in. 
The Vai were predominantly Muslim and powerful enough that Monrovia rarely 
transgressed their autonomous rule. Compared to other tribes, Vai were highly literate and 
boasted their own written alphabet. They were mainly farmers and affluent enough to draw upon 
other tribes to work their land. Blyden had a special affinity for the Vai, seeing their religion as a 
bulwark against EuroAmerican cultural assimilation. Even though mostly Muslim, Vai came into 
Liberians’ gradual orbit, when they allied with their Western counterparts against neighboring 
tribes. Their attacks against Sierra Leoneans aggravated Liberians, because Freetown would then 
demand indemnity of Monrovia. But for most of the nineteenth century, Liberia exercised token 
authority in its northwestern territory, because the Vai had the numbers and armaments to 
humble it in a military engagement. 
The Bassa resided in central Liberia and were one of the poorest and least assimilated 
groups at mid-century. Yet in time, Liberians absorbed them into the republic, looking for an 
effective counterbalance against the unruly Kru and belligerent Grebo.  
The Kru were the largest of the littoral tribes and occupied the central coast of Liberia. 
They were renowned for their seafaring prowess and served as short-term sea hands on many 
European vessels trading up and down the continental coast. The Kru men would often sign up 
for voyages in order to earn enough money to purchase a wife; repeat trips allowed them the 
ability to acquire more wives. In Liberia the Kru did the majority of loading and unloading of 
ship cargo. Because the country lacked any natural deep-water ports, the Kru navigated canoes to 
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the anchored ships and convey the goods to and from land. It could be treacherous work 
depending on the tide and rocky terrain. But the Kru were skilled oarsmen and built a reputation 
for safe, reliable transport. Their expertise and first contact with European traders made them not 
only a valuable commodity to Europeans but also a fierce competitor to Liberians. Monrovia 
needed to finance its government, and it turned to trade in order to raise revenue through import 
duties, port taxes, and ship licensing fees. The Kru would often circumvent and defeat these tax 
schemes, leaving Liberians frustrated and underfunded. J. J. Roberts estimated Liberia lost 
$100,000 alone in lost tax revenue. The goal, then, was to impose Monrovia’s legislative and 
commercial will on the Kru traders. 
The Grebo lived in the southeast and remained recalcitrant toward Liberia throughout 
much of the nineteenth century, with much of their animus stemming from what they perceived 
to be unfair trade practices by Liberians. Greboes had bartered regularly with European traders 
long before Americo-Liberians had arrived. But the proscription by Marylanders—who became 
Liberians after annexation in 1857—against slave trading and their imposition of custom duties 
on legitimate trade threatened to ruin the economic livelihood of many Greboes. Early on, 
settlers had tried to exert soft power through the Episcopalian mission school, which trained 
youth from important Grebo families at its compound. But eventually the Grebo withdrew their 
offspring and attacked the mission station at Cavalla, alarmed that their children were being 
indoctrinated to give up traditional tribal values. A frontier war was settlers’ worst nightmare, 
and they took the draconian measure of burning the main Grebo town and exiling its inhabitants 
in a move reminiscent of the Native American Trail of Tears. The Grebo continued to war 
against Liberian rule, even inviting the English to come free them from their oppressors. The 
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continual strife did have a silver lining for Monrovia, however, because security concerns caused 
Maryland in Liberia to join Liberia ten years after its 1847 independence. 
In time, all these tribes fell under Liberia’s increasing sway. In the late 1830s, around 
28,000 natives had come into Liberia’s political orbit through trade, friendship, and security 
agreements. By 1847 that number had swelled to more than 40,000, as Governor Roberts 
embarked on an aggressive drive for territorial expansion, in an effort to stave off English and 
French colonial ambitions. Liberia had absorbed much of the land that had originally belonged to 
the De, Vai, Kru, and Bassa tribes; it measured 12,830 square miles, roughly the size of the U.S. 
state of Maryland. It had extended its original width only about five miles eastward, but it had 
doubled its length, from an original 140 miles to 285 miles of coastline. Liberian contemporary, 
Walter Walker, estimated roughly 4,500 “civilized” persons at independence.63 The 
demographics broke down as follows
64
: 
Group Population 
Unassimilated natives c. 40,000 
Educated natives 2,000 
Americo-Liberians 1,200 
African recaptives 1,100 
Immigrants from Sierra Leone 
and Cape Verde Island 
300 
   Table 1. Demographics of Liberia in 1847. 
 
 
Excluding recaptives, educated natives, and non-American immigrants, Americo-Liberians 
numbered less than 3 percent of the total population. Roughly 90 percent of the population was 
unassimilated aborigines who lived within the country’s boundaries. Roberts extended Liberia’s 
coastline by another 400 miles during his first four years as president. Continual expansion 
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resulted in nearly 150,000 natives under Liberia’s domain during the mid-1860s.65 A glance at 
the numbers shows that in fewer than twenty years, Liberia quintupled its native population. The 
emigrant populace had itself quadrupled since independence, but it still stood at only about eight 
thousand people.
66
 And this posed continual headaches. 
 Liberia ended up overextending its authority in its bid to outrace Britain and France for 
territory and influence. Natives were none too pleased by Liberia’s perceived power grab. The 
single greatest source of contention was the 1865 Port-of-Entry Act, which restricted overseas 
trade to six ports, all which were located in Liberian enclaves. Conversely, it prohibited 
unloading cargo at traditional trading depots in native villages. Aborigines had been exchanging 
goods with Europeans for generations, long before Americo-Liberians had arrived. The Kru were 
eventually forced to disband entire towns after the law strangled their economic livelihood. Mass 
unemployment meant that many Krumen had to seek jobs in Grand Bassa instead. Furthermore, 
legislation created a head tax, which required every laborer who worked outside the country, 
mainly Kru males, to pay a tax in order to leave and work elsewhere. Thus Liberia’s law treated 
noncompliant natives as illegal smugglers and tax dodgers, and it deprived them of trade and  
profit they had enjoyed for generations. 
 
The Allures of Trade 
Since colonial days, Liberians had taken up trading with startling speed. It was lucrative 
and, compared to the eighteenth century, required minimal capital to get started in the business 
with the advent of steamships and cheaper transportation costs. As Martin Lynn has explicated, 
                                                          
65
 Charles Morrow Wilson, Liberia: Black Africa in Microcosm (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 73. 
66
 James Ciment, Another America: The Story of Liberia and the Former Slaves Who Ruled It (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 2013), 122. 
  
151 
 
West African broking networks depended on having access to both European traders and inland 
producers.
67
 Brokers’ power rested in their ability to prevent contact between the seafaring 
traders and the interior markets. As coastal brokers, Liberian merchants needed to control the 
transport, labor, and credit of the native suppliers. Americo-Liberians obtained trust (i.e. credit) 
in the form of such trade goods as salt, rum, tobacco, textiles, and firearms. These constituted the 
“dashes” or gifts that explorers like Sims and Seymour used to gain ivory and camwood, which 
they would then sell to European traders for a profit. This explains, too, why Liberians were 
anxious to break the ring of surrounding tribes preventing access to interior suppliers. Unfettered 
transportation would benefit natives and settlers alike—so long as the goods came first to the 
Liberians rather than the European traders. As expected, the merchant oligopoly in Monrovia—
composed primarily of mulatto Americo-Liberians—gained sway and leveraged their influence 
to pass commercial legislation that upheld their market dominance.  
Immigrant traders had established a beachhead as soon as colonists arrived in the 1820s. 
U.S. colonizationists’ desire to establish “legitimate” trade to offset the then-proliferate slave 
trade lent impetus for colonists to do just that. With the ACS obligated to supply new colonists 
for six months, its agents found it cheaper to trade with natives for staples than have them 
shipped from the U.S. But from the outset, colonists had attempted to control the trade by fixing 
prices, designating ports of entry for foreign traders, instituting embargoes against recalcitrant 
tribes, and even warring with natives who impeded interior trade. 
Trading could net spectacular profits. In the late forties Liberian merchants were making 
up to 300 percent profit dealing in palm oil. By 1853 Liberia’s commercial fleet numbered 
twenty vessels shuttling goods along the coast. Ten years after independence, the Monrovia 
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government had grown dependent on maritime trade, deriving two-thirds of its revenue through 
taxing it. Liberia’s first two presidents, Joseph Roberts and Stephen Benson, gained their initial 
livelihood as merchants. The proliferation of smaller vessels allowed Liberians to spread their 
reach into the interior. And with it came taxes.
68
 
Imposition of tariffs made sense on a macro level. It would raise revenues vital for 
operating a government and funding domestic improvements. And by restricting trade internally, 
it would help mold diverse tribes and settlers into one “citizenry” by forcing them to exchange 
commodities with each other. By limiting trade with “foreigners,” tariffs would be building a 
national identity through an increase in equal exchange between “fellow” Liberians. At least that 
was the hope. 
In reality, it was delusory to think tribes would give up their prior trading relationships 
with “foreigners” (primarily French and English with a few being German) voluntarily. Many 
natives saw Liberian protectionism as punitive. All the talk about championing free trade had 
been for naught. 
 From its inception, Liberia had adopted a paternalistic stance towards its indigent 
neighbors. In fact, its founders had written it into the national constitution. Hence it was “a 
cherished object of this government” to encourage the agricultural advancement of native tribes 
through the appointment of officials to instruct and oversee the agrarian progress in each 
county.
69
 Liberian emphasis on agriculture stemmed not just from the desire for internal 
development but also from the belief that commodity farming would form a commercial bulwark 
against the persistent slave trade. 
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Liberia’s citizens and supporters sought to parlay opposition to slavery into tangible 
territorial gains. One ambitious colonizationist scheme proposed purchasing the “Slave Trading 
Coast” of West Africa—all four thousand miles of it. Spending a half million dollars to buy the 
land, the plan reasoned, was cheaper than doling out three hundred thousand dollars a year to 
maintain U.S. naval patrols off the African coast.
70
 Of course, colonizationists envisioned 
utilizing the coast to establish trading ports and strategic forts, which would presumably draw 
natives to settle and come under civilized rule.
71
 President Roberts wished for exactly that. The 
1849 defeat and decline of Gallinas, a major slave depot, enabled the president to lobby Britain 
successfully for funds to purchase the territory from local chieftains.
72
 As he expressed in one 
letter, his goal had been “to extinguish the native title to all the territories” along the western 
coast.
73
 In 1847 on his first tour of Britain as Liberia’s newly elected president, Roberts used 
antislavery as justification for territorial expansion. He told an influential audience of clerics, 
diplomats, and philanthropists that the only way to stop the Cuban slavers operating in West 
Africa was for Liberia to buy native land and impose the rule of law on the region. He priced the 
purchase at £2,000, which the group immediately raised for him. He ended up purchasing 
Gallinas for a purchase price of $9,500. While the stated purpose for buying Gallinas was to 
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prevent the reemergence of the slave trade, Roberts listed the secondary reason of opening up 
trade in camwood, ivory, and palm oil; and he added the tertiary reason of settling the land with 
knowledgeable Liberians who could train natives in the art of husbandry.
74
 
Many tribes also engaged in legitimate trade that had nothing to do with slaves. For them, 
free trade had already been in place long before Liberian independence. Trade relied on ship 
captains or company agents negotiating with individual chieftains, who would build a “factory,” 
or a thatch hut for the captain to leave one of his men to live and trade with the natives. The 
captain would visit other coastal villages, planting factories at each stop. Once he had amassed 
enough of these trade depots, he would make rounds, collecting all the produce his man had 
managed to trade for during his time away. The captain would also leave more goods to be 
traded. These products often included rum, wine, beads, pipes, tobacco, soap, candles, perfume, 
beef, pork, flour, and wares made out of brass, glass, or pottery.  
But assertion of Liberia’s sovereignty disrupted traditional trading practices. Foreign 
ships were restricted to designated ports of entry, where their cargo would be declared and taxed 
accordingly.
75
 The customs collector charged import fees, issued trade permits, and approved the 
proposed destinations for shipped goods. The constitution specifically forbade harbor trade, 
thereby banning traditional native trade in which Kru would row canoes laden with goods to 
ships anchored off the coast. Import tariffs ranged from 6 to 8 percent, and anchorage and 
lighthouse fees applied to foreign ships. 
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Schooling Natives in the Art of Christian Materialism 
Roberts hoped to utilize tax profits to fund native schools, but indigenous education had 
unforeseen ramifications for both natives and Liberians. For tribes like the Grebo, Christian 
missionaries had a direct impact on indigenous economies, and not always in a way that natives 
wished. Education of native girls was one source of friction. Natives wanted Western education 
for their children, seeing it as vital to their future commercial success. But this desire often 
clashed with Christian notions of civilization. Missionaries disagreed with natives particularly 
over how to raise girls. For example, most Grebo women contributed to the economy by 
performing manual labor in their tribe’s rice paddies. But missionaries taught their female pupils 
how to cook, sew, and keep house. The “proper” sphere for women, they admonished, was the 
home—and not just any home. The ideal, civilized household was a monogamous marriage 
between one man and one woman. Because many girls were betrothed and married off at young 
ages to polygamous husbands, missionaries had to pay dowry-like sums just to teach native girls. 
Despite receiving compensation, parents would often withdraw their daughters to work the fields 
or get married—activities integral to their economic livelihood and social standing.76 As a 
consequence, missionaries began to require their charges to stay in living quarters adjacent to the 
mission station. From an economic standpoint, they were protecting their financial investment in 
these children by controlling and ensuring access to them. But the move carried unintended 
costs. The children were segregated from their families and tribe. They practiced different 
customs by wearing Western clothes, living in houses, eating with utensils, sitting at a dinner 
table with chairs, and imbibing values sometimes at odds with their home culture. None of these 
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practices itself was necessarily egregious. But missionaries reified Western customs, creating an 
equivalence between civilization and its attendant accoutrements. Unintentionally, they created a 
dangerous dependence, in which their students now relied on them for the goods—i.e. food, 
clothes, furniture, and houses—that would affirm their civilized status. 
Political scientist Nnadmi Azikiwe criticizes Liberians for failing to address “the 
aboriginal problem” because they “failed to recognize the political acumen and the social and 
material cultures of the African tribes which inhabit these regions [of Liberia].”77 He attributes 
the “oversight” to “Christian zealousness.”78 How did missionary zeal end up deploring African 
materiality and promoting Western materialism? Christian emphasis on modesty and propriety 
meant that converts had to conform to Western standards for attire. Despite the tropical climate, 
men sported suitcoats and women wore dresses. Never mind the practicality of native garb; it 
was unacceptable because it was deemed “unrefined” or “uncivilized.” Likewise, proper 
decorum dictated eating with utensils while dining at a table and sitting on four-legged chairs. 
Because sanitary practices had to accompany a pure, regenerate life, the broom became the 
tangible tool with which to combat the sin of grime. Not only was cleanliness next to godliness; 
it manifested godliness itself. In capitalist parlance, missionaries had created demand for a new 
market of consumer goods—suits, dresses, brooms, cutlery, and furniture—which had hitherto 
been unnecessary and undesired. This development further alienated native parents, who were 
already wary of the religious proscriptions against polygamy, witchdoctors, and sassywood trials. 
Missionaries also introduced their understudies to a cash economy. They would reward 
them with coins for attending church or for special holidays like Christmas; students could 
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exchange the currency for goods at the store in Cavalla.
79
 And once they graduated from the 
school, they could use their learned skills (e.g. laundering, domestic service, masonry, or 
blacksmithing) in the mission station’s employ and receive wages. 
If missionaries were well-intentioned, other Liberian citizens were less sanguine. Many 
viewed skilled, educated natives as potential competitors who could deprive them of jobs. On a 
macro level, Liberia did not yet have a strong manufacturing sector that could absorb an artisanal 
and industrial labor force of natives. Outside of porters, domestics, and plantation workers, 
Liberians had little need for native labor. On a micro level, then, the reason that alumni of 
mission schools remained dependent on the mission station was because they could not find 
work at Harper or other Liberian towns, where clerical and accounting positions were either 
taken or withheld from natives. Graduates learned that their education had limited value, when 
they were continually denied employment opportunities in Liberian towns. And if educated 
natives aspired to pursue such advanced vocations as law or medicine, their access to higher 
education was shut off. Although mission schools offered rudimentary language training in 
English, they taught mostly theology and the humanities. Legal studies, natural sciences, and 
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higher-order mathematics were taught at only one place in the country, Liberia College in 
Monrovia, which remained closed to natives in spite of Blyden’s best attempts.80 
Civilized converts ended up founding their own settlements with their own segregated 
businesses and institutions. For instance, the Episcopalians built St. James Episcopal Church at 
Hoffman for natives, rather than incorporate them into St. Mark’s Episcopal Church at Harper. 
What Monrovia had not anticipated was that these separate towns became seedbeds for civil 
unrest and political dissent. The 1873 Grebo unification effort exemplifies the rising clout of 
educated natives, whose socioeconomic marginalization led them to challenge Liberia’s political 
hegemony. 
Despite public rhetoric about an amalgamated nation of Americo and aborigine, Liberians 
benefited from a divided native populace. They accentuated intertribal rifts when they sided with 
one group over the other. Sometimes the alliance spilled over into armed conflict. Internecine 
warfare could endanger trade and private property, but it also presented Liberia the opportunity 
to act as intermediary or aid the winning side. Either outcome positioned Liberia to dictate peace 
terms favorable to its own interests. Throughout the nineteenth century, Liberians fought at least 
eight major engagements, both with and against natives. 
Internal strife between the Grebo during the midfifties illustrates how Liberians effected 
favorable results for themselves. The Grebo people composed two distinct halves: the Grebo who 
lived on the coast and the Half- or Bush-Grebo, who inhabited the forest region about thirty-five 
miles inland. Within the Grebo, there was a subdivision between the Kudemowe and Nyomowe 
clans, who were so named because of the respective bodies of water by which they settled. The 
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mission school at Cape Palmas drew from both sides in forming its student body. Graduates 
became known as “educated Greboes” and came to constitute a third distinct group of Greboes.  
In 1856 Marylanders sided with the Kudemowe when the Nyomwe tried to drive the 
Kudemowe from Cape Palmas. The Marylanders helped burn eight Nyomwe towns and created 
about six thousand refugees fleeing the destruction. Like the Kru had done in 1851, the Nyomwe 
appealed to the British for help against the Marylanders. Although they failed to gain Britain’s 
support, the Nyomwe launched a successful counterattack, cutting off Marylanders from their 
farms and food supply. When the Nyomwe threatened to overrun Harper, the governor had no 
choice but to implore Monrovia for military assistance. A Liberian expeditionary force and a 
U.S. Navy gunboat arrived in time to prevent the wholesale massacre of Harper. The coalition 
crushed the Nyomwe offensive and forced them to seek a peace deal. Harper agreed to “buy” the 
land that it had just torched. Acquiring the land had been Harper’s intent all along, and it bought 
the land on the condition that the Nyomwe leave the area. This negotiating tactic was a favorite 
strategy of President Roberts, who called it “peacemaking with backbone.”81 He would call up a 
militia, travel to the village whose inhabitants had committed the alleged offense, and demand 
retreat or restitution. The sides would then convene a palaver in which they would hammer out a 
peace or “friendship” treaty. The plan worked according to script for the Marylanders in 1856. 
Furthermore, the near defeat convinced Marylanders to cast aside their independence and join the 
Republic of Liberia in 1857 as a full-fledged county. 
Conflict did not end in the subsequent decades. The rising need for more land led to 
further provocations between the two sides. The Marylanders—now Liberians—exploited the 
feud between the Grebo by siding with the Kudemowe against their Nyomowe rivals. Rather 
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than risk open warfare with the deposed Nyomowe, the settlers supported the Kudemowe in a 
war against the Bapo, a tribe closely allied to the Nyomowe. A proxy war ensued until the 
educated Greboes stepped in and convinced both clans to form a new Grebo confederacy called 
the “Grebo Reunited Kingdom,” the one which President James Payne had so vociferously 
opposed. 
 
The Grebo Bid for Socioeconomic Equality 
The 1873 confederation was a major breakthrough for the Grebo, but it also alarmed 
Liberia. Although trained by Episcopalian missionaries, educated Greboes found themselves 
relegated to second-class status by Liberians, who denied them citizenship, political 
representation, and government appointments. The educated Greboes had already organized their 
own separate settlement at Hoffman, but they wanted full integration into Liberian society and 
the ability to live in Harper, the main town in Maryland County. They saw their best means for 
doing so was in reviving Grebo unification and leveraging it until Liberia acceded to their 
wishes. During a five-month war spanning from 1875 to 1876, they handed Liberians a major 
defeat at the Battle of Benleu when more than five thousand warriors overwhelmed a thousand 
Liberian militiamen. In a move reminiscent of Roberts’s backbone stratagem, the Grebo forced 
Monrovia to the negotiating table, where President Payne allowed the United States to mediate a 
truce. U.S. naval captain Alexander Semmes brokered an agreement between Liberia and an 
alliance of nine chieftains. The Grebo leaders agreed to disband their confederation and 
surrender their artillery in exchange for citizenship. The treaty declared Greboes to be full 
“Liberians” and hence entitled them to equal rights in trade, commerce, and land ownership. But 
the terms benefited the educated Grebo more than the traditional Grebo, who failed to receive the 
same economic and professional opportunities. When the Kudemowe rebelled against paying 
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custom duties a decade later, the educated Greboes sided with Liberians and extinguished the 
revolt. They suppressed Grebo raids on settlers’ coffee plantations and discouraged support for 
the Grebo-backed Reform Party, which promised to reduce the tax burden on Greboes. At the 
turn of the century, educated Greboes had succeeded in assimilating into Liberian society. 
Prominent members served as legislators, military officers, and educators. Their involvement 
further expanded “civilized” settlements, with three major towns erected in Maryland County’s 
hinterland. But integration had come at a price: it fractured tribal unity and left traditional 
Greboes feeling politically abandoned and economically deprived. Liberia had succeeded finally 
in bringing natives into the societal fold, though it took a war and military defeat to compel 
Liberians to treat natives equally. On their end, educated natives hade exercised diplomatic and 
military ingenuity in pressing their case for inclusion. Unfortunately, integration ended up 
replicating a caste system in Grebo society. The socioeconomic class benefits reaped by educated 
Greboes, predictably, ruptured their fidelity to their fellow kin and perpetuated the trade and tax 
inequities for the majority of “uncivilized” Greboes. 
 
Liberia’s Fight for Economic Sovereignty 
 While natives struggled with maintaining an insurgency, Liberians worried about 
insolvency. Economic concerns had largely driven Liberia to declare its national independence. 
As touched upon in the last chapter, Liberia made little headway during the forties in getting 
outside nations to respect its commercial policies. Its 6 percent customs tax ignited a commercial 
and diplomatic crisis. British merchants refused to recognize the colony’s right to levy duties. 
The British and Sierra Leonean governments encouraged their traders to ignore the tax, 
dismissing the ability of “private persons” to act as a legitimate governing authority. In other 
words, they rejected Monrovia’s authority to impose international tariffs on the grounds that 
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Liberia was merely the outgrowth of a private organization, the ACS, rather than a sovereign 
nation. When English traders continued to flout Liberia’s trade regulations, in 1845 Liberia 
impounded the Little Ben, anchored at Bassa, for failing to pay any harbor dues. The 
commonwealth sold the cargo in lieu of payment. A Sierra Leonean owned the ship, however, 
and his plight reached the ears of the British, who had one of their gunboat captains seize and 
sell the John Seyes, a trading vessel belonging to Stephen Benson (a prominent Liberian 
merchant who became the nation’s second president in 1856).82 The British justified their seizure 
on the dubious charge that Benson was using the John Seyes to smuggle slaves to the United 
States.
83
 For its part, the U.S. inquired about the reason for why Britain had confiscated the John 
Seyes. London replied that Liberia was “a mere commercial experiment of a philanthropic 
society” and not a sovereign government.84 Other than its official query, the United States did 
little else to intervene. It was unwilling to claim Liberia as its colony and thereby give 
Americoes a semblance of international protection.
85
 Meanwhile, Roberts was not standing still. 
He sought to blunt London by buying as much land as he could from littoral tribes, particularly 
from the Kru. And in 1846 he initiated formal separation talks with the ACS, which agreed that 
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its patronage was hindering Liberia in taking the next step to nationhood and international 
recognition. 
In 1846 the commonwealth held a referendum on the question of “total sovereignty.” Of 
the 1,157 people who cast ballots, 69 percent voted in favor of separating from the ACS and 
declaring Liberia an independent nation.
86
 After agreeing to part ways with the ACS, Liberians 
issued a formal declaration of independence, which was penned as much for the outside world as 
for themselves. Every people has a right to form a government, the document argued, and though 
Liberians had once delegated that authority to the ACS upon their infancy, they had taken back 
that authority once they had reached political maturity. Americo-Liberians were the de facto 
government and had been ever since the ACS had decreased its active administration of the 
colony in order to test their worthiness to self-govern. Americoes had acquitted themselves 
without blemish, and they were now ready to assume the rights and powers of being a sovereign, 
independent state. They had all the hallmarks of a capable politic. Their Western institutions—
i.e. the courts, schools, and church—promoted the rule of law, enlightened learning, and worship 
of the true Creator. The African benefited from two reforms they had introduced: Christianity 
and abolition. In response to the charge Liberia were nothing more than “a mere commercial 
experiment,” they insisted their motives were pure: “Liberia is not the offspring of grasping 
ambition, nor the tool of avaricious speculation. No desire for territorial aggrandizement brought 
us to these shores; nor do we believe so sordid a motive entered into the high consideration of 
those who aided us in providing this asylum. Liberia is an asylum from the most grinding 
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oppression.”87 In other words, Liberia had no exploitive, acquisitive designs but only noble, 
moral ones. 
 Liberia succeeded in earning diplomatic recognition. After Great Britain recognized 
Liberia’s nationality the following year, other countries promptly followed suit: 
Nation Year 
Great Britain 1848 
France 1849 
Hanseatic League 1849 
Haiti 1849 
Norway 1849 
Sweden 1849 
Portugal 1849 
Brazil 1849 
Sardinia 1849 
Austria 1849 
Denmark 1855 
Maryland-in-Liberia 1856 
Belgium 1858 
United States 1862 
Italy 1862 
Netherlands 1862 
North German Confederation 1867 
Spain 1894 
   Table 2. Nations recognizing Liberia’s independence. 
 
 
Britain and France even bestowed small military vessels to the new republic as diplomatic gifts 
upon their independence. But the United States refused to recognize the fledgling state, worried 
about having to receive black diplomats officially in Washington, DC. Not until 1862 in the 
middle of the U.S. Civil War did President Abraham Lincoln acknowledge Liberia’s nationhood. 
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Roberts was quick to capitalize on the diplomatic progress. With the Lark, the schooner 
Britain had gifted to Liberia, Roberts organized an 1848 military operation against Spanish slave 
traders. He had three simultaneous objectives: (1) oust the Spaniards from operating on Liberian 
soil; (2) win cooperation and backing from the U.S. and England; and (3) solidify control of 
southeastern natives. A multinational naval force—the Liberian Lark, a U.S. corvette, and a 
British frigate—transported 200 Liberians to Cess Valley in southeastern Liberia, where they 
besieged and bombarded the Spanish fort until it surrendered. The victory freed 3,500 slaves and 
was a publicity coup for Roberts. He cemented Liberia’s antislavery reputation, undercut a 
European competitor, weakened native ties to “foreigners,” and demonstrated Liberia’s utility to 
Great Britain and the United States. It was abolitionism as both a cause and cudgel. And Roberts 
had wielded it masterly. 
Unfortunately for Liberia, neither recognition nor partnership guaranteed continuing 
respect. Foreign merchants still widely flouted the tariff laws and ignored cargo taxes when they 
visited the Liberian coast. During the forties, fifties, and sixties, legislators passed various port-
of-entry acts, which they hoped would increase enforcement by funneling all ships into 
designated ports where custom officials would inspect all goods entering the country. The 
Supreme Court had even added teeth to the legislation by handing down a thousand-dollar fine to 
an English trader for repeated violations of its revenue laws. One trader in particular, John 
Harris, caused diplomatic nightmares for Liberia. In 1860 Monrovia accused him of trafficking 
slaves in northwestern Liberia and impounded his ships.
88
 It was a bold move, because twenty 
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years earlier Monrovia had seized the aforementioned Little Ben from a Sierra Leonean trader, 
only to see Britain confiscate Stephen Benson’s John Seyes in retaliation. Harris did more than 
just smuggle goods, though. He also waged a covert campaign to incite neighboring Vai to rebel 
against the Liberian government. Thus in the eyes of Monrovia, he was an alleged slaver, tax 
cheat, and a foreign saboteur. 
Harris’s subversive activities were not the first time Liberians suspected Britain or Sierra 
Leone of planting a commercial trader in order to undermine their government. Less than a 
decade before in 1851, the Kru from Trade Town had attacked Liberian citizens at Bassa Cove. 
The Kru leader had entreated the British consul in Monrovia to join in the fight: “I write this to 
let you know that this Country is not belong to Americans, and I will not sell it. I have this 
Country from my Fore Father, and when I die, I wish to left to my sons. I want all English to 
come here and make trade with my people. Please Sir try all the best to do for me and my 
Country.”89 The king’s appeal had bolstered Liberians’ suspicion that William Lawrence, the 
resident British trade representative stationed at Trade Town and a Freetown native no less, was 
a provocateur bent on inciting the Kru to overthrow Liberian rule. Monrovia managed to 
suppress the revolt, and Lawrence only escaped prosecution after the British agreed to censure 
his actions. 
 But Harris was stationed further north, in land adjacent to Sierra Leone. He had the 
implicit backing of Freetown officials, who wished to destabilize the Gallinas region, which both 
Sierra Leone and Liberia claimed as their own. If Freetown could demonstrate Liberia’s inability 
to control the population, it could make the case to annex Gallinas. Harris served as a useful 
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agent in exposing Monrovia’s impotence. Unable to convince the Vai to undermine Monrovia’s 
authority, he decided to provoke them by encouraging Gallinas natives to attack their Vai 
neighbors. Monrovia raised a militia to defend the Vai, and the retreating Gallinas ended up 
pillaging one of Harris’s factories. Harris had the audacity to file a claim for damages, accusing 
Liberia of instigating the destruction of his property. He claimed an absurd £6,000 in damages, 
but an American naval arbitrator reduced his award to only £300.
90
 Yet Harris succeeded in the 
larger aim of gaining a decision in Freetown’s favor. The British declared the Gallinas region to 
be a Sierra Leonean protectorate due to Monrovia’s inability to maintain order and, in their 
words, “effective occupation.”91 This “principle of effectivity” was a new, evolving standard for 
establishing recognized control of territory, which the later 1884–1885 Berlin Conference would 
codify. As James Ciment explains: “To prevent a government from simply planting its flag and 
claiming ownership, the attendees at the conference agreed that a nation had to set up a colonial 
administration, establish an economic presence, make some effort at treaties with native chiefs, 
and deploy a police force adequate to pacify the natives before it could claim the land as its 
own.”92 President Payne had anticipated the need for bureaucratic oversight when he established 
the Interior Department in 1869. And Liberia possessed a lengthy history of trade and treaties 
with tribes near its northwest border. But what it did not have was the military might to either 
pacify truculent tribes or prevent foreign traders from circumventing its laws. Liberia faced a no-
win situation. If it fought British traders directly, it risked a military conflict with Sierra Leone 
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(and the British navy which would indubitably come to their colony’s aid). But if Liberia did 
nothing, the Vai would denounce Monrovia’s inaction and renounce its authority altogether. 
In 1870 Colonial Secretary Lord Granville proposed a border settlement to President 
Edward Roye, one which would have established the Moa River as the northern border for 
Liberia.
93
 Agreeing to the revised border meant surrendering claim to Sherbro—and its one 
hundred miles of coastline—but the deal would have fixed the border and ended Sierra Leone’s 
public interference and traders’ open defiance. Roye agreed to these terms, but his death in 1871 
left the issue unresolved. As Roye’s successor, Roberts rejected the bilateral compromise.94 In 
hindsight, it represented a rare blunder for Roberts, but in the 1870s he would have faced public 
backlash had he been seen as caving in to British demands. 
Liberia had real reason to worry about its control over natives, because it knew European 
powers would sense weakness and pounce. In 1878 Liberia’s worst fears were realized when 
Sierra Leone used Liberia’s ineffectual rule as pretext to seize the Gallinas region from the 
republic. The colonial governor declared the region a British protectorate and demanded 
Monrovia indemnify Freetown for its pacification efforts. It was sophistry for Sierra Leone to 
claim the territory as its own and then insist Liberia reimburse it for security. But casuistry aside, 
the governor was utilizing one more means to erode Liberian sovereignty and delegitimize its 
authority. 
A double standard continued to penalize Monrovia. A number of merchants would try to 
skirt port fees by bartering directly with natives. But if a foreign vessel shipwrecked in the 
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process, aborigines had no compunction about looting the ship or robbing its passengers. When 
this “pillaging” happened, traders were quick to press Monrovia for restitution. If the 
government refused to pay their losses, they appealed to their home government in order to force 
Liberia’s compliance.95 In 1882 the British sent four warships to Monrovia and demanded it 
relinquish claim to all territory west of the Mano River, because it could not control the 
indigenous population.
96
 London’s ultimatum was more avaricious than Lord Granville’s earlier 
proposal, because it extended Sierra Leone’s claim eastward beyond the Moa River to the Mano 
River.
97
 Under the threat of military action, President Anthony Gardner acquiesced, and 
Monrovia eventually signed a treaty in 1885 agreeing to the forced annexation. At the stroke of a 
pen, Liberia surrendered fifty million acres of the country’s most fertile farmland and lost 20 
percent of its territory, including 150 miles of coastline. 
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 Figure 2. Extent of Liberia’s Territorial Claims.98 
 
France sensed feebleness and, in the same year, it outrageously claimed ownership of the 
coast as far as Cape Mount, citing old purchase agreements between tribal leaders and French 
traders. It was a transparent negotiating ploy, and France ended up “settling” for a sixty-mile 
stretch of coast east of the Cavalla River. Monrovia had little choice but to cede the fecund 
chunk to the French. Subsequent land disputes would erupt between the two countries, and 
France followed Britain’s strategy of arguing that it was annexing Liberian territory because of 
Liberia’s ineffectual occupation and control of hinterland natives. France poached large swaths 
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of Liberia’s hinterland, reducing Liberia’s claimed territory by 40 percent. At the turn of the 
century, Liberia had lost about 75 percent of the land it had (nominally) controlled in the 
midsixties. With the lost territory vanished vast farmland, timber tracts, mineral wealth, fishing 
rights, and an untapped workforce of over a half-million people. In total, Britain and France 
siphoned off half of Liberia’s native population, around 600,000 aborigines.99 
 Financial debt played a hand in weakening Liberia’s international standing, too. 
Difficulties in collecting duties had led Monrovia to reassess its revenue stream. Taxing external 
trade could float the government, but it failed to generate sufficient income in order to develop 
the country. As a result, the government began to consider ways to increase trade with the 
interior. President James Payne authorized exploratory expeditions into the hinterland. During 
the late 1860s, in his hunt for gold mines in the interior, Benjamin Anderson had reached the 
Mandingo capital and formed a friendship treaty with the powerful warlord Ibramhama Sissi, 
who pledged to join Liberia and oppose slavery.
100
 He was an influential ally, and Payne wanted 
to move swiftly to solidify the partnership. Because of waterfalls, Liberia had no coastal river 
navigable more than twenty miles inland. Without the capital investment of a mother country, 
Liberia studied the feasibility of building roads into the interior in order to facilitate trade with 
the Mandingo. Payne thought that increased trade could pay for road construction. But Monrovia 
had neither the equipment nor needed investment to capitalize on the commercial relationship. It 
needed a mammoth loan, and in 1870 Payne’s successor, President Edward Roye, approved a 
£100,000 loan (i.e. $500,000) from British bankers, ostensibly to construct roads and a railroad 
line into the hinterland. 
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Alas, Roye had agreed to a bad loan. First, it was a discount loan. The terms stipulated 
that 30 percent of the loan amount be withheld as prepayment of interest, which was set at 7 
percent. Second, it was a short-term loan. Liberia had a deadline of just fifteen years in which to 
repay the entire loan balance of £100,000. Third, Liberia agreed to a lien on its future customs 
revenue. If it failed to pay the full loan on time, the bank would garnish government revenues 
until the loan was paid off. After deducting fees, Liberia would be receiving only £70,000 while 
being required to pay back £132,600. And if it failed to pay back the loan on time, a very real 
possibility, it threatened to bankrupt the government and to trigger its collapse along with the 
public services it provided. Critics accused Roye of bypassing the legislature and receiving a 
personal kickback. Why else would he approve such a disadvantageous loan? they challenged. 
Roye did nothing to allay these fears when he returned to Monrovia and declared he would stay 
on as president for another two years—all without an election. According to the Constitution, a 
presidential term ran for two years, which many Liberians considered to be woefully short. But 
when Roye attempted belatedly to ram a constitutional amendment through the legislature, 
people worried he was about to stage a coup d’état. They were put on alert and, when Roye’s 
supporters attempted an armed takeover of a Monrovian bank, his opponents repelled them and 
jailed Roye in advance of a trial. Details get murky here, because Roye allegedly escaped and 
drowned while attempting to reach an English steamboat anchored offshore. Purportedly he was 
so weighted down with stolen loan money, he drowned after his canoe capsized. Other accounts 
claim that he was secretly executed and the disparaging tale invented to blame him for his own 
death.
101
 In any case, Roye’s demise was intertwined with Liberia’s commercial ambitions, and it 
had financial ramifications for the debtor nation. Only an estimated 20 to 27 percent of the loan 
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amount ever reached Liberia, whether from graft or usurious loan terms.
102
 Yet Liberia was still 
on the hook for the whole £132,600. It defaulted on payments in 1874, and not until the late 
1890s did Liberia agree to indemnify the British on a reduced loan of £80,000 at 4 percent 
interest. Even here, Liberia took more than £53,000 in losses, in light of the actual monies the 
Liberian Treasury had received. Liberia’s commercial development may have been paved with 
good intentions but it was also pocked with fiscal mismanagement and nonexistent oversight. 
 Despite the imprudent loan, at the end of the 1870s Liberia faced a still balmy future. It 
carried a favorable trade balance, exporting $3 million of goods annually while importing just a 
$1 million in return.
103
 Taxes and tariffs generated $80,000 a year in revenue, which was enough 
to keep the government solvent and international loans serviced (excepting the controversial 
Roye loan). 
On the surface, Liberia still faced challenges. With its high debt, it could afford to plow 
only 10 percent of its revenue into “public works.” As might be expected, new roads into the 
interior never materialized in the nineteenth century because of cost and corruption.
104
 The 
dearth of roads, especially during the rainy season, hampered transport throughout Liberia. 
Traversing Liberia took as long as two months by foot because of the formidable terrain, dense 
foliage, and unnavigable rivers. Despite the transportation trials, the first couple decades after 
independence had seen agriculture in Montserrado County flourish. Planters raised cash crops of 
rice, sugar, cotton, and coffee for export. National commercial shipping matched pace, with 
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Monrovian shipbuilders constructing more than fifty sailing vessels by 1870. France, England, 
and Germany were the main markets for Liberian goods. 
But then the bottom dropped out, as the burgeoning trade withered in the 1880s. First, 
Europe introduced steamships, which were a reliable, low-cost alternative to wind-powered craft. 
This innovation allowed smaller British and French traders to compete without having to finance 
and build their own vessels. And as expected, European shipping companies gave preference to 
their nationals. Second, new international competitors rose to challenge Liberians’ agricultural 
dominance. Brazil started exporting coffee, while European countries began raising sugar beets. 
Synthetic dyes were undermining the need for Liberia’s camwood. These developments sank 
Liberia’s coffee, sugar, and forestry industries. By the turn of the century, coffee exports had 
halved and camwood prices had decreased by 75 percent. These market drops devastated 
Liberia’s shipping industry. The trading fleet fell from over one hundred vessels in 1870 to only 
three by the turn of the century.
105
 The downturn also had long-term ramifications for Liberia’s 
relations with natives. Trading partnerships and labor contracts dissolved. Americoes lacked the 
necessary capital to develop the interior and improve the indigenous tribes’ material wellbeing. 
Many ambitious Americoes shifted their professional aspirations from commerce to government, 
which became the exclusive domain of Americoes and shut out political advancement for 
natives. 
As universally acknowledged, Liberia had every incentive it needed to integrate natives 
into the national economy. They required the cooperation of indigenes in order to (1) create a 
united front against British and French intrusion; (2) supply urban populations with essential 
food staples; (3) develop the native economies in order to increase trade and raise government 
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revenues; and (4) provide Liberia’s agricultural sector with cheap, unskilled labor. But operating 
within the Liberian economy required the aborigine to accept some radical innovations—
concepts like individual industry, gender roles regarding labor, private ownership of property, 
internal taxation and external tariffs, and fealty to a remote, unfamiliar authority in Monrovia. 
Moreover, commercial compliance did not guarantee political inclusion for natives. Only under 
sustained pressure in the 1870s and 1880s did Liberia begin to seat token aborigine 
representatives in its legislature. 
Actual societal integration was a difficult achievement to realize in the nineteenth 
century. Economist George Brown deems the cultural and institutional differences between 
Liberians and natives to be so “alien,” it was as if “two Liberias appeared inside the sovereign 
and geographic boundaries of the one country.”106 Anthropologist Mary Moran does not go as far 
as Brown, but she identifies two impediments to Liberians’ assimilating natives: class and group 
endogamy.
107
 First, she argues that Liberians were less open to indigenous people because the 
early colonists—who became future powerbrokers in the republic—were middleclass, business-
minded immigrants who already had concrete notions of civilization from living in American 
urban centers. She contrasts Liberians to Sierra Leoneans, whose most successful settlers were 
black Nova Scotians, who had fled with British troops to Canada following the Revolutionary 
War. Because most of these former slaves had worked in South Carolina’s low country and 
Virginia’s piedmont and tidewater, they had prior exposure to West African culture filtered 
through U.S. Southern plantation society. Therefore, they were more receptive, she reasons, to 
indigenous culture once they set foot in Africa. Second, she avers that the absence of white 
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colonial racism led Liberians to intermarry within their own social group, rather than commit to 
intercultural marriages with natives, in order to preserve political and commercial hegemony. Put 
another way, without white external barriers—like American Jim Crow segregation or South 
African apartheid—Liberians did not feel the need to find common cause with the African 
masses.
108
 To that list, one can add corrosive labor relations, unfavorable tax schemes, 
imbalanced trade controls, inequitable representation in government, and the fierce competition 
to add or protect land rights at all costs. Liberians and indigenes found economic cooperation 
nearly impossible in the absence of trust, goodwill, and generative wealth. 
 Benjamin Anderson from the chapter’s beginning serves as a microcosm of Liberia’s 
strained relationship with its native population. Failed diplomacy, financial tensions, and mutual 
mistrust characterized Anderson’s dealings with King Bessa. The Mandingoes eventually 
convened a council in which all parties hoped to resolve the tense standoff. In Anderson’s words: 
 In this council, the Mandingoes reminded me that, as the Liberians and the Mandingoes 
were one and the same people, I ought not to act with too great a severity; but I was not 
inclined to make common stock of my goods on account of that identity, and in a very 
impatient and unreasonable manner I gave them to understand that all their relationship to 
me depended solely on the restoration of my goods. If they failed in that, I was prepared 
to ignore all ties. I was in no humor for cant about kindred; I wanted my money . . . .
109
 
 
In the end, Anderson got his goods back through a combination of bluster, bullying, and shrewd 
bargaining. He finally managed to persuade a rival Mandingo chief to strong-arm Bessa into 
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returning the loot. In exchange, Anderson promised Liberia would build him a school so that his 
people could learn to conduct business through reading, writing, and arithmetic. It was a promise 
that Liberia could neither keep nor capitalize upon for another century. It was failure born out of 
class rivalry, sociocultural bias, political ineptitude, international pressure, and financial 
instability. But more importantly, it was a missed opportunity that spoke to the severe limitations 
constraining Liberians in the decades following their national freedom. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
“I shall be very glad if any man whether white, black, red, yellow, or even green 
is sent out to . . . release me from my present position of President”: 
Bitter Drama and Broken Dreams at Liberia College 
 
 
Professor Martin Freeman faced a dilemma. After the brilliant but mercurial Edward 
Blyden had been fired as president of Liberia College, the turmoil threatened to shut down the 
school permanently. Freeman accepted the job reluctantly; but by 1887 failing health, crumbling 
infrastructure, and dwindling enrollment left him despondent. In desperation, Freeman penned an 
emotional letter to American colonizationists. He reassured them he was not about to abandon 
his post, but he begged them to appoint a replacement, regardless of color. He confessed that “it 
has been suggested that ‘a white man be sent out to take charge of the work of the College’. In 
regard to this rumor permit me to say that I shall be very glad if any man whether white, black, 
red, yellow, or even green is sent out to relieve me and release me from my present position of 
President pro tem.”1 This was an immense capitulation on Freeman’s part, because Liberians had 
fought for decades to maintain control of the institution’s leadership. Yet after operating for 
twenty-five years, Liberia College teetered on collapse as a result of conflicting visions, 
professional rivalries, and a cutthroat debate over whether to educate natives. 
Higher education had always been a controversial topic in the early republic. Unlike at 
the primary or secondary levels, a college education was a limited resource accessible to only a 
select few, since only one institution of higher education existed in the entire country, at 
Monrovia. The existence of a single college was due to several reasons: the Liberian government 
could afford to fund only one institution; just a handful of men in the country qualified to teach 
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at the collegiate level; and matriculation required students to have demonstrated secondary-
education success, secured scholarship aid, and possessed enough internal fortitude to withstand 
subpar learning conditions and the temptation to drop out for marriage or business opportunities. 
The scarcity of collegiate education makes it an ideal focus for this chapter, which examines how 
higher education became an ideological battleground for the nation’s leaders in deciding the 
direction and beneficiaries of Liberia’s future. This chapter examines Liberia College in 
particular because of the social and political implications it had in the broader debate over the 
country’s future. 
Everyone affirmed the importance of establishing a college, but leaders disagreed on its 
mission and target audience. Since the days of colonization, one of the central tenets was that 
education would bring civilization to the ignorant masses. No one disputed this article of faith. 
The devil is in the details, of course, and problematic questions arose that Liberians answered 
differently. Should education stand outside the larger culture as a figurative “beacon on a hill,” 
or should it permeate culture as “leaven” within society? Should it create and preserve a civic 
identity primarily for Americoes, or should it forge a new continental consciousness by seeking a 
distinctively African identity? Should education aspire to teach the highest intellectual 
disciplines, or should it meet the practical needs of industrial or vocational training? And to what 
degree could white benefactors dictate the terms of that education? These were pertinent 
questions that required concrete answers in order to establish an overarching mission and 
purpose for schooling in Liberia. 
Unfortunately, educators failed to reach a consensus on how to direct higher education in 
the country. Nowhere was this breakdown more evident than Liberia College, the flagship 
institution of higher education. The school was rife with dysfunction and mismanagement from 
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its inception. It was also a microcosm of the larger debates Liberians were having about their 
identity, relations with their neighbors, and their place in the world. 
Edward Blyden is a good starting point in discussing the civilizing role of education. He 
was a central figure in the start of Liberia College, being one of its inaugural professors. He had 
a tumultuous academic career: a gifted scholar who was a forerunner of today’s multiculturalism 
but also a hardheaded administrator who clashed with nearly all his colleagues. His ouster from 
the college presidency, although justified at the time, left the school directionless and more prone 
to the whims of its white colonizationist sponsors. To appreciate his contributions and 
understand his shortcomings, however, require some background on Liberia College’s founding. 
 
 
Auspicious Beginning 
With much fanfare, Liberia College held its inauguration ceremonies on January 23, 1862.
2
 Built 
at a cost of $20,000, the three-story school building sat on twenty acres of land, perched high on 
Cape Mesurado overlooking the capital city of Monrovia.
3
 Liberia’s flagship college carried the 
dreams of an entire nation, which hoped the modest academy would grow into the Harvard of 
Liberia, if not all of Africa. Furthermore, supporters expected the school would help prepare 
Americo-Liberians for governance and natives for “civilization.” 
As an original faculty member, Edward Wilmot Blyden stood prepared to do just that. 
Yet his turbulent time as a Liberia College professor and president belied the difficulty in 
achieving those ends. Part of his struggle was philosophical. His approach to education began to 
change in the 1880s as he sought training for Liberians that was distinct from Western education. 
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The shift stemmed from his belief that African culture was fundamentally different from its 
Western counterparts. This “natural” divide was a product of his racialism, the conviction that 
native instincts set the African apart from his EuroAmerican rival or his Americo-Liberian 
cousin. If the latter two claimed “civilization” to be derived from white EuroAmericans, Blyden 
claimed instinctual knowledge exclusive to the “pure Negro.” But Blyden faced a quandary: he 
had to create an educational alternative that deserved the respect and status afforded to Western 
education. His stint as president of Liberia College shows his move toward “ethnoeducation,” the 
quest to excavate and systematize the autochthonous traditions and culture of Africa.
4
 Hence, 
teaching Arabic became a lasting ambition for Blyden, because the language represented a 
centuries-old alternative to English. Islam, too, came to signify a legitimate source of truth that 
rivaled that of Christianity—which led him to explore the merits of Muslim education later in 
life.
5
 Yet racialism did not merely drive Blyden’s educational philosophy. His experiences at 
Liberia College accelerated his abandonment of a strictly Western-based education. Battles with 
Americo-Liberians—first with President Joseph Jenkins Roberts and later with college trustees—
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fueled his mistrust of Western-minded mulattoes. In the end, Blyden’s civilizing mission at 
Liberia College came to an abrupt halt, undone by feuding, dysfunction, and sustained backlash 
to ethnoeducation. 
Blyden’s successors seized upon industrial education as a fresh tactic to reinvigorate the 
fortunes of Liberia College. Besides the practical benefit of making the school self-sustaining, it 
would accrue American colonizationists’ goodwill, establish the “scientific” credentials of the 
school, and serve as a compelling touchstone for all sides to unite together. But like Blyden, 
subsequent presidents gained little progress in instituting it. Knowing industrial education to be a 
litmus test for colonizationist supporters, many faculty assented to it in principle without 
enacting the requisite move into the interior. Interestingly, while the goal was a perennially 
unrealized albatross for colonizationists, it became a negotiating tactic for educators to continue 
with their own separate agenda. On the downside, it left individual students with little ability to 
advance their studies beyond the collegiate level. Because intensive studies like medicine 
required overseas training, they became luxuries that few would fund, who viewed it as not only 
expensive excess but also a seductive lure to tempt Liberia’s sons from fulfilling their duties to 
their homeland. Thus reinventing the college as an industrial center failed because of mistrust, 
rivalry, and absence of buy-in from professors and students alike. 
 
Liberia College’s Founding Vision(s) 
From outward appearances, the school had auspicious beginnings. On one hand, numbers 
were miniscule during the first year
6
: Blyden, Alexander Crummell, and Joseph Jenkins Roberts 
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formed the first faculty, while seven boys composed the student body.
7
 On the other hand, the 
three professors formed a stellar faculty, the best qualified men that Liberia could muster. Each 
boasted impressive credentials for his day. Alexander Crummell was the best educated man in 
the country, having attended Yale and graduated from Cambridge. Edward Blyden was a gifted 
linguist, fluent in multiple languages and a champion of cross-cultural learning. And Joseph 
Jenkins Roberts, once the nation’s first President, had surfaced from retirement in order to lead 
Liberia College as its first president. The students were all boys drawn from the Americo-
Liberians who had emigrated from the United States in the previous decades. In reality, the 
school was little more than a glorified high school housed in a single building.
8
 Yet its potential 
was far greater. It had the sanction of the Liberian government, financial backing of wealthy 
philanthropists, and high academic aspirations by ambitious, well-intentioned men. The founders 
desired Liberia College to be a full-fledged institution of higher education. Blyden taught Greek, 
Latin, Hebrew, and French; Crummell logic, rhetoric, and history; and Roberts law and 
jurisprudence.
9
 The first two also shared teaching duties for mathematics and philosophy.
10
 A 
traditional Western-based education, all concurred, would lead to productive citizens. 
The three founding professors held strong convictions on how those expectations should 
materialize. Speaking at the inauguration, Blyden asserted that Liberia College would teach “a 
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practical education” by “imparting not simply skill in keeping accounts—but skill in exercising 
the intellect accurately and readily, upon any subject brought before it. The skill secured by a 
college education, is skill in the use of the mind.”11 The means to stimulating the mind, not 
surprisingly for Blyden, rested in classical language study. Greek appealed to him in particular, 
which he considered the archetype for beauty and the foundation for abstract ideas. In short, 
Greek was the means to culture.
12
 In 1863 Blyden still aligned himself with a traditional Western 
education filled with a steady diet of the “classics,” which would cultivate “taste” and the highest 
achievement. Sensitive to the charge he was simply aping white culture, he responded that just as 
everyone had to masticate and digest their food, so too Liberians had to follow the same 
educational process as other civilizations.
13
 “We must rise, and we can rise by the same means 
by which other people have risen,” Blyden declared.14 
Roberts joined Blyden on the dais to offer his vision for Liberia College. In Roberts’s 
grand scheme, the job of the institution was to train men to launch a moral and political 
revolution for the world to witness. By disseminating “useful and scientific knowledge,” the 
school could uphold free institutions, guarantee orderly governance, and perform the same 
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service that Harvard had done for the United States, namely, supply the commonwealth with 
competently trained public servants. Study of law was vital to accomplishing these goals, he 
argued, because it was “essential to a systematic organization of civil society” and “no less 
necessary to the protection of life, liberty, and property.” Therefore, he encouraged future 
graduates to serve the country by aspiring to “the highest and most important offices” in the land. 
More than either Blyden or Crummell, Roberts stressed that the school was “a national 
institution, designed for the benefit of the whole people of this Republic . . . and not for the 
purpose of inculcating any particular system of theological opinions.” While acknowledging 
religion’s value, the president steered a decidedly secular course.15 
Roberts’s secular vision clashed with Crummell’s educational philosophy, though the 
difference was not obvious at the time because Crummell did not speak at the inauguration. For 
the past decade he had maneuvered himself to found and head his own institution of higher 
learning, working under the auspices of the Episcopal Church.
16
 When that endeavor fell 
through, he accepted the offer to teach at Liberia College. What he had not abandoned, however, 
was the notion that religion and education went hand in hand. Eight months earlier he had 
announced “the best and most abiding interests of man, those which pertain to civilization” to be 
“schools and religion.”17 As such, the state had a moral obligation to cultivate religion and 
promote education. For Crummell, Liberia College became the ideal location at which to 
“Cultivate men!” It is significant the order in which he prescribed pupils reach maturity: “Men 
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look here to the preacher, the missionary, the school teacher, to cultivate and train up the future 
manhood of the country.” Crummell did not regard these vocations as necessarily separate, 
though, for people were to draw from a common source—“from the teacher and the 
clergyman”—their culture, manners, refinement, enlightenment, “high morals and pure speech.” 
If anything, Crummell preferred that professors come from the pastoral ranks, because education 
was to improve students’ moral powers in addition to their mental faculties. Additionally, 
Crummell espoused manual labor for all students lest they become popinjays and ladies-maids.
18
 
Thus one can see that Liberia College became an amalgamative site for numerous 
goals—instilling self-esteem and group pride, building national identity, teaching social and 
gender roles, nurturing moral and intellectual traditions, and inculcating manual labor skills—
which, while often complementary, could be contradictory in time. Blyden’s tumultuous career 
reflects the twists and entanglements educators faced in constructing an expansive education that 
was to serve the entire nation. 
 
Edward Blyden’s Background 
 Edward Wilmot Blyden stood out from fellow emigrationists by virtue of his birthplace 
in the West Indies. A precocious student, he came to excel in speech and language, prompting 
his white pastor to send the adolescent to the United States for theological training. But rejection 
by Rutgers and two other seminaries dashed those hopes, whereupon his stymied sponsors 
decided to ship Blyden to Liberia for an unfettered education. In 1851 he enrolled in a 
Presbyterian school in Monrovia, where he learned Hebrew, theology, and classical literature. 
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His ascent proved rapid, as Roberts appointed him editor of the Liberia Herald, the Presbyterian 
Church ordained him into the ministry, and his high school alma mater pegged him to assume its 
principalship. Blyden’s star continued to sparkle. After three years as principal of Alexander 
High School, he spent a half year touring Britain and the United States, promoting the cause of 
Liberian education. In 1862 he returned to Liberia in triumph, accepting a professorship of 
classics at Liberia College, which was about to open its doors. Two years later he assumed the 
concurrent position of Secretary of State. He was just thirty-two years old. 
 His dual diplomatic career convinced Blyden of the importance of learning Arabic. 
Already fluent in five other languages—English, Spanish, Latin, Greek, and Hebrew—he added 
the study of Arabic to the college curriculum in 1867, believing it held the key to unlocking the 
Muslim interior for Liberian merchants. It also marked an implicit challenge against a “mulatto” 
faction with whom Blyden and Crummell bickered. Americo-Liberian mulattoes constituted the 
ruling elite and demarcated Monrovia as the political, cultural, and educational center of the 
nation. When Blyden advocated situating the college within the interior in the late 1850s, it had 
raised hackles among Americo-Liberians. His introduction of Arabic a decade later fueled 
suspicions that he was utilizing it as a stepping stone in moving the college out of Monrovia and 
into the interior. 
 Tensions boiled over during the next four years. Mulatto-backed Roberts quarreled with 
Blyden over his assuming the Secretary of State post against Roberts’s wishes. Although Blyden 
had accepted the cabinet position in 1862, Roberts had forced him to resign on pains of losing his 
professorate. When Blyden reaccepted the same cabinet position in 1864, Roberts viewed him as 
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insubordinate.
19
 Blyden probably felt safe in flouting his president’s wishes because he drew his 
salary from neither Roberts nor his colonizationist friends in Boston but from the New York 
State Colonization Society. Unless found derelict of his teaching responsibilities, Blyden felt 
confident that he could maintain his professorship and whatever other job he pleased. Crummell, 
who sided with Blyden, had no such luck. Americo-Liberians succeeded in getting Crummell 
fired from his professorate at the college. Unable to terminate Blyden due to backing from the 
New York branch, they spread allegations of extramarital dalliances. In 1871 his enemies 
fomented a lynch mob against him on the thinly-guised pretext that he had slept with the 
Liberian president’s wife. Blyden barely escaped with his life after the mob had strung him up 
and dragged him down the streets of Monrovia. The shaken professor retreated to Sierra Leone, 
where he waited for the furor to subside. 
Personal failure preceded professional opportunity. In time, leading Americo-Liberians 
came to regret their mistreatment of the eminently qualified scholar. In 1880 the college trustees 
offered Blyden the dream job he had sought a decade earlier, the presidency of Liberia College. 
The reversal was as ironic as it was unexpected. Blyden had the chance to re-form the school in 
his own image. Through the crucible of the 1870s he had forged an educational philosophy he 
felt could guide the nation’s direction for years to come. The real test was whether he could 
realize his ambitious agenda for the college and the country. 
 
Blyden’s Revised Educational Philosophy 
 Blyden’s ascendance to the presidency of Liberia College in 1881 gave him a platform to 
outline his educational views and priorities. In his presidential address entitled “The Aims and 
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Methods of a Liberal Education for Africans,” he explained his educational philosophy in detail. 
Intellectual goals were to be only a small part of Liberia College’s mission. The college should 
advance society, religion, patriotism, and racial development, too. He described the collegiate 
task as generative, or creating the proper intellectual and moral climate from which material 
prosperity would later emerge. To that end, simply imparting knowledge would not suffice. 
Borrowing from Crummell, Blyden insisted that Liberian education center on character 
formation. As the freshly minted president announced, 
 The object of all education is to secure growth and efficiency, to make a man all that his 
natural gifts will allow him to become; to produce self-respect, a proper appreciation of 
our own powers and of the powers of other people; to beget a fitness for one’s sphere of 
life and action, and an ability to discharge the duties it imposes.
20
 
 
By efficiency, he meant the ability to maximize potential, apply learning to one’s surroundings, 
and benefit the race as a whole. Nothing disturbed Blyden more than Negro inefficiency, the 
inability to experience the highest personal and collective growth because of character flaws or 
social impediments. Inefficiency was symptomatic of a more fundamental problem for Blyden, 
namely the white-imposed standards for physical and intellectual excellence. He saw them as a 
relatively new invention that arose during the Sixth Epoch of history (from the French 
Revolution onward).
21
 While sparking a literary and intellectual renaissance, the epoch spawned 
theories that degraded and proscribed blacks, spewing “race-poison” that infected Negroes in the 
Western world. 
 Blyden viewed Liberia College as an antidote that could help inject race pride. His 
proposed solution to combating the Sixth Epoch was to return to the Second and Third Epochs, 
                                                          
20
 Edward Wilmot Blyden, “The Aims and Methods of a Liberal Education for Africans,” in Edward W. 
Blyden, Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race (1888), 2d ed., reprint, Baltimore, MD: Black Classic Press, 1994), 
85. 
21
 Blyden divided history into six epochs: the theocratic state, Greek Age, Roman civilization, Medieval 
Age, Modern Age, and age of science and industry.  
190 
 
the time of the Greeks and the Romans. Blyden still touted mathematics and the classics—that is, 
Greek, Latin, and their respective literature—because they helped instill mental discipline 
without effacing Negro individuality. What attracted him to these studies was the universal 
culture he perceived they carried. The principles found in Greek philosophy and Roman law, in 
his estimate, would inculcate care, judgment, and industry—traits he believed would bolster 
manhood, citizenship, and critical scientific inquiry. This is, after all, what he experienced in his 
own educational experiences. 
 But more than Crummell, Blyden qualified the value of studying the classics. While 
affirming one “true culture,” Blyden also acknowledged many particular contexts.22 Thus the 
Negro could utilize the same means of general culture, arithmetic and classical studies; but he 
could not imitate the Anglo-Saxon slavishly in music, history, or literature.
23
 The taint of 
Negrophobia in these subjects led Blyden to dismiss the primacy of their study. He placed utmost 
confidence in the study of early epochs, which would offer correct instruction when translated to 
the present. 
 Of course, Liberians had to know local context before applying universal principles. 
Blyden spoke of maintaining balance, a racial equilibrium that held universal culture and African 
nationality in unison. The first component came from the classics; the second from the natives. 
Geography played a vital function, because only on African soil could the Negro find his natural 
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“groove.”24 For Blyden the Liberian interior was superior to the coast, which white Europeans 
and Americans had infiltrated through their commercial, religious, and diplomatic endeavors. 
“Intimate intercourse with our interior brethren” would counteract the pernicious influence of 
foreigners.
25
 Their alien ideas and manners, he argued, truncated Liberia’s moral, intellectual, 
and sociopolitical growth. As discussed in a previous chapter, Blyden put his faith in native or 
racial instincts, the local tastes and mental faculties that developed while living in one’s natural 
environment where original action and self-trust could flourish.
26
 
 Blyden used classical study and its epochal universals for the outward purposes of 
strengthening nationality and participating in the global economy; he used native study for the 
inward purposes of creating a self-affirming identity and propagating a Pan-Africanism of 
sorts.
27
 In each case, Blyden was taking a similarly primitivist approach. Whether returning to an 
earlier epoch or to an unspoiled fatherland, the Americo-Liberian had to consult the past, or more 
precisely, Blyden’s version of it. 
 
Blyden’s Contentious Presidency 
 Blyden stirred enthusiasm for Liberia College from the start, particularly in America. 
Early in his tenure, he canvassed from New York to New Orleans, pitching Liberia College as a 
vital tool in training black Americans because “[t]here are elements in the education he will 
receive there [Liberia] which he can never get in this country [United States] and which are an 
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 At this stage, Blyden’s racialism still advocated “going native,” rather than denigrating Americo-
Liberians as a lost cause. 
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 Or as Blyden put it, “to preserve an accurate balance between the studies which carry the mind out of 
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essential part of the qualifications for useful work in his fatherland.”28 His appeals fell on 
receptive ears, as he collected $4,000 during his stateside tour.
29
 At least a quarter of the sum he 
hoped to use in building faculty housing to induce African American educators to Liberia.
30
 
While fundraising for the college, he was also recruiting prospective professors. To the 
religiously inclined, he marketed the school as a seminary for aspiring African American 
ministers to be trained in Presbyterian missions work.
31
 In early 1883 he submitted a list of 
twenty-one American college students who wished to complete their studies at Liberia College. 
Eleven were from Hampton Institute; eight from the Baptist Seminary in Atlanta; two from 
                                                          
28
 Edward W. Blyden to G. W. Samson, New York City, New York, 1 September 1882, in the New York 
State Colonization Society Records, MG 347, Box 6(32), “Correspondence 1882-1885” folder, in the Schomburg 
Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, New York City, New York. 
29
 Blyden fancied himself an evangelist of sorts, boasting, “I have since my return to the city [of 
Washington, DC] been preaching and lecturing here to crowded houses of colored people—the most intelligent 
classes—and a wide spread interest has been awakened in Liberia. Mr. Frederick Douglass has expressed his interest 
in Liberia by having me as his guest for several days at his residence two miles out of the city.” Edward W. Blyden 
to I. D. Wells, Acting President of the Board of Control of the New York Colonization Society, Washington, DC, 5 
February 1883, in the New York State Colonization Society Records, MG 347, Box 6(32), “Correspondence 1883” 
folder, in the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, New York City, New 
York. 
30
 See Edward W. Blyden to I. D. Wells, Acting President of the Board of Control of the New York 
Colonization Society, Washington, DC, 5 February 1883, in the New York State Colonization Society Records, MG 
347, Box 6(32), “Correspondence 1883” folder, in the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York 
Public Library, New York City, New York. 
31
 Edward W. Blyden to Isaac Smith, New York State Colonization Society treasurer, Monrovia, Liberia, 
10 February 1882, in the New York State Colonization Society Records, MG 347, Box 6(32), “Correspondence 
1882-1883” folder, in the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, New York 
City, New York. One wonders whether Blyden’s 1873 appeal to the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions for a 
theological college was more pragmatic than ideological, after his repeated petitions to government officials for a 
school in the interior fell on deaf ears. As possible support, see Edward W. Blyden to Governor Carter, Department 
of Native Affairs, Lagos, Sierra Leone, 21 May 1896, reprinted in Hollis R. Lynch, ed., Black Spokesman: Selected 
Published Writings of Edward Wilmot Blyden (New York: Frank Cass & Co., 1971), 259. By the 1890s a mature 
Blyden frowned upon “denominational or dogmatic teaching” on the grounds that it promoted division. He still 
considered religion essential to “manly education,” but he defined religion ecumenically. Following Matthew 22 
(and Mark 12), Blyden reduced religion to love for God and love for man. 
193 
 
Biddle University in Charlotte, North Carolina; and an unspecified number from Atlanta and 
Clark Universities.
32
 
Blyden’s offer attracted interest partially because of the prospect of the New York State 
Colonization Society covering some or all of the students’ tuition. At the close of 1882, he 
reported “[t]here will be about 14 16 who will be ready to go to Liberia next Spring, expecting 
the N. Y. S. Col. Society to provide for their support in Liberia College until they get through 
their studies.”33 But Blyden was adamant that beneficiaries only receive money upon their arrival 
in Liberia, presumably so that their presence would confirm their stated commitment to 
emigration.
34
 
Blyden had another reason for educating African Americans in Liberia: once over there 
they would find it logistically difficult to return. They would essentially be sequestered for 
service. He complained that once the Liberia-minded student in the U.S. 
has developed talent[,] he is plied by politicians and others with arguments and 
inducements for remaining in this country. In this way Africa has lost a good many who 
in the freshness of their instincts had felt drawn to labor in the land of their fathers. We 
consider, therefore, that education for Africa in Africa is the surest way of getting the 
laborers needed in that field.
35
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In 1882 Blyden unveiled his new recruiting strategy: “I have advised all who are studying with 
Africa in view to go out at once and enter Liberia College. They have all agreed to do so . . . .”36  
Although denying that Liberia College was “a rival interest” to black colleges in 
America,
37
 he proceeded to compete for its students and graduates.
38
 On one hand, he regarded 
African American colleges to be backward-looking because they had to teach pupils the art of 
forgetfulness, to erase memories of their racial oblivion. On the other hand, he esteemed Liberia 
College as forward-thinking because it could focus exclusively on avoiding the “sinister 
elements in that training.”39 In short, he thought that Liberia College students could discard the 
cultural baggage that burdened African American students. 
Back in Liberia, Blyden’s presidency was getting mixed reviews. Part of the criticism 
revolved around his extended leaves of absence.
40
 With his trips abroad, he was soliciting funds, 
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hires, and connections; but with his successes, he was failing to manage the day-to-day 
operations of the college.
41
 As one disgruntled professor griped, 
The College at present is doing you may say, nothing. Dr. Blyden heard live recitations 
just before the winter examination. He left here after the Trustee meeting in Jan. and staid 
[sic] away three months. He has now packed his books and says he is going to England 
the middle of this month! He had not done any work in two years in the College—in fact 
the College to him was simply his bread and meat and its library most of whose good 
books he has (according to Prof Freeman’s statement) [in] his study.42 
 
Blyden’s perceived neglect was not the only thing grating some colleagues, who complained 
about his disingenuousness: 
Dr. Blyden left here again yesterday for Sierra Leone. He has not taught one class since 
his return—told the American students when they urged him to begin a class in Arabic, 
that they would take consumption if they studied Arabic now. When in America, he told 
them to come at once to the College & begin Arabic without which no one could do good 
service in Africa—oh! consistency thou art not found in Blyden.43 
 
He further rankled some professors when he lashed out against their “insubordination, inactivity,  
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and hostility”44—a charge his opponents dismissed as little more than the proverbial kettle 
calling the pot black.
45
 
 Anger no doubt stemmed from the perpetually decrepit conditions of the college. The 
facilities were abysmal. Neglect, termites, and humidity had combined to make the building 
virtually unlivable.
46
 As one professor reported, the facilities suffered from leaky roofs, caved 
ceilings, falling plaster, broken windows, and rotted floors and rooms. He predicted that “the 
College building, which unless known and promptly met[,] will seriously obstruct, if not wholly 
prevent educational work at Monrovia.”47 During Blyden’s stint as president, the U.S. minister to 
Liberia, Henry Highland Garnet, had scarcely stepped on campus before dubbing it “a grave.”48 
Disrepair was also harming students, prompting one professor to bemoan, “It is impossible to 
keep the students who come healthy and strong from the country rural districts from being 
injuriously affected both in health and morals by the influences here.”49 
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 For all his talk of a sterling fatherland, Blyden harbored concern about the detrimental 
“distractions” found in Monrovia, which he feared would entice pupils from their studies. Six 
students, or an entire class, had already “fallen” by the wayside. He suspended a male sophomore 
for being “led astray” and having a “pernicious effect on the other students.”50 Although reports 
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leave the “crime” unspecified, it was most likely either intemperance or premarital intimacy, for 
which another student found himself expelled.
51
 All these transgressions left Blyden “very much 
discouraged” at the “disastrous influence of Monrovia upon so many bright intelects [sic].”52 He 
began to lobby again for removal of the college from Monrovia and to the interior, convinced 
that isolation would protect students from the moral decay of Liberia’s coast.53 
The official reason for relocating, however, was to procure more land for agricultural and 
industrial education. Blyden was savvy enough to realize that by linking relocation to the novel 
ideas propagated by Hampton Institute, he could win the backing of the New York State 
Colonization Society.
54
 “This change of site will enable us to carry on such manual labor 
operations as will soon make the College to a great extent self supporting,” Blyden predicted, “as 
well as give the students an opportunity of receiving industrial and technical training.”55 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
[35], Crummell, Rev. Alexander, 1868-1874, “Liberia Papers, Crummell, Rev. Alexander, 1869” folder, in the 
Archives of the Episcopal Church, Austin, Texas. 
51
 M. H. Freeman to G. W. Samson, Monrovia, Liberia, 10 September 1885, in the New York State 
Colonization Society Records, MG 347, Box 6(32), “Correspondence 1885” folder (6/12), in the Schomburg Center 
for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, New York City, New York. The allegation against 
Saunders was that “he had fallen into some disrepute by reason of his rumored intimacy with a young girl of rather 
questionable character.” Having been morally compromised, he would gain readmittance only if he could persuade 
college officials that he had been “reformed.” 
52
 Unsigned document [probably H. M. Schieffelin, whose handwriting is similar], n.d. [c. 1882-1885], in 
the New York State Colonization Society Records, MG 347, Box 6(32), “Correspondence 1885” folder (6/12), in the 
Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, New York City, New York. 
53
 Blyden was following the same precedent he had established in the late 1870s when as principal of 
Alexander High School, he transferred its site from Monrovia to Harrisburg, a town in the interior. As early as 1857, 
he had observed, “Temptations to listless vagabondism, to nocturnal carousing and dissipation, you are aware, are 
numerous in this city. They have to a great extent interfered with the progress of our high schools.” Edward W. 
Blyden to D. A. Wilson, Monrovia, Liberia, 10 October 1857, in the African Missions Papers, Presbyterian Board of 
Foreign Missions, microfilm, reel 5, no. 205. 
54
 During the decade, the New York State Colonization Society introduced new letterhead embossed with 
the phrase “Liberian Education and Industries,” signaling the tilt toward industrial education. 
55
 Edward W. Blyden to G. W. Samson in letter entitled “Expenses of Removal,” no place, 7 October 1882, 
in the New York State Colonization Society Records, MG 347, Box 6(32), “Correspondence 1882-1885” folder, in 
the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, New York City, New York. 
199 
 
Industrial Education in Retrospect 
Before the weighty and testy debates of the 1890s, industrial education had a rich and 
lengthy history among African Americans. The term “industrial education” held different 
meanings for different people, which accounted partly for the ensuing squabble as African 
Americans contested the right of whites and fellow blacks to define the concept for their own 
ends. On a narrow level, industrial education meant procuring manual labor skills that would aid 
in gaining a trade or running a household. On a broader level, industrial education symbolized a 
host of commendable values, from thrift and diligence to self-help and fiscal independence.  
In many trade schools within the U.S., “industrial education” for Negroes amounted to 
little more than domestic training, in which men studied how to make shoes and women learned 
to sew and perform chores. Despite the modest gains, proponents argued that they were molding 
moral, responsible citizens who could contribute an essential role in the Southern and national 
economies. Although some African Americans dismissed what they perceived to be the limited 
aims of industrial education, many more objected to the stated reasons and implicit assumptions 
of industrial educators.  
Part of the disenchantment focused on people like Samuel Chapman Armstrong, the 
founder of Hampton Institute and a fatherly figure to Booker T. Washington. As one of the most 
prominent industrial schools, Hampton paralleled Tuskegee in reputation and funding, providing 
Washington a template for vocational training. Armstrong advised blacks to stay in the South, 
where they could, in time and without politics, accumulate sufficient land and morals to rise in 
society. Because of their alleged backward condition and inferior position, Armstrong urged 
blacks to remain content, work hard, and heed white guidance. His admonition found resonance, 
of course, among Southern whites determined to preserve the status quo and among Northern 
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capitalists desperate for cheap labor and a stable economy. For many African Americans, 
however, it was a different story, as they rejected Armstrong’s paternalistic and racialist 
notions.
56
 
Yet Hampton Institute stood hardly alone in advocating industrial training. The 
Philadelphia Institute for Colored Youth and Clark University followed suit in the late seventies 
and early eighties by adding industrial programs to their class offerings. Thus, when Tuskegee 
Institute formed in 1881, Washington’s school introduced nothing new in the way of education. 
At the start of the 1880s, Tuskegee was merely one in an ever expanding galaxy of industrial 
schools, black and white. Along with Talladega College and Tougaloo College, a series of black 
industrial academies opened in the U.S. South, including the Beaufort Normal and Industrial 
Academy in South Carolina, Kittrell Normal and Industrial School in North Carolina, Haines 
Normal and Industrial Institute in Georgia, and the Washington School for Colored Youth in the 
District of Columbia. 
The establishment of the private John F. Slater Fund in 1882 underwrote the rapid growth 
in industrial education. Many of the new schools ran comprehensive industrial programs in such 
fields as printing, masonry, carpentry, brickwork, blacksmithing, shoemaking, and agriculture. 
For women, schools offered courses in nursing and home economics. But the boom would not 
last. In the 1890s, the Slater Fund began to tighten disbursements because of a weak economy 
and a proliferation in state-funded industrial schools. By the turn of the century, half of Slater 
monies was earmarked for Hampton and Tuskegee. Scores of African American schools 
shuttered their doors, unable to cover tuition and operating expenses. 
                                                          
56
 For more on Armstrong and Hampton, see August Meier, Negro Thought in America, 1880–1915 (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 85-99; James D. Anderson, The Education of Blacks in the South, 
1860-1935 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 33-78; Adam Fairclough, A Class of Their Own: 
Black Teachers in the Segregated South (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/Harvard Press, 2007), 120-131. 
201 
 
Besides the often scant training and sometimes racist rationale, the results were, in 
hindsight, discouraging. Such occupations as brick masonry and blacksmithing were losing 
ground in the industrial age, which was also eroding the economic clout of farmers. Thus, many 
black schools were training their students for jobs in declining vocations or soon-to-be obsolete 
industries.
57
 Meanwhile, urbanization and industrialization were in the process of radically 
reshaping the economic landscape, in which large business dominated. 
But Liberia in the 1880s had different needs. In a country where trade dominated, 
industrial development of any kind was welcome. Its proposed placement was contentious, 
however, because the site for Liberia College constituted a struggle for the vision and direction 
of Liberia’s future: toward the Euro-American West or toward the African interior. 
 
Edward Blyden and Relocation: Part I 
One after another, professors lined up to take sides on where Liberia College should 
reside. The matter was more than a pedantic issue for them, in light of Blyden’s directive that 
they move their homes down St. Paul’s River into the “rural district [where] we should have a 
much larger number [of native students].”58 
Alfred King objected to such a transfer on the grounds that relocating the college would 
run counter to “where, it seems, God and the law had designed it to be.” Practically, he wished 
that the controversy would reach finality, ruing, “Nearly thirty years have elapsed and thousands 
of dollars have been wasted, and yet the College is in a transition state—no site has yet been 
determined on by all parties concerned. Is there no definite purpose, or design, in all this?” 
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Liberia College at its present spot, he argued, kept it centrally located for the towns and 
preserved the desires of founder J. B. Pinney.
59
 
Honoring a dead colonizationist’s wishes was not one of Blyden’s priorities, and he was 
not above asserting his authority to achieve his ends. When two recent faculty hires refused to 
move their residences, the Liberia College president recommended their termination to the 
Boston Board of Trustees on grounds that they were engaging in “insubordination, inactivity, 
and hostility to Liberian education.” Professor Thomas McCants Stewart wrote an indignant 
letter to the board, accusing Blyden of being “the fly in the ointment” and “the manipulator of 
one of the most dastardly movements ever planned against College Professors.” What is more 
revealing is Blyden’s categorical condemnation of the offending professors. According to the 
accused, 
The President of Liberia College publicly and shamefully attacked the new Professors by 
indirectly connecting them with his denunciation of all negroes born and educated 
abroad. He said that they were unfit for life in Liberia and as dangerous as they were 
unfit. Thus did Dr. Blyden on the 1st day of Jan’y. 1884 gave the lie opposed himself to 
the utterances of his whole life, for he had hitherto that the exiled Negro’s return to 
Africa would result naturally from [an] abroads education and culture.
60
 
 
Stewart’s charge overstated Blyden’s position at that time, though not by much. Blyden was out 
to discredit his critics, especially Hugh Mason Browne and Thomas McCants Stewart, professors 
he had wooed to Liberia from the United States. Now that they opposed him, his appraisal was 
less flattering: 
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These men are looking back to America, and are turning into pillars of salt. They do not 
understand what they see. The American Negro of education with his foreign tastes and 
foreign blood is hardly yet prepared to enter at once into the peculiar work here with full 
sympathy and intelligence. White men show a far deeper insight into the necessities and 
methods of the work and a wider grasp of the whole subject. . . . Why is it so? Is it 
because these men feel an organic connection with a powerful race and are in constant 
intercourse with that race, gathering inspiration and stimulus? Partly this, but partly also, 
that all their antecedents are so different from those of the poor Negro.
61
 
 
Blyden’s racialism had resurfaced after taking a hiatus in his 1881 presidential address. The 
problem was no longer just Negroes’ “foreign tastes” but now their “foreign blood.” 
Contradiction was evident in Blyden’s shifting thought: if the Negro’s foreignness was innate, 
how would a switch in environment assimilate him to native instincts? In 1883 the answer was 
unclear. 
For Browne, the fundamental issue lay in who would wield control. “It is significant in 
this connection—every institution ever started by foreigners in Liberia has declined when they 
have ceased to control the same,” he wrote. “The teachers also, for some time to come, must be 
foreigners, and these black or white—only that they believe in the brotherhood of man.”62 
Browne favored foreigners because he saw them as higher up the civilization ladder than people 
just stepping out of “heathenism.” Browne was closer to Crummell in this regard. What Blyden 
lauded as the natural grooves of natives, Browne lambasted as the ignorant ruts of heathens.
63
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“We must grow,” he insisted, “and grow under the dogmatic direction of our husbandmen.”64 
Clearly, Browne lumped himself as one of the husbandmen. Not so with Blyden or the rest of the 
trustee board. Browne wanted to oust both parties, whom he compared to unlearned and illiterate 
“canalboatmen.” According to his recommendation, “We needs [sic] now in Liberia, an 
industrial school & common primary schools, a corps of well trained and experienced foreign 
teachers, and these to be under control of a foreign Board.”65 Therefore, he urged the New York 
State Colonization Society to usurp the trustees’ authority for a fifty-year period in order to 
impose order.
66
 
Stewart was more circumspect than Browne but equally as passionate. He had entered 
into Liberian work with care and deliberation, mulling for months Blyden’s job offer. He had put 
on hold a promising legal career and stepped down from a prominent New York pastorate just to 
take this job in Liberia. What ultimately swayed his decision was nothing the country possessed 
at the moment but its possibilities for the future.
67
 “While I was not moved by the missionary 
spirit in going to Liberia,” he confessed, “I am sure that I went because I felt that I could do more 
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good there than in the United States.”68 His goodwill evaporated soon after he had landed in 
Monrovia. 
Stewart’s opposition to Blyden arose from a sense of betrayal. After finding Stewart slow 
in relocating, Blyden scorched him to New York, all while remaining publicly cordial. The 
backstabbing dismayed Stewart, who poked, “My knowledge of the field was confined to 
representations; but things seen are different from things heard of.”69 A dissembling Blyden was 
at the top of his list. Once stoked, Blyden’s disdain for Browne and Stewart did not waver. He 
censured the pair in unequivocal terms: 
These Professors do not understand things here and they will not wait to see before 
proceeding with rash sayings and doings which excite the ill-will of the people. They 
have the inexperience and immaturity of youth and imperfect training. They have been 
accustomed only to obey white men, and Pharoah [sic] must speak before they will 
listen.
70
 
 
They were juvenile and slavish, and Blyden wanted them fired. Since he could not terminate 
them outright, he began to sow seeds of discord, hoping that public sentiment would turn against 
the pair. The imbroglio expanded as key political figures in the fledgling country took sides. As 
Stewart noted, “Even Gen’l Sherman of the gov’t was with us, for Dr. Blyden then antagonized 
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him by attempting to array the mulattoes against the blacks, an old game of his.”71 For Americo-
Liberians, Blyden’s racialism was wearing thin. 
Blyden eventually got what he wanted when the two men returned to the U.S. 
disillusioned.
72
 But the fighting with colleagues over relocation, regrettably, had taken its toll. 
Blyden lost the power struggle in 1885 when the Trustees of the Donations for Education in 
Liberia voted on 19 March 1885 to fire him from the college presidency and on 29 October 1885 
to strip him of his agent status.
73
 An appeal on his behalf failed, too, when the Boston Board 
declined to rehire him.
74
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Liberia College on the Brink 
Disaster struck the same year when the New York State Colonization Society voted 
unanimously to cut off all funds to the school until the instability and location dispute had been 
resolved.
75
 Liberians were left scrambling to raise the necessary funds on their own. But the 
economic downturn in the mid-1880s made it difficult. After seven months visiting American 
philanthropists, Antero Barboza, whose wife ran a girls’ school,76 reported he had only managed 
to scrape together a measly $200 in donations, a mere tenth of the monies needed.
77
 By 1888 
college trustees capitulated, expressing their willingness to transfer the college to the interior, 
provided that the society would pay the hefty moving costs, of course. Bowing to the society’s 
wishes for “mechanical industries,” the trustees proposed opening a room or “cheaply 
constructed out building” so that “some skilful [sic] workman might be employed to teach the 
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boys the use of the simple tools.”78 And in an effort to make the college self-sustaining, the 
trustees approved the planting of cash crops on property adjoining the college.
79
 
Suspension of the college, however, did create a silver lining, namely a groundswell of 
public support and a drive for state funding. As one executive committee member of the college 
enthused, “The people of Liberia are displaying a lively interest in the College and there is a 
widespread anxiety to see it resume operations at an early day.”80 Moreover, the national 
legislature appropriated $1,500 in scholarships for deserving students. Even so, the trustee 
warned the society to “open the College as soon as possible lest they [students] become 
discouraged and go home which would have a very bad effect on the public mind and would 
probably lead the Legislature to resend it said appropriation.”81 By 1891 the New York State 
Colonization Society was ready to give Liberia College another try. 
 
Omar Cook and Relocation: Part II 
The society hired Orator Cook in 1891 to spearhead industrial education at the college. A 
white agent for the New York State Colonizationist Society, the new departmental head was also 
an internationally renowned botanist whose enduring legacy lay in coining the term speciation. 
Unfortunately, Cook shared a similar flaw to Blyden in that he was rarely present, finding 
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scientific investigation much more enjoyable than teaching.
82
 As one trustee complained, “O. F. 
Cook was appointed in the U.S.A. and sent out as Fulton Professor to teach the Natural Science 
and to be the Principal of the Industrial Annex[,] a new department desired by the N.Y.S.C.S. He 
has not yet entered upon his duties.”83 Of course, Cook had his own take on the matter, advising, 
“Things are so far gone that attempting to teach would be foolish, to say the least. The trustees 
seem inclined to treat the whole matter as a private perquisite and this is especially the attitude of 
the President.”84 Cook’s superciliousness may have derived from feeling slighted at the onset. 
Relations were rocky. Cook’s arrival in Monrovia got off to an inauspicious start when 
no one from the college showed up to welcome him. The snub left trustee Charles King 
scrambling to soothe any hurt feelings. Professing ignorance of Cook’s departure date from 
America, King apologized for the “embarrassment” and assured King of faculty support because 
“we recognize the importance of combining Physical with intellectual training thus affording our 
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youth an opportunity to develop a useful manhood in his separate spheres of life.”85 But 
privately, King and his colleagues were already souring on Cook. At an executive committee 
meeting three days later, the trustees of Liberia College complained that “professor Cook failed 
even to acknowledge a letter from our Executive Committee given assurances of a wish to 
cooperate with him in the establishment of the Industrial annex to the College”—a grievance 
they wanted conveyed to the unresponsive “Boards in the US (especially the Boston Board 
recognised by our charter).”86 The trustees’ chagrin not only lay in Cook’s unaccountability—
due in part to the recognition that his pay and mandate came from New York and Boston rather 
than Monrovia—but also stemmed from  the U.S. boards’ failure to notify the trustees of their 
plans in advance. In the trustees’ eyes, U.S. colonizationists had foisted Cook upon them. So 
even as trustees iterated their dutiful support for industrial education, they chafed at the heavy 
handed manner in which it was being implemented. 
In time, disaffection grew to be open and mutual. Appalled by the “maladroitness” 
around him, Cook threatened to resign his college post before a full school year had passed.
87
 He 
had been slated to teach natural science and create the industrial department, but up to then his 
travels had prevented him from doing so. In the mid-nineties the New York State Colonization 
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Society spent $7,000 to fund his expeditions into the interior. While costly, they generated 
widespread publicity for the society and tied colonization and emigration to the larger effort of 
commercial development exploration. Cook profited handsomely, too, drawing a salary and a 
$250 bonus for a “satisfactory” report of his expedition.88 
His three-volume report ended up being more than suitable, as it stirred interest on a 
number of levels. It raised the profile of the colonization societies, which bankrolled his 
expedition and published his findings. It whetted Westerners’ hunger to know more about the 
“Dark Continent” and its “lost savages.” It advanced natural and social scientists’ research by 
chronicling different tribal customs and by describing the terrain, climate, and geography of the 
interior. And it aided prospective African American emigrants in deciding whether to take the 
calculated risk of relocating. 
 For the last audience, Cook’s agricultural experiment drew considerable interest.89 On 
orders from the society, Cook had started a plantation at Mount Coffee, Liberia, designed to 
serve as “model farm, industrial school, and settlement.”90 Like Hampton and Tuskegee, Liberia 
College aspired to build its own self-sufficient farm. The payoff was potentially huge. The hope 
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was that one day the Mount Coffee plantation would underwrite the college, “effect a properly 
conducted colonization movement,” and “consummat[e]” and “bring these [stateside 
philanthropic] societies into complete harmony.”91 A vocal supporter of Hampton, Cook sought 
the endorsement of its president, Dr. Hollis Burke Frissell, who Cook claimed stood poised to 
“give us most valuable assistance in getting the best negro assistants and in reaching the public 
interested in this and kindred matters.”92 An industrial “school” acted, then, as a means to 
stimulate renewed interest in emigration. 
 For all its benefits, industrial education had its drawbacks—ones that circumscribed 
Liberian choices even as they expanded their options. Part of the disadvantage went beyond 
dollars and cents. While colonizationist-funded education engendered a natural sense of personal 
gratitude, it could devolve into an unhealthy dependence by emigrationists, whose personal 
loyalties to their white sponsors could cloud their judgment. When disagreements arose, 
Americo-Liberians were often reluctant to criticize their benefactors, many of whom they 
regarded as their mentors and even confessors. As Alfred King expressed, “I have the utmost 
respect for your Soc. I was educated by it. And in later years Dr. Pinney gave me great insight 
into the true aims of the institution in Liberia. I know I am in accord with them. Perhaps, I have 
not impressed you.”93 The desire to please could lead to obsequious professions of loyalty and 
admiration. Even Blyden had appealed to the definitive authority of the society, explaining, 
“They [dissenting Negro professors] have been accustomed only to obey white men, and Pharoah 
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[sic] must speak before they will listen. I hope that Pharoah [sic] will speak with no uncertain 
utterance. I hope that you will uphold the hands of the College authorities here in the great work 
before us.”94 Blyden’s deference is understandable to a degree. By charter and precedent, 
Liberian administrators possessed limited control, which the U.S. societies could override by the 
mere threat of withholding funds. And yet, Blyden’s petition to the U.S. boards to resolve 
interpersonal conflicts did little to establish the “natural instincts” he so adamantly expounded. 
Bereft of real authority, he did what his predecessors and successors did: he looked to Boston 
and New York for his marching orders. 
 
Negotiation and Resistance at Cape Mesurado 
At the same time, beneath the obligatory oaths of loyalty, Liberian educators attempted to 
chip out their own autonomous niches. Distance proved both a curse and blessing in doing so. 
On the downside, without a reliable transatlantic telegraph exchange in Liberia, lapses 
between correspondence and reply could be excruciatingly slow. Predictably, the Boston-based 
Trustees of Donations for Education in Liberia suffered from a dearth of information on Liberia 
College. The following excerpt exemplifies the tenuous communication between America and 
Africa: 
Surprise is expressed that eighteen months should have elapsed since the passage of 
certain amendments to the act of incorporation of Liberia College, at the instance of the 
New York and Boston Boards, without anything having been done towards the repair of 
the College building, and asking for information upon that point: and as to the 
employment of a suitable corps of instructors and the putting of the Institution in working 
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order. This Board has not heard from President Cook since his last departure from this 
country.
95
  
 
Since sending an inquiry in February 1894 to the college president, the Boston board had not yet 
heard back from him by September, seven months having passed. His silence aroused enough 
suspicion to the extent that “it was stated to him that the Board would be very glad to learn from 
him what, in particular, induced his return to this country [United States] at this time and what he 
might be accomplishing in the interest of the College.”96 The New York State Colonization 
Society fared little better. Its correspondence secretary wrote with some exasperation, “There has 
been no communication of interest from the Board of Managers at Monrovia. One has recently 
been received asking for appropriations for salaries for Professors and teachers, but no list of 
scholars, or statement of the work they were doing was made.”97 
Rivalries could exacerbate miscommunication. The U.S. societies and Liberia College 
trustees often jockeyed for control of the school, and relations could be frosty. The New York 
board protected its own information with territorial possessiveness, especially when it came to 
monies. For instance, in 1895 the society’s secretary and treasurer, Charles Geyer, typed a curt 
communiqué to the college trustees, remonstrating, “The Society resents the manner of the 
Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees of Liberia College in seeking the information 
asked and declines to furnish it to them. The funds are held for the Board of Trustees of Liberia 
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College and this Society is in frequent communication with them and has furnished, within a 
recent period, full particulars of the trust funds held and the accrued income. This society prefers 
to conduct its business and correspondence direct [sic] with the parties interested and they may 
as well understand it now as at some future time.”98 After a two-day cooling off period, Geyer 
eventually sent the requested information, but only as “a personal favor.”99 
Prolonged silence in America could lead to operational paralysis in Liberia, such as when 
one Liberia College trustee complained of being “in the dark” and without requisite advice or 
authorization to act.
100
 The school’s board of trustees depended on its American sponsors for 
guidance, primarily because they controlled the purse strings for scholarships, branch sites, and a 
proposed relocation of the college. Correspondence on these matters would last months until the 
beginning of the next school year, when it would start all over again. 
Domestic correspondence between the two U.S. boards also reveals a mixture of 
confusion and negotiation. In an 1892 letter to New York, the Boston Board president, J. S. 
Ropes, admitted to being “somewhat startled and much puzzled” by Liberia College’s trustees’ 
claim to have submitted annual reports the last two years.
101
 He wondered whether they regarded 
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their last letter to Boston to constitute a report; he clearly did not consider a list of professor 
names and student numbers to be a full accounting.
102
 
On the upside, the slow correspondence cycle enabled Liberians the occasional freedom 
to force a society into making crunch-time decisions favorable to their liking. Presidential 
succession at the college in 1892 provided them one such opening. In the eyes of both Boston 
and New York, the trustees had exhibited chutzpah in naming their own college president. They 
had passed over New York and Boston’s preferred candidate on the grounds that he had declined 
the office. Furthermore, they lobbied for their own choice, Garretson Gibson, who needed the 
U.S. boards’ stamp of approval. More precisely, he needed the salary that only the Americans 
could authorize. Labeling Gibson a “tool,” Ropes recommended $500 be earmarked for Gibson’s 
annual pay—a paltry figure considering that Blyden had received 2½ times this salary when 
serving as the college president a decade earlier and that Cook currently earned four times this 
amount as an appointed professor.
103
 Because Gibson was not the top pick of the U.S. boards,  
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Gibson found he had little initial support, financial or otherwise, in America.
104
  
Still, the trustees had outmaneuvered their American sponsors. An annoyed yet resigned 
Ropes was ready to acquiesce, especially since no other candidate appeared readily available in 
the necessary timeframe. He also detected a strategic benefit in affixing his imprimatur to the 
matter, namely the chance to accrue leverage. As he confided to New York, “I think we are much 
more likely to gain influence with the trustees in this way [approving Gibson’s appointment] 
than in any other which occurs to me.”105 He wanted to delay a decision, though, until Cook had 
reported back to New York, when he hoped a clearer picture would emerge.
106
 
Ropes waited nearly four months before communicating with Gibson, penning a 
diplomatic yet subtle reminder of who was in charge. Ropes held out the possibility of granting 
aid “to the utmost of our power” should Gibson meet certain demands and criteria. He was to be 
“a thoroughly honest, disinterested, efficient, and fearless manager.” Above all, he had to be a 
reliable and continual source of information. Noting the “little correspondence between us” in 
years past—that is, the lack of proper communication from the college trustees—Ropes refused 
“wasting further amounts upon this [college] or any other object” until 
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informed of the actual state of affairs, and to know definitely the plans and intentions of 
the Trustees and the method in which they propose to carry them out. If you can supply 
this deficiency, and give us a clear and definite plan of your future arrangements for 
carrying out the work of education in Liberia you will not only have our hearty support, 
but will do yourself and your colleagues much honor by this good work and, as I fully 
believe, awaken much interest and obtain much help from this country.
107
 
 
Finally, he pressed Gibson for “full information respecting the industrial department which it is 
so desirable to establish” because “the more fully you can give us the facts and your views the 
better will our Board be pleased.”108 Of course, the implication was that Ropes was dissatisfied 
with the trustees and would continue to withhold “hearty support” until he had been appeased. 
From the above statements, we can see that Ropes viewed the job in Monrovia to be that 
of managing and executing the policies established in Boston and New York. He wrote with the 
self-assurance of knowing that he held veto power over anyone the college wished to hire. Yet 
Ropes was also confronting the limits of his authority. The influence of the Boston-based 
Trustees of Donations for Education in Liberia—which had peaked in the late fifties and early 
sixties—had waned in direct proportion to their decreased levels of financial support to the 
college. By the 1890s the New York State Colonization Society had surpassed the Boston board 
in contribution levels. So while Ropes attempted to dictate terms to Gibson, he had to work 
behind the scenes to ensure that Boston and New York maintained a united front before 
Monrovia. For his part, Gibson had only to supply the requisite obeisance and wait until the 
calendar year forced Ropes’s hand. In this skirmish at least, Gibson and the college trustees had 
won a minor but important concession. 
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Curriculum counted as another area of success for Liberian educators, whose prescribed 
course of study generated little opposition from either Boston or New York. Collegians studied 
such traditional subjects as grammar, history, geography, algebra, arithmetic, natural science, 
and human anatomy and physiology. At least one female instructor ordered French and music 
textbooks, with the specific request that sheet music include secular in addition to sacred 
numbers. Maps, slates, pencils, crayons, blackboards, and an organ rounded out her wish list.
109
 
Because the above were intended for the female department of Liberia College, the omissions are 
noteworthy. Women collegians did not follow a classical track of study, which included learning 
ancient languages like Greek and Latin—foundational courses for the ministry. In contrast, 
Crummell had previously outlined an ideal ministerial track that included Greek, rhetoric, and 
philosophy for clergy candidates.
110
 Neither did women train in law, business, or Arabic—fields 
that lent themselves to trade, governance, and diplomacy. Remarkable was the breadth of study, 
however. Provided they could gain admittance, secure funding, and procure the requisite 
textbooks—a luxury afforded to no more than two dozen—women in Liberia had access to a 
broad, liberal arts education that would have been universally envied. At the same time, the 
depth did not rival that of the men’s course of study. Male students took more algebra and 
science courses that included botany, chemistry, and astronomy. Their training extended to 
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learning ethics (i.e. moral philosophy) and current events—necessary elements in becoming 
paragons of faith and commerce. 
In early 1900 Garretson Gibson was the acting college president, before assuming the 
national presidency later that same year.
111
 His annual textbook order in 1900 is an ideal starting 
point for analysis because the order originated from the State Department, thereby allowing for 
the necessary funds to purchase a comprehensive booklist.
112
 It reveals an interesting breakdown: 
Category No. of 
Books 
Percent 
Geography 36 5.5% 
History 36 5.5% 
Mathematics 96 14.8% 
Music 24 3.7% 
Periodicals 4 .6% 
Political Science 24 3.7% 
Science 156 24.0% 
Theology and Moral Philosophy 108 16.6% 
English books 60 9.2% 
French books 14 2.2% 
Greek books 62 9.5% 
Latin books 28 4.3% 
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Spanish books 2 .3% 
    Table 3. Statistical breakdown of textbook order in 1900. 
 
 
From the book list, one can find an intriguing mix of classical education and a modern liberal 
arts education at work in Liberia College’s curriculum, which achieves an approximate balance 
between the sciences and the humanities. Roughly, 45 percent of the books fall into math and the 
sciences; 25 percent cover the languages; 15 percent treat theology and philosophy; 10 percent 
deal with the historical; and 5 percent address the arts.
113
 Furthermore, omissions are noticeable 
in law, logic, rhetoric, medicine, literature, and “industrial” education.114 With Blyden no longer 
in the picture, Arabic language textbooks were absent from the curriculum order. Mechanical 
studies had its own challenges. Throughout the nineties, educators on both sides of the Atlantic 
had touted the virtues of industrial education, even taking the initial steps to create an industrial 
department at the school. Cook had intended Mount Coffee to be the centerpiece for this venture, 
but the farm had languished to such a degree that he eventually recommended the New York 
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State Colonization Society seize control from the college.
115
 The absence of textbooks does not 
signal that Liberian educators had devalued industrial education, but the lack of industrial 
equipment purchases does hint that administrators had diminished its primacy by 1900. No doubt 
expenses played a role, as startup costs for a coffee plantation required a long-term financial 
commitment of at least seven years. 
 
The Problem of Americo Aspirations 
 Blyden came to prioritize native education in part due to the outsized ambitions of 
Americo-Liberian students. While the goal was noble—students bidding to craft their own 
educational opportunities abroad—Blyden feared professional opportunities would seduce 
students to abandon Liberia in favor of more lucrative, comfortable vocations in England or 
America. The New York State Colonization Society offered a limited number scholarships to 
worthy candidates. The requirements were stringent: “a young man of sound health, of good 
scholarship and of consistent piety” who maintained good grades, church membership, and an 
unswerving commitment to labor in Africa.
116
 Reviewers considered his parentage, academic and 
pastoral references, and most importantly, the likelihood that he would keep his word and return 
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to Africa upon finishing his matriculation. Although unstated, the understanding was that the 
scholarship recipient would remain single, because sending a family to Liberia raised the costs 
exponentially as well as the chance of the family’s returning to America because of low pay or 
poor living conditions.
117
 
Blyden did not have to look farther than Thomas Sherman, who balked at returning to 
Liberia after a college stint in America. “After having taken things in consideration and due 
deliberation,” Sherman announced, “I do hereby decide not to return immediately” and “to make 
my departure to England this fall.”118 He faced an uphill battle to convince his colonization 
sponsors, though, who had refused his earlier request to go to Germany or England and doubted 
his claim that “I am perfectly willing to leave this land any day, I haven’t anything to prevent 
me, nor, am I enchanted by the grandeur of America, nor do I desire to remain here any longer, I 
wish it was so that I could return immediately.”119 Despite his professions of loyalty, the New 
York State Colonization Society pulled his funding and forced a chastened Sherman to return 
home. 
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A medical student, Cornelius McKane, ran into the same stonewall when he petitioned to 
extend his stay abroad.
120
 On the verge of earning his M.D. at the University of Vermont, he 
made his strongest case for postponing a return to Liberia: “I have a thorough theoretical course 
in medicine but lack clinical experience. Public prejudices prevent my entering any of the large 
hospitals in the country. Will not the society aid me to obtain two courses at the University of 
Edinburgh that I might become a credit to them and a blessing to any people in Africa[?] It 
seems sad for one to return home now without the polish I need to make one a real light in 
Africa—I hope you will overlook my eagerness and ambition . . . .”121 Obviously the board did 
not, because a follow-up letter left the Liberian reduced to pleading, “I go to London for no 
person [sic] aggrandizement . . . I ask you to give me a chance.”122 The supplicant turned 
petulant after receiving a firm no, remonstrating, “I cannot see how I can prudently accept the 
Society’s offer to return immediately to Liberia. You know my plans. To return to Liberia 
without any definite work is to impede my progress and prevent my usefulness. As a mere 
practitioner of medicine I can do Liberia but little good. . . . I have prepared myself to go to 
London to accomplish the work I have planned.”123 For all their faults, Liberian educators and 
missionaries did often share a sense of sacrifice, which some of their protégés struggled to 
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emulate, at least to the standard set by their predecessors. Students like McKane came under 
scrutiny when they requested more resources and opportunities than their benefactors had 
originally intended for them. McKane’s request for monies to buy medical books, instruments, 
and medicines—while perfectly logical—did little to endear him to his sponsors, who considered 
his petition “out of line.”124 His impending marriage to a fellow medical student did not help 
either. In the end, McKane deserted Liberia, moving to Savannah, Georgia, a half decade later. 
In a six-page, handwritten letter, he confided his ongoing resentment at the past treatment by 
Liberia’s educational leaders. Whether “from ignorance viciousness blinded prejudice or 
jealousy” they mounted “vigorous and persistent opposition . . . in a sly underhanded way.” 
Much to his chagrin, they rejected the establishment of a college medical department he 
proposed and rebuffed his offer to help reorganize the school. Only one man living in Liberia he 
deemed serious about education, and he was a white agent of the American Colonization Society. 
As a result, McKane grew as disillusioned as Blyden in concluding, “The aboriginal African will 
redeem his own country” because “he is better fitted by nature and circumstances.” In this sense, 
he is better positioned than the American Negro, “a semibarbourous [sic] race recently merged 
[sic] from heathenism and slavery” that still suffered from “the same peculiarities and 
perversions from the South.” This was the real “Negro problem” that McKane believed would 
take more than a century of “evolution” to eradicate. So, like Crummell, McKane decided to 
uproot to America, where his “labors would be welcomed and appreciated.”125 
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Conclusion 
At the turn of the century, Liberia College was in transition. It no longer followed 
Blyden’s vision for the school. In the 1860s Blyden had dreamt Liberia College would be the 
educational epicenter of Africa, where students would obtain a classical education founded upon 
Western principles. By the 1880s Blyden had altered his dream to the point of utilizing Liberia 
College as a civilizing vehicle that would help build an intellectual mecca dedicated to 
sociopolitical and cultural Africanity. Neither dream came true by the advent of the twentieth 
century because too few people shared his vision. Liberian educators splintered into factions that 
sapped morale and undermined operations. Fractious infighting drove away promising scholars 
and left administrators lamenting what might have been. Without solidarity, Liberian trustees had 
little chance of wresting control of the college away from U.S. colonizationists. Liberians 
struggled to balance deference with their bid for institutional autonomy. Sometimes, individual 
professors and administrators attempted to manipulate the U.S. boards for their own devices. 
Blyden himself was not above enlisting the support of the U.S. boards when disputing fellow 
Liberians. Even when Americo-Liberians resisted pressure from the boards, dependence on 
American funds prevented any public confrontation or complete rupture. Each side needed one 
another. Liberians needed the U.S. boards for revenue and arbitration, while colonizationists 
needed the Liberians for publicity and implementation of their goals. That did not prevent the 
parties from trying to co-opt each other. Internal rivalries only worsened relations, leading some 
disillusioned professors to abandon the country altogether and the U.S. boards to withhold 
critical information sometimes from the other. The dysfunction and distance guaranteed inertia, 
confusion, and ineptitude. In the morass that was Liberia College, its survival represented a 
minor miracle. And yet mere existence was a hollow victory when compared to its lofty aims in 
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1862. The inability to transcend philosophical and political differences meant that completing 
Blyden’s overarching dream of an indigent, independent education in Africa would have to wait 
for another century. 
Part of the hurdle was Blyden himself. His racialism isolated him, turning enemies and 
even allies against him. Beyond such deleterious effects, it suffered from internal defect. While 
he espoused racialism, his identity and educational philosophy were self-consciously constituted, 
not derived from an organic connection with primordial sources. That is, his racialist notions 
resulted from social experience and political practice. He arrived at racial instincts not from 
within but from without. Yet he was unwilling to acknowledge extrinsic causes behind his or his 
enemies’ motivations. Americo-Liberians were, in essence, irredeemable. Their opposition to his 
agenda simply proved their damned state. In his estimation, decades if not centuries would have 
to transpire before their biological intermixture could be reversed. In the interim, he grew 
convinced that higher education was being wasted on “tainted” Americo-Liberians. 
The pedagogical arc of Liberia College further compounded Blyden’s problems. Early 
on, educators conceived Liberia College along Western lines. It was tradition defined in 
“classical” terms. By the 1880s Blyden desired an education that was culturally and 
sociohistorically particular. It was tradition derived from indigenous sources. In the 1890s 
industrial education served as an adulterated vision that would rally all sides together. It was 
tradition under the name of innovation. Blyden was ready to combine all three approaches, but 
by the turn of the century, his vision had been gutted. Educators turned to either classical or 
industrial approaches, eschewing African norms and thereby purging natural “race feelings” in 
the process. 
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The final flaw grew out of Blyden’s inability to secure institutional control of Liberia 
College. Throughout his career, he never had full freedom to enact his educational vision. As 
Wilson Moses noted, educators like Crummell held a contradictory blend of beliefs: political 
black nationalism, Victorian civilizationism, and Anglocentric elitism.
126
 At Liberia College 
Blyden tried to work out a consistent philosophy, one that incorporated African languages, 
religions, and customs into his notion of “African nationality.” But this meant modifying or 
jettisoning the last two tenets of civilizationism and EuroAmericophilia. The problem was that 
while he rejected white superintendence in principle, he accepted it in practice. This habit 
extended outside his college interactions with the Boston and New York boards. For instance, he 
praised the rule of King Leopold in the Belgian protectorate of the Congo, preferring to see it as 
an instrument for imposing peace and civilization. In other words, he saw EuroAmerican 
intervention as a means to forging national and institutional unity. This enigmatic view makes 
sense when realizing that Blyden accepted half steps as temporary solutions because of his 
racialist convictions. He was willing to tolerate white control and supervision for decades 
because he was confident that, in the end, whites could not endure the African climate and would 
die out or move away of their own accord. Likewise in the 1880s he viewed Islam and its 
attendant culture as a half measure that would someday lead to Christian redemptionism of 
Africa. And yet the underlying tension remained: Blyden was still utilizing Western-styled 
elitism and civilizationism to effect black nationalism. Even when he extrapolated a pure, 
untainted classical or Christian method, he needed white capital and actors to aid his efforts. 
When Americo-Liberians proved unworthy for the job, he had nowhere else to turn. Although he 
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valorized “pure Africans” his ethnoeducation required the active abetting of white 
colonizationists to oversee uneducated Negroes and non-instinctive mulattoes. Accepting this 
particular half measure meant an indefinite postponement of Blyden’s dreams for Liberia 
College—one that, to his dismay, he could neither rush nor rectify during his lifetime. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
“Neither the Church of God, nor civilization will ever prosper in these regions”: 
Black Missionaries’ Battles Over Faith and Fealty in Liberia 
 
 
“Foreign missions” in Liberia was a collectivizing project that intended to unite African 
American emigrants and West African natives under the auspices of “black nationality.” White 
and black missionaries labored to bind the populace together with an evangelical nationalism that 
emphasized the spiritual, social, and material benefits of Christian conversion. If missions was a 
nationalizing endeavor, it was also a race-defining project through which missionaries developed 
and deployed their ideas about race. In Liberia, missionaries of all stripes—Caucasian, African 
American, and African—struggled to work out different and often competing notions of what 
race meant. In short, missions became a site for contestation, for challenging prevalent 
conceptions of race and reformulating it in a place where blacks were now the reigning majority. 
Racial friction, though, soon gave way to cultural disputes and ethnocentric strife. By the first 
decade of the twentieth century, the banner of “black nationality” was in tatters, unthreaded by 
natives’ disaffection with the resulting inequality evident in their daily lives. 
Through their letters back to their home mission board, Episcopal missionaries revealed 
the uneven power relations between whites, black “Liberians,” and natives. The parties waged 
contentious battles over crucial issues of congregational authority, lay membership, and 
ecclesiastical direction. The nature of Christianity further muddied the waters, with missionaries 
wrestling over the “core” of the gospel message. Oftentimes, missionaries attached cultural 
judgments to the faith they preached. Moreover, denominational allegiance sometimes carried 
political ramifications, which pitted missionaries against the unconverted if not each other. The 
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story of Episcopalian missions in the mid-nineteenth century, at times, was an ugly battle for 
control and influence. 
A paramount concern in the entire exercise is the question of culture. How did 
missionaries account for the different cultural sensibilities in the interior? Was Christianity to be 
deculturative, accretive, or syncretistic? Answering these questions led missionaries to take 
divergent paths and elevated seemingly petty arguments to a series of perpetual crises. The 
inability to settle the role of culture, ultimately, made it impossible to unify Liberia on the basis 
of a common racial identity and destiny. The quest for racial harmony proved not just elusive to 
attain but illusory in its promise of a shared national identity. 
 
Modest Beginnings 
In the mid-1850s the Protestant Episcopal Church deployed missionaries, both black and 
white, to Liberia in an effort to gain a toehold in the country. During this time period, Baptists, 
Methodists, and Presbyterians were the other major denominations active in the region. The two 
earliest and most prominent missionaries—Lott Carey (Baptist) and Daniel Coker (AME)—both 
sailed to Liberia in 1821. This chapter focuses on Episcopalian missions because of the unique 
racial composition of its missionary force. Unlike the Presbyterians, Southern Baptists, or 
African Methodists—almost all of whose missionaries were black1—the Episcopal Church 
employed Caucasians, African Americans, and Africans in more equitable proportions. While 
blacks were in the majority, a handful of white Episcopalians went on to have distinguished 
careers in Liberia. In seeking to collaborate, these missionaries provide a window into the 
successes and failures of US missionary activity on the western coast of Africa. Although it is 
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easy to characterize their limitations as byproducts of their culture, this chapter argues that 
proselytizing Episcopalians struggled hard to break free of societal norms in order to disseminate 
the Christian Gospel. 
The same year that Coker and Carey landed in Liberia, at its general convention in 
Philadelphia the Protestant Episcopal Church created the Domestic and Foreign Missionary 
Society to propagate the Gospel and promote the denomination in the United States and abroad. 
The work in West Africa was daunting, with seven hundred thousand natives within Liberia’s 
colonial borders. Even if the society were to build a half dozen mission posts, they would reach 
only an estimated fifteen hundred natives. And it had difficulty in establishing just one mission 
station. The society’s formation did not translate into fieldwork immediately, because the church 
found funds scarce and missionaries reluctant to go to Africa. The most promising candidate was 
Ephraim Bacon, the Liberian agent for the American Colonization Society. He and his wife spent 
months on deputation, raising financial support throughout the eastern United States. After 
collecting eighteen hundred dollars and packing their belongings, the Bacons learned that the 
ACS refused them passage to Liberia, probably in retaliation for Ephraim’s resigning his position 
with the ACS in order to devote his efforts fulltime to ministry. Over the next fifteen years, 
another half dozen candidates failed to pan out, leaving the church stymied in its outreach to 
Africa. 
The introduction of Episcopal missionaries to Liberia, ironically, came about without the 
direct efforts of the parent society. Members of St. James Church in Monrovia wished to form a 
religious society to establish a school in the interior. Since they wanted to affiliate with the 
Episcopal Church, the society adopted its lay reader, James M. Thompson, as its first official 
missionary. Thompson had emigrated as a free black from Connecticut, and together with his 
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wife in 1836 he opened a mission school at Mount Vaughan. Later known as Hoffman Institute, 
the school initially enrolled seven children, five boys and two girls. Although having two official 
missionaries in place, the Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society deemed it unwise to leave 
the operation entirely in the hands of colonists. The society appointed a white missionary, 
Thomas S. Savage, to oversee the fledgling mission outpost in Liberia. In a move repeated more 
than once, Savage received the bulk of the credit for opening the Mount Vaughan post. Disease 
soon devastated the mission, taking the lives of both James Thompson and Savage’s wife Susan. 
Thompson’s widow continued to teach at the school for thirty years; but Savage, with his 
medical training, made his name as a naturalist before returning to the United States in 1847. By 
then, his services to the Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society were no longer needed, 
because it had retained a new white supervisor, one who would shape Episcopal missions in 
Liberia for the next third of a century.
2
 
 
John Payne and the Question of Race 
John Payne was a white antiracist who thought mission work provided the governance 
model for Liberians to emulate. He had arrived a year after Savage and gradually consolidated 
power over a thirty-year career. Born in Virginia, he landed in Africa in 1837, energetic and 
eager to establish the Episcopalian Church in Liberia. He was both vigorous and disciplined, 
maintaining a rigorous work schedule. According to his own estimates, he preached 312 times a 
year, taught students on a daily basis, and translated two hours every morning. During his career 
there, he translated a significant amount: the Gospel of Mark, Prayer Book, and school books 
into the Grebo language. Payne was also fearless. After the Greboes went to war with Liberian 
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colonists in 1843, he was forced to take his family and flee for safety.
3
 But as soon as the 
fighting subsided, he returned to the Cavalla station in order to continue his work. Security was 
never a guarantee, as 1845 witnessed more than a hundred casualties, entire villages razed, and 
mission stations vandalized. To compound the problem, tropical disease killed or impaired the 
missionary force until Payne was the last ordained missionary who remained. By default, he 
became the de facto leader and over the next two decades, oversaw the creation of scores of 
churches and village schools in the interior.
4
 
Payne was typical of many white missionaries laboring during the mid-century. He had 
faith in black amelioration and eschewed the notion that Africans were innately deficient in 
intellect. He envisioned the day when native converts would be able to lead and sustain their own 
religious and social institutions. He was a fervent believer that the Christian gospel would effect 
a prosperous, civilized population, given enough time. For Payne, the maturation process would 
take scores of years before natives could responsibly handle their own affairs. In 1848 Payne 
observed “we find, in the history of modern Missions and of the Church, that the process of 
rendering Christianity self-sustaining in any heathen country, has been the work, not of a few 
years, but of generations.” After a decade in the field, he reported finding three natives, at most, 
who were fit enough to conduct ministry. His pupils learned well enough, but intellectual 
capabilities masked “superstition, the moral weakness of infancy, the fickleness of childhood, the 
vanity of youth.” The stench of degradation clung to whole communities, and years would have 
to pass for them to climb out of “the depths.” By extension, Payne doubted whether African 
American missionaries, or “colonist missionaries” as he called them, could do much good either. 
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Only a generation ahead of “the Heathen” they would accomplish little on the mission field, he 
believed.
5
 
Experience caused Payne to revise his opinions, though. White missionaries were hard to 
recruit, and many who came left soon thereafter, overcome by debilitating tropical diseases. 
Because of climate and contact with Christian civilization, Americo-African colonists had the 
best chance of reaching the heathen, Payne concluded. The establishment of a functioning 
government in Monrovia impressed him, and if “Colonists already fill every civil office in 
Liberia, the higher ones, most ably; why should they not also, in time, fill all in the Church?”6 
Although swift development of their “self-growing” character surprised him, he embraced the 
idea of a church-state alliance, one that would end the regional slave trade, curb tribal warfare, 
and promote lawful commerce. Like Sierra Leone, Liberia could utilize “good government and a 
strong missionary influence” to effect “rapid temporal and spiritual improvement.”7 All that was 
needed now was the right ally. 
 The idea of laboring with an equal, in reality, still resided in the distant future. While 
admiring the rapid ascent of colonists, Payne noted: “Obviously, however, they still need the 
helping hand of their more favored American brethren to develop and perfect their social, 
intellectual, and political constitution.” Only under “steady Christian influence by a competent 
agency” could Liberians perform effective, efficient outreach to “the most ignorant, degraded, 
and wicked child, ever found in a civilized land.”8 Payne demonstrated this viewpoint by 
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assuming the title of “Senior Missionary.” Although the rank could smack of self-
aggrandizement, to Payne it merely reflected the de facto hierarchy that existed in the present 
condition. With few exceptions, natives were fit only to be assistants, and colonist missionaries 
could succeed presumably with the “right direction.” The second group needed proper training 
and correct superintendence. His promotion in 1851 to Missionary Bishop at Cape Palmas and 
Parts Adjacent, no doubt, validated Payne’s sense of self-importance and leadership style.9 
Fourteen years after coming to West Africa, Payne had entrenched himself as the nation’s top 
Episcopalian leader. His next task would be to find and mentor worthy disciples to carry out his 
agenda. 
 
Eli Stokes and the Racial Challenge 
Payne had already failed in his first attempt. In 1850 he had contacted Eli Worthington 
Stokes, a newly arrived African American from Rhode Island.
10
 Stokes was an astute and 
talented individual who dreamed of one day gaining his own see. He had gotten his ministerial 
start in Baltimore, one of only two colored pastors in the city (his brother being the other). 
Ordained in 1843, he moved on to organize a church in New Haven, Connecticut, where he 
stayed until elevated to the priesthood two year later.
11
 Bishop John Henshaw of the Rhode 
Island diocese—who had been Stokes’s colleague while in Baltimore—invited him to transfer to 
Providence in order to assume the rectorship at Christ Church. Finding the church mired in debt, 
Stokes embarked on a fundraising tour in Europe—a foreshadowing of his future resourcefulness 
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once he arrived in Liberia. Christ Church eventually dissolved and its congregants folded into 
another parish. But by then, Stokes had left for what he hoped would be a larger scope of 
ministry in Africa.
12
 
Getting to the continent had taken some perseverance. Bishop Henshaw expressed doubt 
about Stokes’s health and fitness in 1849, but Stokes remained undeterred and determined to 
go.
13
 He assured the bishop and Foreign Committee that despite his delicate health, he would 
manage just fine once in Africa. And because he already knew Payne beforehand, Stokes felt 
“fully satisfied that we shall freely unite in building up the church of Xt in that now benighted 
land.”14 On the bases of these promises, Henshaw vouched for him and the Foreign Committee 
agreed to send him to Cape Palmas. Before arriving in Liberia—or even being appointed—
Stokes was seizing the initiative, requesting the honor of naming the church at Cape Palmas, 
where he hoped to minister: “I wish the committee would allow me the privilege of naming the 
new church at Cape Palmas—as it is the first. I would much desire that it should be called 
CHRIST church, which I think highly appropriate.”15 The name had special significance for Stokes 
because he had served as the rector for Christ Church in Providence before its untimely 
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dissolution.
16
 Thus he left the U.S. for Liberia with the mind that “I can be of more service there 
than here.”17 His remarks reveal his intention to continue the work that he had already started—
head up an Episcopal church of black congregants. But whereas Stokes thought he would be 
working alongside Payne, Payne was under the impression that Stokes would serve as his 
assistant. 
Relations soured almost immediately. Signs of strain filtered back to the Foreign 
Committee, for Stokes was unusually reticent, declining to report on field matters because “as 
the Rev[eren]d J. A. Payne, has the charge of all, I have thought it prudent to leave the whole 
matter to him. Hence my silence.”18 Meanwhile, Payne was slandering Stokes in private. He 
reported Stokes’s views to be “monstrous” because (ironically) Stokes had a low opinion of 
Africans. Payne accused him of advocating forced conversions and recommended the Foreign 
Committee intervene in order to stop this insubordinate.
19
 Stokes’s main transgression appears to 
have been in failing to consult with Payne, who condemned him for “a want of common sense & 
discretion.” Presumably, Stokes could have avoided committing a series of errors in the field—
preaching ungrammatical sermons, employing an “immoral” teacher, requiring Baptist and 
Methodist congregants to become Episcopalian—if only he had heeded Payne’s direction. 
Stokes’s “ridiculous” and “obnoxious” character led Payne to question whether he was even 
saved. The senior missionary suspected that Stokes’s previous stint at Oxford had precluded a 
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proper view of the church’s role, namely that of humble servanthood.20 Actually, Payne 
oscillated on whom to blame. From the Stokes predicament, he judged American training to be 
“a very superficial education” that ill prepared African Americans for mission work.21 He 
surmised that white benefactors coddled blacks to the extent that they misled their protégés as to 
their true abilities. Blacks, inflated by well-meaning flattery, possessed a distorted understanding 
of their real qualifications. Worse, “their intercourse with their white brethren becomes galling.” 
Payne was especially offended that Stokes would claim that “he was [being] degraded & 
oppressed on account of his color.”22 From Payne’s vantage, Stokes’s overblown sense of self-
dignity caused him to take “any dissatisfaction” of him to “the very extreme of presumption and 
absurdity.” An exasperated Payne questioned whether anyone could please this perpetual 
malcontent. 
By June 1850 the feud was both public and personal. Stokes wrote a lengthy complaint to 
the States, detailing a fractious relationship with Payne. The senior missionary had placed Stokes 
underneath James Dennis, a man for whom Stokes had little respect, labeling him “a discarded 
Methodist preacher.”23 Stokes portrayed Dennis as both capricious and vindictive, leading to a 
rupture between the two. Dennis issued an ultimatum to Payne: either dismiss Stokes or he 
would leave. Payne chose to retain both men. A frustrated Stokes accused Payne of blindsiding 
him by leaving him unwarned and unprepared to handle this “very wicked man” whom Payne 
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had appointed as catechist and school principal.
24
 Payne’s refusal to explain himself further 
infuriated Stokes, who felt deserted and betrayed. That Payne was younger than Stokes probably 
did not help either. 
For his part, Payne viewed Stokes as a test case, and he judged Stokes a disaster.
25
 
Consequently, Payne reverted to his original position that black missionaries be homegrown. 
While he believed colonists reared from birth in Liberia held the advantage of always being free, 
a more important benefit emerged: “Trained up in such circumstances, young men may be fitted 
to labor harmoniously & pleasantly with their white Brethren in Africa, & of with those of the 
For. Committee.”26 Social conditioning was the missing ingredient in emigrant missionaries, and 
Payne was too impatient to wait on their seasoning. Limiting missionaries to domestic Liberians, 
Payne predicted, would mitigate if not obviate the “injury” of learning in the United States. 
Moreover, the policy would ensure they received the “proper influence” by being “under the care 
of a judicious & pious Christian minister.” Payne had his eye on an ideal candidate with “the 
proper character,” Garretson Gibson, though he was still three years away from completing 
sufficient training to assume his own church. In the interim, Payne needed someone to blunt 
Stokes, who had adopted an openly adversarial stance against his superior.
27
 
Beneath his complaints, Payne’s underlying problem was less about recalcitrant 
personalities—of which he himself was one—and more about governance. The colonial 
encounter led him to favor a structure of inequality that reserved preeminent authority for white 
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missionaries. Yet, it would be a mistake to characterize Payne as power mad. Like many race 
theorists of the day, his racial thinking was at odds with his theological convictions. 
 
Race Theory in Perspective 
American race theory provided a starting discourse that missionaries, consciously or 
subconsciously, deployed or deplored on the field. Since the eighteenth century, race and 
Americanness shared a close association. With his Letters from an American (1782), Michel-
Guillaume-Jean de Crèvecoeur defined “an American” as either European or possessing 
European ancestry. Although he permitted intermixture, he limited it to relations between fellow 
Europeans. A half decade later, Thomas Jefferson published his influential Notes on the State of 
Virginia (1787), which attracted wide readership over the next century because of his stature. In 
Notes Jefferson, though decrying the evils of slavery, deplored the ingrained inferiority of 
Negroes, who he alleged were below whites in their mental makeup. One could not simply chalk 
their deficiencies up to environmental reasons, Jefferson argued, because they had the 
surrounding white culture from which to glean lessons. The absence of Negro accomplishment, 
then, must signal innate inferiority, he concluded. Nature, not servitude, was the source for this 
so-called “distinction.” Jefferson was far more concerned that slavery had deleterious effects on 
whites, making them lazy, morally callous, and at risk for slave revolts. Although he denigrated 
Negro intellect and creativity, he—unlike some later polygenesists—considered the Negro to be 
a moral equal of whites and hence still part of the human race.
28
 
 Jefferson was not without critics. Samuel Stanhope Smith, a New England divine and 
Princeton professor, offered a rebuttal in 1791 with An Essay on the Causes of the Variety of 
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Complexion and Figure in the Human Species. Smith dismissed Jefferson’s complaint of blacks 
failing to learn from whites by pointing out that whites prevented blacks from social 
amalgamation, thereby hampering any advancement. To cultivate genius required freedom. Yet 
as historian Bruce Dain has noted, Smith still retained a hierarchical understanding of culture. He 
castigated the savagery and despotism in Africa, blaming them for Negroes’ “dullness.” The only 
African culture he respected was Abyssinia, whose occupants he believed had migrated from 
Asia. Heat, poverty, and “nastiness” all conspired to keep native Africans in savagery and sin. 
Blackness was an unfortunate, hereditary byproduct of living in a torrid climate. Unlike 
Jefferson, Smith thought the condition redeemable, though it required settling African Americans 
in a temperate area where they could live in unmolested freedom.
29
 
 Charles Caldwell, a medical professor at the University of Pennsylvania, challenged 
Smith’s environmentalism. He questioned the validity of Smith’s theory, arguing that climate 
alone could not account for racial difference. In 1830 Caldwell outlined his racial theories in 
Thoughts on the Original Unity of the Human Race. God had created four different species—
Caucasian, Mongolian, Indian, and African—in a hierarchal order with Caucasians at the top and 
Africans at the bottom. Predictably, civilization was the domain of Caucasians, whereas Africans 
wallowed in a cultural wasteland. Caldwell popularized two important strands of thought, 
polygenesis and phrenology. In his mind, the latter supported the former. Thus he observed that 
the skulls and genitalia of blacks resembled that of apes, which served as empirical evidence to 
refute the biblical account of monogenesis.
30
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 In many ways, Caldwell represented the logical extension of an earlier figure, Johann 
Friedrich Blumenbach of the University of Göttingen. A medical doctor himself, Blumenbach 
was a skull enthusiast, collecting and using cranium artifacts to extrapolate different 
classifications of humans. By studying skulls sent from various parts of the world, he derived 
five categories of races: Malayan, Caucasian, Mongolian, American, and Ethiopian. His division 
of races had lasting influence because not only was he the first to use the term Caucasian as 
shorthand for white, his geographic terms also corresponded to later color designations of brown, 
white, yellow, red, and black. As historian Nell Painter has shown, Blumenbach retooled his 
taxonomic system over a twenty year span to connote value based on aesthetic considerations. 
Hence, “[t]he white colour holds the first place, such as is that of most European peoples.” The 
skin and symmetry that Blumenbach extolled for their preeminent beauty Caldwell interpreted as 
signs of cultural and intellectual superiority. He would not be the last.
31
 
 In the same decade as Caldwell’s Thoughts, a Philadelphia physician and craniologist, 
Samuel Morton, published Crania Americana (1839), the opening salvo from a new school of 
ethnologists. Morton surpassed Blumenbach’s impressive stash of skulls with six hundred of his 
own, the largest collection in the world.
32
 Through precise measurements of the skulls, Morton 
surmised that the races had very real physical differences based on varying cranial sizes. His 
book included an appendix from a phrenologist colleague, George Combe, who argued that 
Morton’s research had scientific value to the extent that it assigned moral and mental worth to 
each race based on objective physical data. That hard data ended up being cranial capacity. 
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According to Morton’s numbers, Caucasians had the highest mean, and Ethiopians the lowest. 
Within the Caucasian race, he ranked the Teutonic “family”—made up of English, Germans, and 
Anglo-Americans—the best; while he rated the Negro family the worst, appraising American-
born Negroes even below their African brethren. Variant skull size, by itself benign, reinforced 
pernicious racial thinking, which linked it to innate mental ability: the smaller one’s brain, the 
more diminished one’s intellectual capacity. Caldwell seized on Morton’s numbers to reassert 
Anglo-Saxon superiority, crowing that “the inhabitants of the United States, being also of the 
best Caucasian stock . . . promise to be even more than the Britons of future ages.”33 Yet 
Caldwell’s polemics were tame compared to those from another lightning rod, Josiah Nott. 
 A surgeon out of Mobile, Nott crackled with supercilious hyperbole that elated supporters 
and enraged opponents. Intent on preserving slavery and white supremacy, he argued that 
Morton’s data conclusively proved that smaller Negro brains signified stunted moral and 
intellectual faculties. A study of “niggerology” would show that the peculiar institution merely 
reflects the natural scientific order, he proposed.
34
 In 1854 he teamed up with Egyptologist 
George Gliddon to write Types of Mankind, a 738-page tome that he hoped would demolish 
monogenesis and establish that races possessed fixed moral, physical, and intellectual 
differences. Negroes were savage and irredeemable, Types contended, and had been so since 
their discrete creation. Like Morton, Nott and Gliddon subscribed to a “family” of Caucasians, 
which the authors claimed were destined to civilize the earth. So long as Negroes recognized 
racial inequality, they could learn from their social superiors. It was manifest destiny at its 
whitest. 
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Payne was an environmentalist still shackled to the belief that whites possessed superior 
traits of civilized maturity and superintendence. Unlike scientific racists, he regarded blacks as 
full human beings capable of understanding the Gospel message and electing for Christian 
conversion. Their “degraded” environment did nothing to impair the potential for spiritual 
receptivity or growth, he believed. But his racialized prism could not admit the idea that blacks 
could be the intellectual equals of their white counterparts, at least in the short term. Payne was 
willing to concede inevitable equalization in time, but his timetable stretched decades if not a 
century or more. Black governance was out of the question, and he resented Stokes for aspiring 
to what he perceived, for the foreseeable future, to be the exclusive domain of whites. Payne was 
not far from Samuel Stanhope Smith, both of whom attributed black obtuseness to a nasty 
environment. Of course, the problem for Stokes was that he still found himself regarded as a 
dullard. 
Faced with this affront, Stokes refused to stand still. A so-called “ultra-protestant-
episcopalian,” he displayed a savvy combativeness that instantly put Payne on the defensive. 
Stokes charged Payne with violating church doctrine by utilizing laypersons to perform duties 
reserved only for ordained ministers (like administering the Eucharist). Thus Stokes could claim 
that he was the truer Episcopalian and raise questions about Payne’s fitness to lead. While 
acknowledging such a practice could be construed as “heresy,” Payne shifted attention back to 
Stokes, who “must be strangely ignorant of human nature” if he raised such a fine doctrinal 
distinction on the mission field. Furthermore, Payne repeated the spurious charge that Stokes did 
not believe in regeneration—because no one had heard him preach on the subject.35 In raising the 
specter of a false shepherd, Payne was laying grounds for seeking Stokes’s expulsion. Yet rather 
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than wait for a decree from the Foreign Committee, Payne fomented the congregation at Harper, 
Cape Palmas, to petition for Stokes’s ouster from their pulpit.36 And Payne went so far as to 
usurp Stokes’s Eucharist responsibilities, ostensibly because Stokes’s bouts with fever rendered 
him “almost unintelligible.”37 
The takeover was much messier than Payne portrayed. When Payne ordered Stokes to 
stop administering the sacraments, Stokes openly defied him by announcing that he would 
proceed with officiating communion. Consequently, Payne’s ally, Gov. John Russwurm, had 
boycotted Stokes and led congregants to an open-air service convened by Payne.
38
 Calling the 
rival event “astonishing” and “unheard of,” Stokes exercised literary license in condemning the 
event as a pagan ritual.
39
 It was a “Romish” mass during a “dark and gloomy night” that 
hearkened back to the “condition of the church, in the dark ages” replete with “glaring” torches 
and shadowy schismatics.
40
 A humiliated Stokes, shorn of authority, wrote the Foreign 
Committee to protest this blatant behavior, complaining: “If you had given me any power I could 
have, prevented all this, but you put me under M[r.] Payne, and he put me under these preachers! 
and allows them to do as they please with me.”41 By comparing Cape Palmas to Sodom, Stokes 
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insinuated that Payne was wicked and perverse, and Stokes requested a transfer to Monrovia, 
exclaiming: “For God sake do not send any minister here that has the least spark of integrity!”42 
By then, Stokes had exhausted all his tactics. His counter-petition against his critics had 
gone nowhere. And his argument that Payne was not even the same color as either himself or his 
parishioners had fallen on deaf ears. Stokes faced an uphill battle because after decades on the 
field, Payne commanded the loyalties of the church leadership. In September 1850 Payne 
requested formal permission to fire Stokes on the basis of “Mr. Stokes’ total unfitness to 
accomplish good in the ministry here or elsewhere.”43 Stokes saw the irreparability of the 
situation and chose to retreat to the capital city—on the pretext of recovering his failing health.44 
In reality, he intended to form his own church. This ambition had been evident as early as the 
summer, when he wrote the board: “Gentlemen Africa is large. Let me raise up a congregation in 
Monrovia creditable to the Board and the whole church.”45 The Foreign Committee, siding with 
Payne, declined to grant him permission to do so; and in fall 1850 they remanded him home to 
the United States. Bruised and weary from his battles with Payne, Stokes accused the committee 
of having “disrespected” him by repeatedly ignoring his plight. Declaring that God would judge 
between them, he compared their treatment to a lynching, “like hanging a man uncondemned.”46 
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The real issue was not his alleged insubordination, he contended, but Payne’s jealousy that 
colored people welcomed Stokes as their own. Recalcitrant to the end, he resolved to build his 
own church with “my people.”47 
 
Alexander Crummell and the Need for Christian Civilization 
Alexander Crummell’s 1853 arrival in Liberia gave Payne the necessary counterweight to 
combat Stokes’s appeal. Here was an educated, articulate black man who could serve as Stokes’s 
rival and Payne’s proxy. Within sixty days, Payne issued an enthusiastic endorsement for the 
missionary novice: “I am sure I shall express the sentiments of all who know him, when I say 
that the endowments of mind and spirit, with which the Giver of all grace has favored him, in 
connection with the fact that he is a colored man, eminently fit him to establish the Church, and 
to take charge of the institution in contemplation for this place.”48 Yet Crummell soon 
discovered what Stokes already knew: Payne had difficulty ceding authority to colored colonists. 
Cracks in the relationship formed within six months of Crummell’s arrival. The bishop’s 
racial views offended Crummell who, as a dinner guest of Payne’s, was on the receiving end of 
“the bitter vulgar remark—‘your race is the lowest, meanest, most lying, thievish, treacherous, 
back biting race on earth.’”49 Crummell had had experience with prejudiced bishops before with 
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the Onderdonk brothers in New England. Partly to escape prejudice such as theirs, he had studied 
abroad—which was ironic in that it was what caught Payne’s initial attention and respect. In his 
mind, Crummell had procured training “of the right sort,” an English education Payne esteemed 
as an essential qualification for any colonist missionary.
50
  
A chasm grew between the two men as they began to work together. As discussed 
previously, Payne preferred an Episcopalian high school and college be located in Monrovia—
which was one of the chief reasons Crummell had come to Liberia. Crummell made this goal 
plain, for Payne reported: “Mr. Crummell is most desirous that we establish on the beautiful site, 
on the extremity of Cape Mesurado, an Episcopal Institution.”51 This arrangement appealed to 
Crummell even more when Payne tabbed him to run the proposed school. But Payne’s first 
priority lay in Crummell’s establishing a thriving Episcopal church to compete with Eli Stokes 
for members and influence.
52
 By this time, Stokes had succeeded in erecting St. Paul’s Church in 
the capital.
53
 Tapping his European contacts again, he had raised enough money to finance a 
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small church which, to Payne’s chagrin, Stokes was advertising as Episcopalian. Consequently, 
Payne ordered Crummell to focus on the urgent task of building a church before proceeding to 
the school. 
Crummell’s architectural plans for Trinity Church were grandiose. Despite a small 
congregation size, he envisioned a sanctuary that would hold ten times the current number of 
parishioners. The church would boast a Gothic tower and cost the princely sum of $6,000 or 
$7,000.
54
 Not surprisingly, Crummell ran into opposition when he announced his preliminary 
estimate. Mixing contrition with tenacity, he wrote: “I regret that my proceedings relation to 
ch[urch] bldg have caused apprehensions on the part of the Com[mitt]ee in N.Y. But let me say 
that the estimate of 6 or 7000 dollars was carefully made; and they shall not reach up to $10,000 
if care, prudence, simplicity, after this intimation of yours, can prevent that wh[ich] appears to 
you extravagant.”55 Yet the structure he proposed did not match the size of his congregation. 
Payne observed that “the ordinary congregation of Trinity Ch[urch] Monrovia, has not yet 
reached one hundred, and while provision should be made for increase, a reduction of the 
dimensions of the church will still admit of this object.”56 More pointedly, Payne distanced 
himself from Crummell in stressing that the church building “was planned however, without 
consulting me.”57 Part of Payne’s disenchantment stemmed from what he considered Crummell’s 
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excessive housing allowance. The prior year, Crummell had leased a house in Monrovia for $175 
a year, an amount Payne thought “hardly justifiable under any circumstances.” In 1856 Payne 
severed Crummell’s $100 supplemental housing stipend.58 Perhaps the reduction derived from 
the bishop’s weariness with Crummell’s persistent overdrawing of his account, including a $300 
past due account from the previous year. Crummell attributed the overspending to his wife’s 
chronic illness, which necessitated accommodations outside of town. In truth, he had squabbled 
with two previous landlords about his housing arrangements, leading to his eviction and eventual 
settlement twenty-five miles outside Monrovia.
59
 Yet Payne acceded to Crummell’s expressed 
desire to live nearer to Monrovia. The bishop approved $500 for Crummell to repair a house at 
Cape Mesurado, but by year’s end, Crummell had abandoned the site for being too remote and 
inaccessible. Whether through indecision or fickleness, Crummell was taxing both Payne’s 
budget and patience. And building projects were the least of Payne’s concerns. Stokes was still 
drawing members away from Trinity Church. 
Stokes had devised an ingenious way to circumvent Payne’s authority. In the early 1850s 
he raised funds in Scotland for his church and petitioned to transfer it to the jurisdiction of the 
Bishop of Glasgow.
60
 Thus in submitting to the leadership of Anglican bishops abroad, he 
instigated competing claims of authority and obfuscated church canon. Payne charged Stokes 
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with plotting to seize control of the episcopate, but Payne found himself foiled because Stokes 
maintained support in both Rhode Island and Scotland.
61
 Even when an investigatory 
subcommittee recommended he be put on trial, Stokes’s home church in Rhode Island rejected 
the list of charges against him, contending that it had been tampered with, was a forgery, and 
hence did not count as an official affidavit.
62
 Payne wanted the Rhode Island diocese to either 
recall or suspend Stokes, but it declined on the grounds that collecting the facts from afar was too 
difficult and the charges too vague. Meanwhile, the Payne faction in Liberia tried to publish an 
official denunciation in the church journals, only to be rebuffed out of fear of libel.
63
 Stokes had 
his own publishing weapon, an editor at the Liberia Herald, who pushed for “a bishop of pure 
African blood—we recommend our beloved partner Rev. E. W. Stokes for this office.”64 
By 1860 Stokes found himself in an enviable position. Crummell was bleeding 
parishioners, who found him to be “imperious, self-willed, and so thoroughly English that he 
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cannot, and will not adapt himself to circumstances.”65 His congregation had dwindled to around 
twenty-five. Stokes could not help but deride his rivals’ ineptitude, noting that Trinity would not 
be finished “for some considerable time yet” and boasting that he could have built three churches 
with the monies invested in Trinity.
66
 But by 1861 Stokes was broke, and trickling donations 
forced him to beg Payne for financial aid.
67
 Of course, Payne declined to offer any help other 
than platitudes. Yet Stokes had another stratagem to deploy: if he could not win backing from a 
European or American bishop, he would recruit an African one. And he would not be going 
alone; Crummell was about to enlist with him. 
In the mid-1860s Crummell alarmed Payne when he flirted with joining the African 
independent church movement pushed by Stokes. The notion of independence did not mean that 
church leaders renounced denominational affiliation or missionary legacy. Instead, it referred to 
the conviction that church leadership be black and (white) missionary control be kept minimal.
68
 
Stokes had devised a plan in which the bishop in Sierra Leone would expand his authority by 
extending his current diocese or creating a new one in Monrovia, whereby Stokes could head a 
church under the auspices of the Anglican Church.
69
 He needed signatures for his petition, 
though, and recruited Crummell for help. Along with two other men, Stokes and Crummell 
declared the creation of the Diocese of Monrovia and published an open letter stating the reasons 
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for their actions. Rather than being a premature step, their declaration had been forced upon 
them, the quartet argued, by Bishop Payne’s deprival of their ecclesiastical rights. He had 
violated their civil liberties by proposing a forty-year “foreign” governance of Liberian churches. 
In their words: “We feel quite certain that if we had been in any territory of the United States, 
and had been white men[,] Bishop Payne would never have ventured to impose upon us a system 
which is unparalleled in all American Church History, for its exclusiveness, stringency, and 
crudeness.”70 In short, the black clerics objected to what they perceived as an illegal power grab 
by Payne, whose proposed system would rob them of pastoral autonomy by putting the whole of 
Liberia under his control.
71
 They accused him of prejudice, racism, and even “pro-slavery 
feelings” in trying to “break up and crush out our organization!”72 For a decade, Payne had 
intimidated and terrorized subordinates through insults and threats of firing, they charged. 
Enough was enough: “We can stand it no longer. In America such treatment was our lot, and we 
had to bear it; we cannot endure it here.”73 Payne blamed Crummell as the primary author of the 
document—it was not difficult to decipher because many of the quotes attributed to Payne could 
only have come from Crummell—and targeted him as the chief opponent. Payne’s alarm had 
grown into animosity. 
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Stokes lost faith in Crummell, too. Crummell harbored his own ambitions apart from 
Stokes. He floated the proposal that he be made bishop of any newly created diocese, even 
drafting a legislative bill that would have appointed him as the diocese head.
74
 He campaigned 
for the promotion by enticing undecided churchmen with the promise of paid positions should he 
become bishop. Stokes worked to undermine Crummell, leaving their alliance in tatters. Black 
solidarity went only so far. In any case, Stokes was dead within two years, felled by illness 
brought about by malnourishment. By then, Payne was on the verge of retiring, weary of the 
continued resistance to his leadership. And Crummell had worn out after battling his firing from 
Liberia College the previous year. Bereft of friends, he returned to the interior in order to preside 
over a startup church at the New Georgia settlement. 
 
Alexander Crummell and the Charge of Imperialism 
 Historian Tunde Adeleke has dismissed Crummell as no different than other “European 
racial classifiers” in that he internalized “Euroecentric cultural dichotomies” by extolling English 
civilization and lionizing its language.
75
 Because Crummell deplored an unregenerate Africa, 
Adeleke judges him to be an agent of Western imperialism. An examination of Crummell’s 
philosophy of missions paints a more complicated picture. 
 In 1895 Crummell laid out his mature thinking on the role of civilization in Christian 
evangelism. In an essay entitled “Civilization as a Collateral and Indispensable Instrumentality in 
Planting the Christian Church in Africa,” he argued that missionaries had two duties, one 
spiritual and the other social. He rejected the notion of a private, otherworldly faith that did 
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nothing to ameliorate the social conditions of the prospective converts. Both the “inner spiritual 
condition” and “external circumstances” needed the missionary’s attention, Crummell argued. 
He outlined three self-evident truths: (1) Christianity is not solely individualistic; (2) it is both 
celestial- and temporal-minded; and (3) it develops adherents to the “highest lev [sic] of 
humanity.” Therefore, he recommended that missionaries expand their efforts beyond the 
individual to the current “organisms of life,” or the larger spheres in which the person operated 
or lived—be it family, school, industry, or the state. As Crummell put it: “It seems then 
somewhat clear that, added on to the duty of personal salvation, comes the farther obligation of 
the reconstruction of society in its several forms.” Social renovation was to elevate people to 
“order, rectitude and excellence”—which would result in God’s glory and man’s progress. 
Crummell viewed progress as the union of godliness and culture, the lifting up of man both 
internally and externally. Sanctification extended not just to the spirit but also to the mind and 
body. The result would be civilization, or as Crummell defined it, “clarity of the mind from the 
dominion of false heathen ideas.” This word was a broad category that connoted a wide array of 
actions and behaviors—many of which the black missionary adjudged according to Anglocentric 
values and standards.
76
 
Although critics could complain that Crummell did little to indigenize Christianity, he 
was convinced that he was effecting evangelism through “high” culture. Two examples from the 
mission field demonstrate how he desired to use the church to accomplish uplift. First, he 
insisted that a church bell, rather than an existing cow’s horn, be installed to call people to 
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worship.
77
 Second, he requested an organ, which “will tend to elevate, and purify the simple life 
of our people.”78 Historian Mark M. Smith has noted that whites tended to cast black music as 
“rousing, emotional, but unrefined.”79 Listening to sounds from non-native instruments, 
Crummell believed, refined audiences. But beyond elevation, the experience purified the hearers. 
Whereas the gospel was justificatory for him, civilization was just as salvific, in the sense that it 
sanctified the believer. Contrary to what he wrote nearly thirty years later, social renovation 
represented spiritual growth for Crummell. The consequence, then, is a dichotomous distinction 
that is as binary as the black/white social distinction. From a doctrinal viewpoint, “heathenism” 
was not an intrinsic fallibility but a backward and infantile state that Episcopalians needed to 
overcome. Yet rather than one accepting Adeleke’s depiction of Crummell, one can see another 
perspective at work here. Crummell understood culture to be the great leveler, a tonic against 
racism and biological difference. High culture became not simply a social cohesive but a critique 
against racism in the West. Five years after leaving the mission field, he delivered a 
Thanksgiving homily in which he preached that “high and grand civilization” would lead to 
greatness and a “vital destiny” in human history. It would precede permanency and progress and 
hence “develop wonders for the world.”80 By demonstrating Negro superiority on the global 
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stage, Crummell hoped to prove the worthiness of the race. Yet eminence would not come 
without effort and for Crummell, it started with ecclesiastical admonition of family roles.
81
 
In his mission work Crummell placed an inordinate amount of stress on correct living. 
Behind the pulpit, he implored his congregation “to live properly as ‘colonists do.’”82 He grew 
elated when “discovering a two-storied red house going up” with separate bedrooms and parlor.83 
“This is the beginning,” he gushed, “but I hope next year to see a half dozen such houses in the 
settlement, and many other civilized improvements.”84 If edifices were important, so too were 
their occupants, especially wives and mothers.
85
 Families “need careful, punctual endeavors for 
the improvement of their temporal condition; to make the women tidy and domestic in their 
habits; to learn [sic] them to sew; and to teach them to read. Satisfied that this work must be 
done, or, otherwise these people will eventually relapse into utter nakedness and their old 
heathenisms.”86 Shepherding families was key to winning recognition for the race, but Crummell 
often felt he was losing the battle for civilization. He had started out with a clear goal: to uplift 
the race by having his followers imitate “high” culture.87 But their obstinancy in refusing to 
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abandon “low” culture ultimately frustrated Crummell and helped spur his departure from 
Liberia. 
 
Payne and the (Muted) Rebuke of White Paternalism 
With Crummell’s exit, Episcopalian missions could have sunk into oblivion. Payne had 
retired in the late sixties under a cloud. A Scottish-born missionary, Benjamin Hartley, wrote the 
board in January 1867 to complain about “a great lack of spirituality” and “few signs of real 
Christian fruit” at Payne’s station, which reduced mission work to “a mere farce.” Allegedly, 
Payne baptized and confirmed Africans indiscriminately, only a quarter of whom “intellegently 
[sic] knew what they were doing when admitted into the church.” As a result, Hartley judged, 
“The consequence of this superficiality is that nine tenths are not a whit more spiritual than their 
heathen neighbors, and soon have to be suspended.” Finding themselves cut off from mission 
supplies of food and clothing, the expelled natives soon offer a formal apology in order to have 
their rations restored. “For them,” a wry Hartley observed, “‘honesty is not the best policy.’” 
Even after graduating from the Cavalla school, natives “are hanging on the station as the easiest 
way to get a living” and “expect to be supported by the mission.” Perhaps most damning of all 
was Hartley’s assessment of Payne himself, whom he implied was running his own personal 
plantation: “All individuality must be sacrificed to the mind and will of Bp. & Mrs Payne if a 
missionary wants to live in peace . . . as every thing is carried out on Southern principles.”88 
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In response to Hartley’s philippic, the foreign missions committee launched an official 
investigation into the “want of harmony among the missionaries and teachers.”89 When 
interviewed, a retired colleague of Payne, Jacob Rambo, recalled “there was generally harmony 
among our whites” and “there was seldom a misunderstanding—more with natives or Liberians 
than whites.” Although student conduct was an issue, Rambo advised investigators to consider 
“the materials—heathen scholars—and in most cases plainly educated native and Liberian 
teachers” of whom “we could not expect so much.” Ironically, he cited Crummell’s model school 
at Mt. Vaughan as proof of Payne’s progress among natives. Whereas Rambo held Payne in high 
esteem, he took a dim view of Liberian clergy, who were “clannish, yea quite exclusive!” If 
anything, he believed them to be prejudiced against whites because “they have often smitten the 
hand that fed them, and stabbed the heart that loved them well.”90 A German-American 
missionary, John Duerr, highlighted the educational deficiencies of Payne’s students, stating that 
while students were “well stuffed” with learning, no one explained the meaning of what they 
were reading and reciting.
91
 He echoed Hartley in declaring that the real hindrance was “the 
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tyrannical rule of the Bp. & Mrs. Payne.”92 They were rude, petty, and querulous; and Duerr 
claimed their mismanagement drove him from Liberia after only nine months. A third retired 
missionary, Alice Colquhoun, blamed Payne’s wife for the low morale, describing her as 
“despotic . . . domineering, and dictatorial in the extreme.”93 And Payne shared “like tendencies” 
with his spouse by exhibiting “a haughty manner” and “the spirit of domination.”94 
The ensuing report noted the “peculiarity of temperament of Bishop Payne,” namely that 
he was insensitive to others and inconsistent in disciplining subordinates. Moreover, it blamed 
him for failing to develop “self-reliant & independent” native pupils, who it found were in a 
perpetual “state of dependence upon the mission” without basic crafts or skills.95 “While we 
abhor the doctrine of modern scepticism that civilization must precede Christianity,” the report 
read, “at the same time we hold that Christianity properly construed* does promote a healthful 
civilization—where this result is not manifested, therefore, we must reasonably infer some defect 
in the Christian training.” It speculated that part of the trouble grew from “Bishop Payne’s early 
training having been a southern man & [his having been] reared in a slave state.” In spite of 
Payne’s stated opposition to slavery, the report surmised he had been “unconsciously” influenced 
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it—which in turn explained the “defective training” of his students. The report concluded that he 
trailed “the spirit of the age” and alluded to the quandary of dealing with the longtime bishop. He 
was deemed unfit to be transferred to another mission field because investigators believed he was 
too set in his ways to reverse course and would only introduce the same problems to his new 
locale. So after rejecting his transfer, the report recommended he be retained and directed to 
encourage more self-sufficiency among the natives.
96
 The report did little to vindicate Payne, and 
the bishop likely sensed the board’s tepid support, because he retired from the mission field 
within a year after receiving the report. 
 
Samuel Ferguson and the Racial Experiment 
Fortunately for the Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society, a capable successor was 
waiting in the wings. In time Samuel David Ferguson became the esteemed bishop, an office that 
both Stokes and Crummell had coveted decades earlier. Ferguson possessed many of the 
characteristics that his predecessors did not; he was humble, deferential, and diplomatic. Yet 
beneath his calm exterior, he harbored a steadfast desire to prove himself an equal to his white 
superiors and colleagues. He clashed repeatedly with meddling whites as he enlarged his 
influence. 
Born in 1842 Ferguson emigrated to Liberia as a child, disembarking in Monrovia in 
1848. His early years were spent in Charleston, South Carolina, where his lifelong affiliation 
with the Episcopal Church happened almost by chance. As an infant, he had fallen ill and was on 
the verge of death. His Baptist father and Catholic mother grew concerned enough to seek out an 
Episcopalian bishop for baptism and last rites. Ferguson recovered, though, and attended school 
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in Charleston before his family uprooted for Liberia. They joined the settlement of Sinoe in the 
summer of 1848, but African fever struck down his father and two of his siblings. At this critical 
juncture, John Payne took a personal interest in the fatherless boy, who rapidly excelled in the 
mission school at Sinoe. Payne confirmed and ordained him; more importantly, Payne gave him 
his first teaching post at age twenty in the neighboring town of Cavalla. Their relationship was 
sufficiently close enough that he lived with the Paynes during his time there.
97
 
 By most accounts, Ferguson was exactly what the Foreign Committee was seeking. He 
exhibited initiative, loyalty, and perseverance. In 1868 Payne elevated him to the priesthood at 
Crummell’s church, Trinity Church in Monrovia. He shuttled between Cape Palmas and Mount 
Vaughan, preaching at St. Mark’s Church while serving as principal of Mount Vaughan’s high 
school. When Payne retired to the United States in 1869 after over thirty years of service, 
Ferguson began to assume more administrative duties and to supervise Episcopalian missionaries 
caught in the middle of a brewing war between Liberians and natives. He performed the basic 
duties of bishop while the Episcopal Church struggled to find a suitable replacement. The first 
bishop it sent died less than three months after landing in Liberia; the second, Charles Clifton 
Penick, did not arrive until 1877, eight years after Payne had relinquished his duties. As a result, 
Penick leaned heavily on Ferguson’s expertise. When Penick retired in 1883 Ferguson continued 
to juggle numerous administrative tasks. His faithful reports and stabilizing presence finally 
convinced the Foreign Committee to appoint him as Missionary Bishop to Cape Palmas and 
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Parts Adjacent in 1884, making him the first black Episcopal bishop in Africa.
98
 Under his 
bishoporate, Episcopalians flourished in Liberia. His charges more than doubled the mission 
outposts, doubled the students instructed, nearly quadrupled church communicants, and almost 
doubled the number of churches in the country. 
 Despite Ferguson’s achievements, he shared many of the same complaints as Crummell. 
Ferguson objected that—after assuming responsibilities for running the high school in addition to 
pastoring the church—his missionary salary had dropped 20 percent, leaving him with the 
unenviable choice of going into debt or neglecting his family’s needs. Although he believed 
missionaries were not to obsess about their pay, “[y]et the laborer is worthy of his hire.”99 
Another drawback was the mission board’s practice of paying their black missionaries in specie 
or drafts, rather than in U.S. dollars, because merchants devalued the former by 35 percent.
100
 
Although facing similar problems as Crummell, Ferguson handled the setbacks with more tact. 
In asking for higher pay on the basis of his eight years of experience and his raising a family, he 
added: “However, I must and will be guided by the better judgment of the Committee and . . . 
must be contented with whatever they see fit to allow me. I know they have not the means at 
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command which they have had in former years . . . .”101 Shrewd to be just subservient enough, 
Ferguson fared better than either Stokes or Crummell in pressing his claims. 
 In spite of his financial trials, Ferguson headed a relatively successful missions post. His 
school was one of the largest, educating seventy-one “scholars” in 1869; and his parish, St. 
Mark’s Church, was the first and most populous “African church” in the Episcopalian 
denomination, boasting 150 congregants by 1871.
102
 To alleviate his travel, he built a house 
nearer his ministry sites. But Ferguson ran afoul of his oversight committee, which objected to 
his living in a house of his own, rather than the designated mission house. He penned a respectful 
reply in which he pointed out that they had not objected three years earlier, when he had built the 
house in order to be closer to his parish. His letter’s tenor was a model of respectful decorum: 
Please do not charge me with dictating to your Committee. Far be it from me. With an 
humble conviction of the relations we sustain to each other, I have only expressed my 
opinion. I have been engaged in the service of the Committee for the last ten years, and 
ought at least to be considered as having an interest in the work. Not being here to see 
things as they are for yourselves, I am sure you will not entirely disregard the suggestions 
of those who see and know the true state of things.
103
 
 
Flexibility was a trademark of Ferguson early on. For instance, he was elated to report during 
Passion Week of 1873 that Methodists and Baptists had worshiped with his church in an 
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ecumenical service. His ecumenical practices continued because he commented in 1875 that “our 
[denominational] neighbors have learnt to regard us in a different light, for we were favored with 
frequent visits from them”—a revealing remark that the Episcopal organ was quick to excise in 
its printed version.
104
 A year later, the journal editor again omitted Ferguson’s description of a 
local revival in which “Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, Congregationalists and Episcopalians 
all united in supplicating a special outpouring of the Spirit.”105 In this case, ecumenism and 
emotionalism appear to have been the offenses for which Ferguson found himself censored. In 
later years he himself grew more doctrinaire, especially after ascending to the bishoporic, when 
he ordered a female teacher’s firing unless she left Methodism and joined the Episcopal 
church.
106
 But in his early years Ferguson emulated his mentor Payne by associating with those 
believers not strictly Episcopalian. 
 Ferguson was much more optimistic about natives’ abilities than his predecessors. While 
he could be critical of his wards, he was also careful to explain their shortcomings. So though 
one boy was “not at all a bright scholar,” his English language deficiency was due to “neglected” 
training as a child; likewise, while a native boy was “rather dull” and slow to comprehend an 
idea, he never forgot it once mastered. Unlike Payne, Ferguson perceived select natives as 
capable of leadership or “executive ability.”107 As bishop, he far surpassed his predecessors in 
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delegating authority to natives. For example, in 1889, 38 percent of his missionary staff were 
aborigine
108
: 
Position White Liberian Native 
Presbyter 1 6 4 
Deacon 0 2 1 
Candidate for Holy Orders 0 4 4 
Lay reader 0 10 2 
Physician 1 0 0 
Female teacher 1 7 1 
Male catechist or teacher 0 7 13 
Business agent 0 2 0 
Table 4. Numerical breakdown of the bishop’s missionary staff. 
 
At the same time, his sympathetic assessment of natives’ abilities contrasted with his gloomier 
take on their spiritual condition: “the poor Africans in the rear groping in the grosser darkness of 
heathenism.”109 In 1883 he posed in the below picture110—furthest right figure on the second-
floor balcony—and drew a connection between the girls’ orphan asylum and the government 
lighthouse on the left. He described the asylum as a “sanatarium” [sic] for the sick, and the 
lighthouse as a beacon piercing the “nocturnal darkness” of heathenism.111 As such, he implied 
that the Episcopal church and Liberian government worked alongside each other to rescue 
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Africans from themselves: “a fit emblem of what the institution is, or sh[oul]d be, to the poor 
Africans.”112 
 
        Figure 3. The Cape Palmas Orphan Asylum and the lighthouse. 
 
This negative evaluation carried over to cultural considerations, too. When a fellow missionary 
requested a transfer, he met with some “hesitation” on the oversight committee because the 
mission house was “built in the native style.” Before they would permit him to move, they 
required the natives construct a house appropriate “for a teacher.”113 Elsewhere, Ferguson 
described a “more comfortable” house as having raised floors and separate kitchens.114 Later 
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when he became bishop, Ferguson would insist that missionaries live separately from their native 
charges. 
 The outbreak of tribal war in the late 1870s provided an opening for the opportunistic 
Ferguson. In an unintentionally humorous account, he recounted traveling into the interior to 
evangelize a tribe preparing to go to war. Undaunted, he preached on death and the afterlife to a 
crowd of warriors with guns in hand. “They listened attentively and, I trust, were benefitted,” he 
reported. His second audience was less so. In the neighboring town, he changed his message to 
the battle between David and Goliath. “The Gospel was never listened to under more 
unfavorable circumstances,” as the warriors rushed away upon hearing two false alarms. As 
Ferguson noted dryly, they had found “a good excuse for withdrawing their attention altogether 
from me.” Just as he was closing in prayer, the enemy appeared, leading him to beat a hasty 
retreat for his canoe.
115
 
 Perhaps the presence of simmering hostilities, or potential for their bubbling over, 
influenced Ferguson to adopt a warlike mentality. In any case, he was prone to martial language. 
Thus he portrayed Payne as “a faithful worn-out soldier from the field of battle, with the 
satisfaction that a partial victory has been won, and the hope of final conquest.” Moreover, 
Ferguson referred to himself and his fellow Episcopalians as “the Church militant” fighting “on 
the battlefield, face to face with the enemy . . . advancing to a new position on territory claimed 
by him.”116 Even bishops, dignified as they were, became “battle-tested officers in waging 
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war.”117 Bellicosity was biblical because Ferguson received his “marching orders from the 
Captain of our Salvation” and was “ready to go forth to the conflict . . . until all this land shall be 
conquered and possessed for our King.”118 
 Personal tragedy struck Ferguson in 1878 when his wife died, leaving him the father of 
five motherless children. The widower took comfort in what he believed was God’s providence, 
but he was sorely tested by what happened next.
119
 Following his wife’s death, the mission board 
lowered its support for Ferguson, surmising that his church would make up any difference. A 
“perplexed” Ferguson wrote: “While you continue to recognize me as your missionary it cannot 
surely be a matter of indifference with you whether I eat or starve . . . .”120 He warned the 
mission board that he would be forced to seek secular employ. His superior’s response grated 
him particularly. Whereas Bishop Penick thought the missionary should earn the average salary 
of those to whom he was ministering, Ferguson found this rule to be impractical and ludicrous. “I 
don[’]t think such a theory has ever been put into practice anywhere. The cases of your own 
experience, which you mentioned, refer, I presume, to your pastoral connexion with self-
supporting churches. If to service you rendered some missionary organization your salary could 
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not have been rated according to such a principle . . . .”121 Under such a system, clerks and 
mechanics would earn more than a missionary, Ferguson protested. Penick refused to budge, 
rejoining: “The great work of Missions is not Church sustention but Church extension.” 
Furthermore, he rejected the notion that the missionary society should become the “equalizer of 
salaries.”122 An aggrieved Ferguson wrote the Foreign Committee in order to document what he 
considered the dismissive attitude of Penick, insinuating that the bishop had ignored logic in 
snubbing his request. Not until a half decade later did the committee raise his salary to an 
acceptable $1,600 a year—after he had remarried and sired an additional child.123 
 Ferguson’s run-in with Penick had not been his first clash with a white missionary nor 
would it be his last. Crummell’s nemesis had been Bishop John Payne (who ironically had been 
Ferguson’s benefactor). Ferguson found his fiercest rival in William Allan Fair, a white 
missionary who arrived in 1875 to run the Orphan Asylum at Cape Palmas. Fair and Ferguson 
began to feud almost immediately. As a white missionary, Fair was both headstrong and 
supercilious. In his first published comments after arriving in Cape Palmas, he noted: “I was very 
kindly received by the people everywhere I went. They were much pleased to see a white 
Missionary again.”124 Fair did not take orders well from Ferguson, either ignoring or disputing 
him. An early sign of discord arose when Fair declined to attend meetings over which Ferguson 
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presided. When Ferguson made his absences a matter of public record, Fair resorted to grudging 
excuses, offering vague and thinly veiled recusals such as: “I am sorry to say that I am not 
feeling very well today. In consequence of which, and for other reasons, I beg to be excused 
from attending the meeting.”125 Publicly, Ferguson attempted to soothe feelings with a formal 
resolution calling for Christian friendship and harmony while expressing regret for any 
“unpleasant feelings on the part of Rev. W. A. Fair, our foreign brother.”126 But privately, 
Ferguson blasted him for being hostile and arrogant: 
Rev. Mr. Fair has been pleased to assume an attitude antagonistic to our efforts. . . . He 
manifests no disposition whatever to advise with us on the subject [of mission work]. He 
is giving directions concerning the work—making changes, etc, without a word with any 
of us who have been in the field so long and are better acquainted with the workings of 
the mission than himself. But if he did this without censurring [sic] us for the part we are 
disposed to take in compliance with your instruction, it would not be so bad. He comes 
right down upon me with a charge of taking an advantage of him simply because I have 
done what you requested me to do. I have never been so completely astounded at the 
doings of an intelligent Christian man before.
127
 
 
Moreover, Ferguson indicated that he was up to the challenge and would not back down from 
Fair. “Be assured that we (I speak for the col[ore]d Brethren) will do all in our power to keep 
down strife on the one hand,” he vowed, “and preserve alive the little fire on the other.”128 The 
Foreign Committee sided with Ferguson and informed Fair he was at fault in the matter, leading 
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Fair to apologize to Ferguson for “misjudging” the situation.129 Whether due to incompetence or 
retaliation, Fair began to send substandard reports to Ferguson, who refused to sign off on them. 
As a consequence, Fair sent out subsequent correspondence—which Ferguson intercepted—
questioning his rival’s leadership. Ferguson had had enough. He wrote to the Foreign Committee 
requesting that he no longer be assigned to work with Fair, stating: “When a matter is entrusted 
to me in common with others you expect me to exercise my best judgment. Now if I cannot 
express my opinion without his being offended because it happens to differ from his own views, 
there is no good to be derived from our being associated.”130 One final flare up occurred a decade 
later when Fair refused to administer communion to one of Ferguson’s protégés, who was under 
suspicion of committing adultery. By then, Ferguson was bishop and overruled Fair.
131
 
Undeterred, Fair wrote to Ferguson, demanding to read the adultery trial proceedings for himself, 
because he considered them to be “uncanonical and unjust.”132 In other words, he was charging 
Ferguson with malfeasance in his presiding over the trial. Ferguson refused to turn over a record 
of the trial—which by then had been disposed of in his protégé’s favor—to Fair, whom he 
considered “the most litigious and disagreeable brother that I have ever had dealings with, white 
or colored.”133 
                                                          
129
 See S. D. Ferguson to S. D. Denison, Cape Palmas, Liberia, 21 November 1876, “Liberia Papers, 
Ferguson, Rev. S. D. 1876” folder, in Box 25 “Ferguson,” Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society—The Liberia 
Mission Papers RG 72, AEC. 
130
 S. D. Ferguson to J. Kimber, Cape Palmas, Liberia, 2 June 1877, “Liberia Papers, Ferguson, Rev. S. D. 
1877” folder, in Box 25 “Ferguson,” Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society—The Liberia Mission Papers RG 
72, AEC. 
131
 S. D. Ferguson to W. S. Langford, Harper, Liberia, 12 April 1886, “Liberia Papers, Ferguson, Bp., S. D. 
1886” folder, in Box 26, Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society—The Liberia Mission Papers RG 72, AEC. 
132
 S. D. Ferguson to W. A. Fair, Harper, Liberia, 11 July [188]7, “Liberia Papers, Ferguson, Bp., S. D. 
1887(5)” folder, in Box 26, Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society—The Liberia Mission Papers RG 72, AEC. 
133
 S. D. Ferguson to Wm. S. Langford, Cape Palmas, 11 July 1887, “Liberia Papers, Ferguson, Bp., S. D. 
1887(5)” folder, in Box 26, Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society—The Liberia Mission Papers RG 72, AEC. 
274 
 
Ferguson and Native Resistance 
 A more serious challenge to his authority came in the same year. In spring 1887, 
Ferguson reportedly confided to Penick that native rights were “being trodden upon,” with 
Liberians leveling “attempted taxation without protection or benefit.”134 Whether from true 
concern or malicious intent, Penick relayed Ferguson’s words to the U.S. State Department.135 
The Liberian government reacted unfavorably upon learning of the letters.
136
 Its secretary of 
state, E. I. Barclay, accused Ferguson of being “traitorous” with the intent of “thwarting . . . and 
paralyzing every effort which may be made for the pacification” of “insurgents.” Barclay 
demanded that Ferguson turn over all incriminating documents so that the government could 
review them for “disaffection and disloyalty.”137 Under the cloud of indictment, Ferguson 
described himself as “greatly astonished” at the “slander” against him.138 He professed 
unshakable “love” for the government and declared the natives’ action to have “no just cause.”139 
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The “rebellious tribe,” he declared, “must suffer all the ill consequences that may follow.”140 
Ferguson offered his own missionaries—who were “as deeply interested in the welfare of their 
people as Bishop Penick ever can be”—to counter the retired bishop’s personal views and “base 
misrepresentation” of him.141 Privately, Ferguson fumed at Penick’s “prejudice and disposition 
to do harm.”142 He suspected Penick of trying to undermine his position with the natives and 
sabotage the mission work under his administration.
143
 In Ferguson’s mind, Penick was “evil[ly] 
disposed” in trying to incite the “heathen” against him. Penick—realizing the danger he had put 
Ferguson in and perhaps hoping to avoid further attacks on his reputation—retracted his earlier 
statements about Ferguson.
144
 Without incriminating evidence or testimony, the Liberian 
secretary of state issued a commendation of Ferguson, praising his “correct” patriotism and 
loyalty.
145
 Thus Ferguson was able to clear his name and rectify the “entire misapprehension.”146 
But the saga left him less freedom to maneuver: he was now on record as supporting the 
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government over and against the natives. In September 1887 he had disseminated an open 
pastoral letter in which he intertwined the fate of missions and the government, stating that “the 
Mission will best succeed in its holy purposes by supporting and strengthening (morally) the 
government; and furthering the interest of the missionary enterprise by the government will have 
much to do with the prosperity and success of the nation.”147 Furthermore, he ordered that every 
church incorporate prayer for the Liberian president and “all in Civil Authority.”148 Thus his 
position hardened under the guise of doing one’s Christian duty. 
Natives certainly felt this way. According to Ferguson: “The king and chiefs are said to 
complain that instead of standing neutral as did the white missionaries when ‘desperate wars and 
contentions’ were going on, I ‘want to make my Episcopal work an instrument’ of enslaving 
them; and to [sic] state that since the Mission has been in their country they have ‘never 
witnessed any like act compared with this.’”149 In their minds, Ferguson’s alliance with the 
government was both unprecedented and unwelcome. They accused him of abandonment, styling 
themselves as “shepherdless Christians.”150 
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Continual comparisons to his white predecessors rankled Ferguson, who pointed out that 
prior white missionaries had very much intervened in intertribal conflicts by taking sides. If 
Bishop Payne had been in a similar predicament, he would have taken the exact same steps, 
Ferguson argued. After all, he was merely following the orders of the Foreign Committee, who 
had stated: “It is under the protection of that Government that the Missionary work is carried on, 
and every thing conspires to make the Committee the most anxious that nothing shall interfere 
with the growth and prosperity of said Government.”151 The lengthy defense of his actions—ten 
handwritten pages—suggests that Ferguson felt pressure to justify his stance as congruent to that 
of his white compatriots. 
Yet it is notable to whom Ferguson had not compared himself. He had justified his 
actions as in concord with Bishop Payne rather than Bishop John Auer, who had been Payne’s 
immediate successor. The Greboes had viewed Auer favorably because he had introduced trade 
teachers to the populace—a move that threatened to undermine colonists’ monopoly in skilled 
tradesmen. The German-born Auer had also expanded James Thompson’s Mount Vaughan 
mission school, envisioning it becoming a full-fledged institute. Finally, Auer was open to 
baptizing polygamists who expressed an otherwise genuine commitment to conversion. Greboes 
stood poised to embrace this forward-thinking bishop, but his unexpected illness and death in 
1874 fueled conspiracy theories among Greboes that the Liberians had had a hand in his 
expiration. The eventual elevation of Ferguson, for many Greboes, symbolized a depressing 
return to the status quo. 
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Ferguson further damaged his credibility when he claimed personal disinterest after 
swearing institutional allegiance to the Liberian government. “I am sure it cannot be proven that 
I have at any time shown partiality,” he huffed.152 He had, and publicly too. It was a fine line that 
Ferguson had to traverse: balancing patriotism with altruism. For many natives in Cavalla, he 
had failed to do so. He was no longer Missionary Bishop of Cape Palmas and Parts Adjacent; he 
was that “Liberian Bishop,” politicized and disowned. 
 
Episcopalians and the Ethnic “Problem” 
Natives had a long, troubled history with the colony and subsequent state of Liberia. 
Forty years earlier, Episcopalians had relied on the Liberian government and U.S. navy to open 
and secure the interior for missionaries. In 1843 Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, 
accompanied by then Governor J. J. Roberts, had led a squadron of U.S. Navy ships into Cape 
Palmas to suppress Kru and Grebo attacks on shipping vessels, which had resulted in the earlier 
loss of an American schooner and the execution of its crew. A white Episcopalian missionary, 
Launcelot Byrd Minor,
153
 had first reported the grisly details to the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, 
and he urged the secretary in no uncertain terms to retaliate
154: “It would ill become me, a 
minister of the Gospel, to recommend any unnecessary effusion of blood, but forbearance, in the 
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present case, would not be mercy. It would be evident to every one acquainted with the African 
character, that a severe example is now absolutely necessary, to secure any thing like respect and 
security to our countrymen trading on the coast.”155 Because innate “native hideousness” led to 
their “lawless violence” and “deception,” he recommended naval officers besiege and raze the 
hometown of the Bereby ringleaders.
156
 
The next year, Perry landed five hundred marines and sailors, who killed fifty natives and 
torched a dozen villages in Bereby.
157
 Overwhelmed by Perry’s forces, the natives sued for peace 
and signed a treaty that promised unfettered trade through their territories, ceded authority to the 
Liberian government to resolve disputes, and guaranteed the entrance and safety of missionaries 
to the region. The Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society of the Episcopal Church sent Perry 
hearty congratulations on the beneficial services he rendered on its behalf.
158
 In reply, Perry 
promised to expend “our utmost exertions to foster and protect the missionary 
establishments.”159 
Conflict flared over the next decades, leading to intermittent clashes in 1856, 1868, 1875, 
and 1893. The mid-1880s revolt, then, stood in a series of longstanding disputes between interior 
tribes and the coastal government. The difference in 1885, however, was that the native rebellion 
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threatened to tear apart the unity of the Episcopal mission force. Missionaries had not had to 
make this stark choice during the 1868 Grebo war, in which they had been regarded as neutrals 
and protected or ignored by natives on both sides of the conflict.
160
 Part of the reason for the 
altered treatment was the 1881–1882 passage of sedition legislation that proscribed treasonous 
acts against the Liberian government, which extended to aiding or abetting enemies of the state. 
The result was that it muzzled dissenters who feared running afoul of the stringent law. Unlike 
the 1860s, Ferguson faced the added problem of corralling a sizable congregation of indigent 
converts, some of whom actively assisted the rebellion. Their actions pressured other native 
Christians to take a stand—either for or against—in the dispute, and stressed an already 
precarious group to its breaking point. 
In 1885 Cavalla experienced upheaval as natives broke their accord with the Liberian 
government. According to the native missionary Martin Park Keda Valentine, tribal chiefs 
regarded the compact as a non-binding “friendship” that they were free to withdraw from at any 
time. A large contingent of natives regarded the “Republic of Liberia” to be a title “merely 
assumed by a few black people who came to Africa solely in their own interest, seeking to 
annihilate the native tribes, as the Americans had done the Indians.” The catalyst for revolt was 
the imposition of custom duties that prevented the tribes from trading freely with any foreign 
ship captain. When they prevented the Liberian duty collector from taking payments in Cavalla, 
the government in Monrovia levied a stiff fine of $200 and demanded they desist in their 
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unauthorized “interference.” It also took punitive action when it imprisoned their delegates to the 
Superintendent’s Council.161 Refusing to bow to unfair taxation, the Gbedewe (or Half Cavalla) 
tribe declared independence and appealed to the neighboring British and Sierra Leoneans to free 
them from “foreign rule.”162 
 Native missionaries faced a quandary. To follow their bishop required them to repudiate 
the rebellion, but to oppose it risked losing native backing and threatened to decimate years of 
work and alliance building.
163
 One native in particular, John Payne Valentine Kãẽ, had agonized 
for years over choosing the ministry over “home, homefolks & friends”—a sacrifice that had 
admittedly “retarded my progress in spiritual life.”164 When conflict broke out, he abandoned his 
educational post and moved to Taboo to reside with the rebels.
165
 He may have been one of the 
reported “renegade converts” who turned their backs on the missionaries and exhorted the 
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natives to emulate the Americans of 1776.
166
 They denounced the native missionaries as traitors 
and accused them of plotting the extermination of natives through alleged arson and poisonings. 
Natives forcibly repossessed the land, compelling the missionaries to flee to neighboring stations 
for safety and effectively ending the Church’s involvement at Cavalla. 
 Yet loyalist missionaries contributed to their own demise. Ferguson and Samuel 
Waddington Kla Seton, a Grebo missionary, seem to have acted as backdoor liaisons between the 
Liberian government and loyal chieftains.
167
 Two dozen native missionaries pledged their fealty 
to the Liberian President and spoke out against heathen greed (natives’ desire for control of their 
trade apparently being the basis for their charge). An unnamed native convert declared that 
“neither the Church of God, nor civilization will ever prosper in these regions until peace & 
perfect union [with Liberians] shall have been established.” Public pronouncements like this did 
little to endear the people to missionaries. Rhetorical skirmishes soon turned into the real thing. 
Martin P. K. Valentine—the principal of Hoffman Institute and Ferguson’s right-hand man—
suffered martyrdom in Liberians’ eyes, when he was killed while helping lead a hundred-man 
contingent of Cuttington College students and workers against the Gbedewe rebels.
168
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Samuel Seton and “Culture War” 
 Political affiliation was only one arena of contention. Cultural practices drew Ferguson 
into another unwanted debate. A fellow missionary, Samuel W. Kla Seton, broke from the 
church after being ousted for alleged “gross immorality” under Bishop Penick.169 Seton’s feud 
with Ferguson arose when the bishop declined to reinstate him.
170
 He wrote Ferguson to inform 
him that he was starting his own denomination, the African Evangelical Church of Christ, and 
would no longer “dapple with you in the human teachings.”171 Instead, Seton would engage in 
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divine teaching and would “endeavour to win you all to Christ and into his Church.”172 Most 
infuriating for Ferguson would have been the charge that the Episcopal Church had “departed 
from the pure word of God,” in favor of dogma, “opposing and jarring” creeds, and 
denominational discord. As for Seton, he would preach the unadulterated Gospel and recognize 
the authority of none but Jesus, “the only Head of His church.”173  
Ferguson was not amused. He had a printed tract circulated throughout the country, 
accusing Seton of being a false prophet, treacherous wolf, evil seducer, crafty deceiver, and 
damned heretic.
174
 Privately Ferguson feared not for “our civilized people” but for “the poor 
heathen and weak converts,” who he thought would be led astray by Seton’s new “sect” which 
allowed converts to continue the practice of polygamy.
175
 Monogamy was the “opposing and 
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jarring creed” that Seton had alluded to earlier, one that he found at odds with the societal norms 
of the natives.
176
 Polygamy was a controversial issue that prevented many natives from joining 
the Episcopalian ranks. In some ways, owning wives was similar to owning slaves in the 
antebellum Deep South of the United States. It bestowed status and wealth upon the practitioner, 
allowing him to procure more property and recognition in turn. For example, natives discouraged 
one tribal king from converting because monogamy was beneath his royal dignity and would 
mark him as a poor man who could not afford to purchase more wives. In contrast, Ferguson 
considered monogamy a “sure test” to identify the civilized from the heathen.177 He deployed a 
slippery slope argument, insisting that if he relented on polygamy, a host of other compromises 
would follow. Additionally, monogamy preserved the purity of the church because it “has 
undoubtedly kept many false professors out of the Church.”178 So unlike Seton, Ferguson 
regarded monogamy as “divine law” rather than a cultural trait or phenomenon.179 
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Admiring Seton’s emphasis on African autonomy, Edward Blyden deemed the bishopric 
appointment of Ferguson, “a mulatto,” to have been a mistake.180 Blyden opposed Ferguson 
because his version of Christianity trampled Blyden’s native instincts. Fifteen years earlier, 
Blyden had laid out his recommendations for mission work: 
Now, if I may venture to suggest advice to those attempting to open new missions among 
the people of this coast—especially the intelligent tribes—it would be, Respect and 
preserve the harmless instincts of the people. Let the boys and girls in the schools eat the 
simple, wholesome food of their country and with spoons only, as they sometimes do 
among their own people, or with their fingers as is more generally done, and let them eat 
this sitting on mats and not at a table with knives and forks and chairs. Let them wear the 
clothing of their country made in the best style, clean and neat, that in the process of their 
training they may not receive the impression that the external accidents of European 
civilization are the essentials of Christianity. . . . Then when they leave school and return 
to their people, they will have nothing to unlearn before they can be useful and secure the 
sympathy of their relatives and acquaintances.
181
 
 
Polygamy, for Blyden, was another benign instinct that in no way impinged on the essence of 
Christianity. If anything, he viewed the practice as salutary because it “protected and sheltered” 
women from prostitution and concubinage.
182
 Blyden pronounced Western-oriented missionaries 
to be misguided and their “theories” failures because missionaries misapplied them to Africa: 
“The marriage laws of Europe have proved disastrous in the Equatorial regions of the 
globe” because they obliterated the societal arrangements already in place.183 Combined, 
Blyden’s intellectual arguments and Seton’s religious teachings posed a stiff challenge to the 
bishop’s authority. 
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Ferguson’s fear proved justified, when tribal leaders favored the new doctrine and 
questioned why it was not being taught by Episcopalians.
184
 One missionary urged Ferguson “to 
examine all your Catechists and teachers, (especially Greboes) as to their soundness in this 
direction.”185 Ferguson concurred. He wanted converts to speak out against polygamy. Anything 
less was tantamount to betrayal and disloyalty. A professing Christian who did not side publicly 
with the church was not worthy of being called one because he deserted his church in the heat of 
battle.
186
 Behind the scenes, Ferguson promised a potential ally, Robert Gibson, that he would 
recommend him for a future appointment within the church—and hence the prospect for 
“pecuniary reward.”187 In reality, Ferguson was offering inducement for Gibson to switch sides, 
because Gibson was allowing Seton to conduct his church services in Gibson’s home. Ferguson 
exhibited a deft pragmatism in dealing with Gibson, who had earlier been suspended from 
Episcopalian work for cohabitating with a woman not his wife.
188
 Yet because he retained stature 
with the natives, Ferguson deemed him “able to exert a good influence” and “considerable 
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weight” on behalf of Episcopalians.189 Thus he lobbied successfully for Gibson’s 
reappointment.
190
 Yet the gambit had weakened Ferguson in the process, making him appear 
desperate and devious in his dealings with the natives. Never again would he be on the amicable 
terms he had once enjoyed as a young missionary on the field. Safeguarding himself against both 
white and black assaults, Bishop Ferguson grew conservative both in his doctrinal and racial 
outlook. 
 
William Wadé Harris and the Syncretistic Alternative 
It is difficult not to view Ferguson’s tenure as a missed opportunity. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in contrasting Ferguson to one of his subordinates, William Wadé Harris, who was 
one of Ferguson’s greatest triumphs—but also a living repudiation of his teachings. Born around 
1860 in a Grebo village five miles from Cape Palmas, Harris spent his childhood living in a 
religiously mixed household. His father was a practicing polygamist who observed the prevalent 
spiritism of the region; however, his mother was a convert to Methodism and sent him to live 
with her brother, a Grebo Methodist Episcopal preacher, at age twelve.
191
 Like his mother, Harris 
professed Christianity and underwent baptism before his eighteenth birthday. But the death of his 
mother left him again under his father’s control, from which he extricated himself by becoming a 
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kruboy, or crew member, on a British cargo ship trading along the coast.
192
 His travels exposed 
him to new religious experiences. While in Lagos, he worshiped at a Tinubu Wesleyan church 
known for its separatist doctrine. The English skills he gained from the British enabled him to 
return home and begin work as an intermediary between the Liberian government and Grebo 
tribes, rising to the eventual rank of official translator for all Maryland County. In 1885 he had 
garnered sufficient social standing to marry Rose Bedo Wlede Farr, the daughter of an 
Episcopalian native missionary.
193
 By 1888 he had adopted Episcopalianism and caught the 
attention of Bishop Ferguson, who confirmed him at Harper and hired him in 1892 to teach near 
his birth village, Half Graway. Years later, Harris confessed he had been motivated to convert 
out of a desire for monetary gain, but at the time, his allegiances appeared sincere, because 
Ferguson rapidly promoted him from catechist and assistant teacher to lay reader and pastor of a 
nearby Episcopal congregation. In 1903 Ferguson bestowed Harris with a coveted school 
headmastership. By now, Harris was at the pinnacle of societal success. He was a respected 
Episcopalian missionary with the outward accoutrements that attested to such status: a large 
family, an annual income over $400, and a two-storied brick house. Moreover, he was a Grebo 
who had achieved the same stature as Seton, recognized by both sacred and secular authorities as 
an influential leader and liaison between Greboes and Liberians.
194
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 This event is significant because it evinces that Harris had identified with Liberians in several ways. 
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But political developments soon forced Harris’s hand. Sometime in 1908 Harris switched 
from recognizing Monrovia’s jurisdiction to supporting the localized authority of chieftains. A 
near mutiny in Monrovia inspired him in February 1909 to replace the Liberian flag with the 
Union Jack at the Harper station. He declared his return to “heathenism,” promoted aborigine 
rule, and urged the establishment of a British protectorate to achieve this goal. By taking this 
public stand, Harris was siding with Blyden and Seton.
195
 Predictably Ferguson favored Liberian 
governance and promptly fired Harris for siding with his nemeses. Stripped of his translator and 
missionary duties, Harris was found guilty at trial and sentenced to a short stint in jail. 
Tensions reached a boiling point in 1910, resulting in a three-month war between 
Liberians and Greboes. A freed Harris had allegedly exhorted his compatriots to resist Liberian 
rule during the short-lived rebellion, which resulted in devastating defeat for the Greboes.
196
 A 
broken, disillusioned Harris found himself once more in jail. It was during this imprisonment he 
experienced a vision in which the angel Gabriel visited him and instructed him to abandon 
Western clothes and become an itinerant Christian prophet. Once released, Harris donned a 
simple white gown (reminiscent of the garb worn by local tribal priests) and traversed Liberia 
and Côte d’Ivoire barefoot. Accompanied by two women whom he called his wives,197 he 
preached a message of repentance, exhorting listeners to burn their fetish idols and be baptized. 
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Moreover, he claimed to be Elijah, the prophet of Jesus Christ, and the angel Gabriel his 
teacher.
198
  
Harris’s evangelistic methods were not Ferguson’s. He pronounced healing upon the sick, 
cast curses on Sabbath breakers, and battled local priests by pitting their fetish power against his 
own. Armed with a Bible, cross-shaped staff, a bowl of water, and a calabash—according to 
reports—he would visibly defeat the material objects wielded by his opponents. His gospel was 
much more permissive than Ferguson’s. Harris allowed native converts to practice polygamy, 
retain their pagan songs (by substituting God’s name in place of their local deities), and attend 
any church of their choosing. He elevated former witch doctors to his apostolate and insisted that 
God created different laws for black and white people. The result was that he baptized thousands 
of indigenous converts, who flocked to the self-proclaimed black Elijah and prophet of Jesus 
Christ. Establishing churches that observed a syncretistic intermixture of Christianity, Islam, and 
spiritualism, Harris’s followers—called “water people”—came to number over two hundred 
thousand in what became known as the Harrist Church, a separatist denomination that parted 
ways with Episcopalians over politics and theology. Although Harris counseled converts to look 
to the white man and his Bible for further teaching, Harris and his acolytes rejected a 
deculturative Christianity that voided their existing cultural mores and spiritual values. 
 
Conclusion 
 Despite cultural shortcomings, no one should discount the commitment of the 
missionaries in this chapter. John Payne, Eli Stokes, Alexander Crummell, and Samuel Ferguson 
sacrificed immensely while serving in Liberia. All experienced material deprivation, and most 
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felt the sting of losing loved ones to disease. Each of their legacies attests to noble actions. Payne 
spent over half his life ministering to black people in a land four thousand miles from his native 
Virginia. Stokes died prematurely after sharing his food until he had too little left on which to 
subsist. Crummell repeatedly housed and fed visitors in his home, even when he could ill afford 
the expense. And as bishop, Ferguson fought hard on behalf of his missionaries for equal pay. 
Even their rigid views can be somewhat explained. To a degree, the men’s cultural blinders arose 
from a well-meaning racial apologetic, namely, the belief that Africans were eminently able to 
participate in “civilization,” or the Western discourse of life. 
Yet, while their intentions were noble, their relations were often rocky. As progressive as 
Payne was compared to fellow white Virginians, he never could overcome his distrust of blacks 
in positions of authority. As perceptive as they were in detecting and challenging white 
supremacy, Stokes and Crummell failed to build a functional alliance because of petty jealousy 
and personal ambition. And despite his wish to act independently, Ferguson retreated in the face 
of white and native opposition. Cultural intolerance emerged from a common migratory problem. 
Black emigrants had lost their former identities and could not easily reproduce them in a new 
land. Christian nationalism offered the promise of being the basis for a new collective identity. 
More easily seen in retrospect, much of the difficulty arose from trying to build a nationality on 
top of a preexisting indigenous population, one that was ill-suited to embrace the wholesale 
importation of EuroAmerican Christianity. The defect many missionaries failed to see in the 
nineteenth century, sadly, was that the three Cs—Christianity, civilization, and commerce—need 
not be concomitant. The logic for connecting the trio was alluring: the gospel’s spread, 
transformed mores, and legitimate commerce could potentially stamp out the slave trade and 
commend the race. But by linking the three in a rigid EuroAmerican construct, missionaries 
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shackled their beneficiaries with an alien faith that neither invested nor conjoined aborigines to 
the budding nation. Imposing exploitive trade terms and a deculturative civilization, predictably, 
bred distrust of Episcopalians’ motives and their advertised faith. Blyden, Seton, and Harris 
pointed to an alternate course of action, one which assimilated African traditions and customs 
into the practice of Christianity. But doing so required shedding preconceived notions of 
morality, religiosity, and individual worth. It also obliged missionaries to revisit existing political 
and socioeconomic structures that barred natives from full societal and ecclesiastical 
participation. Neither of these developments happened in the nineteenth century. The exclusive 
focus was on erecting a Christian racial polity. And though racial harmony was to be the 
intended bedrock for an evangelically informed black nationality, Episcopalian missionaries 
found the foundation crumbled when cultural and ethnic concerns were injected into the debate 
over color.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
“The Love of Liberty Brought Us Here”: Visions 
of Freedom in the Age of Colonialism 
 
 
Vision is a luminous thing. It can lead and inspire if properly conceived and channeled. 
The best ones obtain buy-in by virtue of their ideas and ideals. The visionary also creates 
passionate followers by living an exemplary life that models the desired characteristics of his or 
her vision. For proponents of Liberian emigration, principles of justice, unity, and equality 
proliferated in their pre-migration writings. Prominent emigrationists espoused grand theories of 
republicanism, Christian evangelism, and free-trade capitalism, arguing that their adoption would 
elevate the African race to heights comparable to those in Europe and America. 
Yet vision is just as often a nebulous thing. Its job is to bind people together in a common 
cause, a collective goal for which people will suffer and sacrifice. Many emigrationist thinkers 
assumed that kin or ancestry would be the coagulant that would cohere disparate groups into a 
free citizenry and a black nationality. Biology is an amorphous adhesive, however, as most 
African Americans learned upon arriving in Africa. They had underestimated their own 
acculturation process, with many natives regarding them as thoroughly “white” in their thinking 
and living. Their preferred style of government, economics, and religion required introducing 
and persuading natives to adopt new systems of thought and values. 
In the wrong hands, vision can turn into a deleterious thing. Defective vision can lead to 
it being ineffective, even destructive. For instance, one sees limited vision in the motto and 
imagery on Liberia’s national seal: “The Love of Liberty Brought Us Here” refers exclusively to 
African-Americans emigrants, with a picture of a sailing ship offshore reinforcing their arrival. 
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    Figure 4. Liberia’s National Seal. 
 
 
The coat of arms—along with the 1847 Liberian flag, which was a striking replica of the United 
States’—underscores the privileged advantage Americoes had in defining the nation at its 
founding. If they were inviting natives to adopt their civic nationalism, they were also imposing 
the requirement that aborigines abandon cornerstones of their tribal identities. Here is the 
element of coercion that historians decry, that cause them to denounce the colonizing nature that 
was present in the nationalizing project. 
Nationalization is not wholly hegemonic, however. It is part suture, part sunderance. 
Liberians needed the loyalty of natives, or more precisely the right kind of natives, in order to 
project power, unity, and stability to the outside world. Therefore, “the interior question” was 
never whether to incorporate indigenes into the republic; it was an issue over how deeply to 
absorb them into the political, religious, and socioeconomic fabric of the country. 
Without a searing willingness to interrogate reality, vision can falter and slip into an 
incongruous thing. Early emigrationist thinkers articulated ethereal principles that highlighted 
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universal respect and brotherhood. Martin Delany’s patriotism stipulated not only love of 
country but also universal love for mankind. Edward Blyden equated republicanism to 
fraternalism, an “all for one and one for all” mentalité. Alexander Crummell likened the African 
race to a family, with all the obligatory affections and expectations that such a bond demands. 
But such noble ideals capsized once they crashed upon the rocky African coastline. No 
Liberian president could meet such lofty standards in their policies toward natives. Realpolitik 
won out, as Liberian politicians maneuvered to secure national stability through land, taxation, 
and trade protectionism. To understand nineteenth-century Liberia is to view everything through 
the lens of survival. As a nation, Liberia faced long odds. It wrestled with staggering weaknesses 
in financing, development, skilled workers, military preparedness, and international relevance. 
Liberia’s undercapitalization and U.S. noninterventionism led to lopsided contests with world 
powers France and Britain over trade and resources. Foreign incursion combined with a native 
insurrection had the potential to lead to the domination over and partition of Liberia. This was 
the nightmare scenario that Liberians sought to avoid. In protecting its territorial integrity and 
regional influence, Liberia overreached in land acquisition and trade restrictions, alienating 
important neighbors like the Kru and Greboes. 
Liberian society had its own tensions. Color, class, and county rivalries threatened to 
unravel the fragile unity that kept Liberia intact. Citizens could hardly expect to sustain a unified 
front against European powers or hostile natives if they could not maintain mutual security and 
ingrain a common identity. They needed a homogenized history, a shared vision about the past. 
Liberia perpetuated founding stories that spoke of unified resolve against an omnipresent 
enemy. These national fables celebrated the victors and castigated the losers. Americo-Liberians 
crafted a triumphalist myth, slanted to present colonists in the most noble and heroic hue, namely 
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defending their lives and liberty from physical extinction and cultural death. Conversely, it cast 
natives in the evilest light, as faceless savages who imperiled the good community. Thus, 
historical episodes were both self-referential and stereotypical. In fashioning such a narrative, 
Liberians laid the groundwork, both knowingly and unwittingly, for future exclusion of natives 
into the body politic. On one level, chronicle consonance was understandable. The call for 
cohesion in the face of security risks was a strategic maneuver to unite competing Liberian 
communities in service of a higher purpose, the collective safety of the country. 
Yet it seems many times as if the default position was to accept a false dichotomy 
between suppressing rights or risking revolt. This occurred even in Liberia’s treatment of allies. 
Whether returned Congoes or educated natives, at times they experienced a shabby, second-class 
reception. They lived in a liminal zone that counted them as friends of the republic but not 
entitled to full rights. The shared benefits of Liberia’s vision were adulterated, at best. 
A flawed doubleness lay at the heart of the Republic’s message. Liberians forged an 
alloyed appeal that melded the Christian, civilized, and commercial into what they hoped would 
be a compelling argument for black nationality. At the same time, they considered the tripartite 
amalgam to be a shield against heathen barbarity and continental backwardness. Commerce, 
civilization, and Christianity, then, were both enticement and entrenchment that allured and 
repelled. Yes, it was a bridge to societal inclusion, but it was a ribbon-thin plank guarded by 
vigilant gatekeepers. 
Liberia’s leaders were influential arbiters for entry into the republic, but they differed on 
the requirements for admission. President J. J. Roberts was willing to welcome aspirants who 
submitted to governmental authority and accepted a limited bill of rights. President James Payne 
took a hardline stance that shunted aside applicants without the requisite feelings of patriotism. 
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Crummell favored moral-minded supplicants who assented to top-down authority from Anglo-
centric institutions like the church. Samuel Ferguson and Edward Blyden were less doctrinaire, 
but Ferguson had to curb his advocacy for natives and Blyden had to flee the country after losing 
a power struggle with Americoes.  
In the highly charged decades of the seventies and eighties, Liberians were quick to vilify 
native sympathizers as collaborators and even conspirators. Missionaries attracted suspicion 
when they supported native grievances. The perceived perfidy of educated natives was another 
reason to suspect the patriotism of missionaries. Either their training was defective, or their 
loyalties were divided. It was dangerous to be seen as on the wrong side of the citizen/native 
divide, as Bishop Ferguson discovered when the secretary of state called him out for subversion. 
And disagreement could be hazardous to one’s health, as Blyden and President Edward Roye 
learned, when Americoes were quick to inflame public ire by bandying around words like traitor 
and saboteur. 
These reactions unearth two fault lines running below the surface. First, the use of 
divisive rhetoric to damage native sympathizers betrays the fragility of the new republic. In their 
struggle for independent survival, many leading Americo-Liberians chose ethnic unity over 
solidarity with natives. By equating national loyalty with group interests, Liberians promoted a 
selective patriotism that grew increasingly strident and polarizing: either one was an ardent 
supporter of Monrovia’s government and policies or one was a traitor. Their decision had 
deepening ramifications for societal boundaries and native-citizen relations, resulting in 
exclusion of natives, demonization of dissenters, contraction of native rights, foreignization of 
obstreperous tribes, and calcification of social hierarchies that cemented Americo elites at the 
top. Second, the concern over native intentions exposes the simmering mistrust harbored toward 
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domestic tribes. The underlying premise, and hence the overriding fear, was that natives were a 
potential fifth column, willing to sell out the country to the French or British. That natives would 
side with foreign outsiders, ironically, was just another sign for Liberians that aborigines were 
not yet ready for full inclusion and participation in representative government. The perverse 
logic seems to be that if they truly understood and embraced the principles of liberty, they would 
rally around the republican values inherent in Liberian rule, rather than kowtow to the oversight 
of monarchal governments. So if they are pledging loyalty to France or Britain, the reasoning 
goes, would not that signal natives’ inadequate judgment, if not downright gullibility? Of course, 
Liberians conveniently overlooked the underlying reason for natives’ wanting to escape 
Monrovia’s sphere of influence in the first place, namely the broken promises and ill treatment at 
the hands of African-American immigrants. 
Not enough Americo-Liberians were asking hard questions. What is the reality 
confronting our neighbors if they surrender their land, if they must pay taxes, if they are forced 
to abandon traditional beliefs and social practices? What are the economic consequences if they 
lose direct access to European trade? What are the political ramifications of denying them 
legislative representation? How have we Liberians contributed to intertribal enmities and 
educational disparities? And more importantly, what steps are we going to take in order to ensure 
equal opportunities for citizens and natives alike? Failure to answer these types of probing 
questions led to an observable breach between principles and praxis. 
An imposed vision can prove a rancorous thing. Lack of introspection was due to 
Americo hubris that stemmed from both self-aggrandizement and self-interest. As well 
intentioned as emigrants might have been, they harbored an abiding sense that their way of life 
was the best one to protect and promulgate. What was good for Americo-Liberians was good for 
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Africa, a premise they confirmed as much in deeds as in words. This blinkered belief sowed 
doubts over whether Liberians had any genuine interest in correcting economic imbalances, 
creating shared narratives, or establishing collaborative rule. Finance, remembrance, and 
governance became zero-sum activities, sites for bitter contestation that extended into the next 
century and beyond. 
An exacting vision can feel like an onerous thing, while a conflicting vision can result in 
a dichotomous thing. The Americo-Liberian appeal lay in continual progress, that upward 
mobility would enhance the lives of the civilized practitioner. But ascent was arduous and, even 
with a benefactor, the social climb could take decades. One of John Payne’s native protégés had 
to wait three years before he was able to assume an entry-level teaching position and achieve a 
stable income. Furthermore, civilized natives could find the destination unfulfilling, an uneasy 
coexistence between their public personas and their authentic selves. One prominent native, 
William Wadé Harris, spent twenty-five years of his Christian life climbing the socioeconomic 
ladder before he renounced it all—his job, house, and family—and returned to his native roots. 
Like other Westernized natives, Harris had found himself in an anomalous space, neither 
governing nor governed. Despite his school headship, his social standing was precarious, 
dependent on staying in the good graces of his Liberian sponsor, Bishop Samuel Ferguson. In the 
end, Harris found the Liberian vision to be discordant with his spirit and values. Whichever path 
he followed, he experienced dissonance. Either he was a cultural sellout because his lifestyle no 
longer mirrored that of fellow indigenes, or he was a political traitor when his loyalties reverted 
to his Grebo people. Unable to reconcile his two cacophonous identities, he sank into a 
depression that only lifted after he had witnessed an angelic vision that called for him to be an 
itinerant prophet free from either Episcopalism or African spiritualism. 
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Faith-based vision has the danger of backsliding into a sanctimonious thing. The doctrine 
of universalism lent itself to the idea that savages were salvageable civics. In this construct, 
native recipients—in spite of their waywardness—had the capacity to (1) understand and 
embrace the Gospel and (2) join an existing community of believers. Yet the conviction that they 
were savages spoke to the chauvinism inherent in Liberians’ hamartiology, namely that 
aborigines’ entire pre-conversion state was degenerate. Ministers like Crummell substituted 
civilizationalism for sanctification; Christian profession meant not only a conversion of hearts 
but also a revolution in habits, as converts found that creed and conduct were inextricably 
intertwined. Although this tenet is neither heterodox nor extrabiblical,
1
 where Americo-Liberians 
erred was in making those works culturally particularistic. For example, Crummell preached the 
familial relationship between Liberian and native. It is a shrewd argument that laid the grounds 
to expand civic entitlements to all the country’s inhabitants. Yet it also unintentionally put 
natives at a disadvantage, because Crummell’s prescribed family is a specific recipe that calls for 
adding essential ingredients like monogamy, patriarchy, and gender norms—which he considers 
concomitant with Christianity. Thus, their absence marks moral deficiency, implies cultural 
inferiority, and contributes to ethnic typecasting. 
Over time, though, vision can grow into a polymorphous thing. While vision can fail 
when imposed from the top down, it works best when people claim the vision for themselves, 
refitting it to meet their needs, whatever those may be. This is what historians like Tunde 
Adeleke miss when they excoriate missionaries as indistinct actors in the colonial theater of 
domination. According to this script, missionaries are the lead soldiers who advance the 
imperialist agenda of their parent country on unsuspecting natives. Such a depiction is little more 
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than caricature in Liberia. Individual missionaries like Crummell and Eli Stokes battled white 
prejudice, ecclesiastical politics, and Americo preeminence. Harris and Samuel Waddington Kla 
Seton were two converts who broke from the Episcopal church in their pursuit of a middle way, 
one which prohibited deculturative religion while preserving the core of salvation. In doing so, 
they restructured relations with missionaries, refashioned the gospel message to one agreeable on 
their terms, and redeployed it to spheres independent of Americo-Liberian control. They also 
appropriated the symbolic referents of faith: Harris’s Bible book became a physical talisman 
against “devil doctors,” while Ferguson’s monogamy-as-litmus-test-of-conversion became a 
false doctrine in Seton’s construction. Whatever Liberians’ original vision, it became something 
different in the hands of natives. 
 Historians have reached varying conclusions on nineteenth-century Liberia, based on 
how they have perceived the legitimacy or consistency of its vision for society. James Ciment 
argues that Liberians placed survival above their ideals.
2
 This work tries to show that though 
survival was a pressing concern, it was not necessarily antithetical to ideals, which were 
themselves variegated and open for debate. Liberians engaged in broad discussions about the 
composition and direction of the country, cognizant that national ideals would help ensure the 
republic’s survival. The scope and timing of inclusion was up for grabs, but the vision was 
always to graft natives onto the budding nation. James Smith contends that conflict was 
inevitable between Africans and black Americans because of divergent cultural habits.
3
 This 
work examines some of the theoretical tenets underpinning the culture habits of black Americans 
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and how they translated in practice. Conflict was not foreordained, because early emigrants and 
citizens disagreed among themselves over how to treat natives. The eventual dominance of 
Americo-Liberians has led some historians to write fixed oppositional narratives that fail to 
acknowledge the volatility and malleability of native policy in the first decades of nationhood. 
Tom Shick views Liberia as the coexistence of two unequal societies, one settler and the other 
African. The faith-based, missionizing sentiments of the ACS, he judges, were never enough to 
guide Liberians, who needed more tangible support in the form of money and immigrants. Bereft 
of dollars and numbers, Liberia was left with only an ideological commitment to racial 
nationalism. The country entered into loose alliances with African tribes in order to expand or 
strengthen its geographical claims, but without currency or critical mass, it was unable to entice 
or coerce integration of the two disparate societies.
4
 This work complements Shick by analyzing 
the ideological components of that nationalism. Despite pre-migration rhetoric of racial unity, 
Liberian nationalists made surprisingly few appeals to race after independence. It was commerce 
and Christian-influenced civilization that became the overriding mantras for black nationality. 
The perpetuation of inequality was a sad reality in nineteenth-century Liberia. Yet Schick glosses 
over the gradated inequities depending on the subgroup. To speak of two disparate societies fails 
to delineate the group dynamics within society. Liberian society contained a hodgepodge of 
peoples: affluent Americoes, ambitious artisans, manumitted slaves, recovered Congoes, 
Barbadian immigrants, and educated natives. And “uncivilized” tribes had their own factions, as 
the Greboes and Half-Greboes demonstrate. A binary social construct leads to an adversarial 
history that lacks nuance. Amos Beyan attributes unequal social relations to colonizationist-
introduced paternalism, which entrenched coastal elites as Liberia’s sole powerbrokers. 
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According to Beyan, these merchant-princes imitated slaveholders in the American Colonization 
Society with their practice of class stratification and labor exploitation. Furthermore, he blames 
the ACS of failing to provide enough capital for Liberians to withstand the larger “world 
economic system,” by which he means a Marxian system that divides the haves from the have 
nots, thereby producing simultaneous wealth and poverty in society.
5
 Yet Liberians inherited 
Western modes of thought that went well beyond a simple Marxist issue of who owned the 
means of production. Moreover, they faced pressure unique to their race. White missionary 
agencies burdened Liberians with a redemption mandate to save Africa from heathenism, while 
white colonizationists saddled them with an exculpatory mentality to prove themselves as worthy 
representatives of their race. Tensions besides paternalism also factored into societal inequality. 
Identification and disassociation, benevolence and self-interest, cultural profusion and economic 
protectionism—these were other competing impulses prevalent in the first half-century of the 
republic’s existence. Does inequality rise to the level of imperialism? Claude Clegg believes it 
does, asserting that African-American liberty came at the expense of Africans. The price of 
freedom for Liberians was a corresponding deprivation of lives, land, and liberty for natives. It 
was an exploitive regime in the same vein as European colonial powers, Clegg concludes, 
marked by both dispossession and oppression.
6
 Clegg is not altogether wrong in his assessment. 
A combined ward and apprenticeship system proved ripe for abuse. Land expropriation was 
deplorable, too, though it comes with a caveat: what Clegg tends to minimize is the geopolitical 
pressures that drove Liberians to extend their territory. Bracketed by both the French and 
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English, Liberia felt it had to assert control over coastal regions or lose them forever to the 
colonial powers. The threat was real and imminent. Foreign traders and colonial governors were 
strident in urging their home governments to force land concessions from Liberia. Britain and 
France were relentless in issuing ultimatums in order to compel Liberia’s submission to trade 
demands and territorial reduction. Under the specter of subjugation and partition, Liberians felt 
they had no choice but issue a preemptive, clarion claim of ownership, regardless of whether 
indigenous tribes agreed with the validity of their control. Caree Banton argues that Liberian 
expansionism differs from European colonialism in its motivation; concerns over national 
sovereignty and black respectability informed their attempts to regulate and cultivate natives.  
She identifies four distinct groups within Liberian society—African Americans, West Indians, 
recaptives, and natives—who projected conflicting visions of what Liberia could become: in her 
words, “a site of freedom, a colony, and a pan-African republic.”7 For Americo-Liberians, 
commerce, civilization, and Christianity were the building blocks for realizing any of these 
visions. They formed the basic materials for a patchwork people stitched together by an 
imagined, racial kinship. But in practice, they came to act as value-laden signifiers that divided 
Americoes from the other groups. Rather than bind the country together, commerce, civilization, 
and Christianity became the rift that eventually unraveled the social fabric of Liberia in the late 
twentieth century. Because Americo-Liberians failed to build a common vision for a shared 
future, they struggled to form a cohesive nation-state where the dream of liberty extended to all 
people. 
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